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a b s t r a c t
C hapter One in tr o d u c e s  th e  th e o r y  which i s  based  on th r e e  p o s t u la t e s  
d e r iv e d  from pragm atism , em p ir ic ism  and c o n s tr u c t iv is m  r e s p e c t iv e l y .
V e r id ic a l  p e r c e p tio n  i s  se en  n o t  a s  r e f l e c t i n g  th e  w orld  a s  i t  i s  in  some 
a b s o lu te  s e n s e ,  bu t a s  p r o v id in g  g u id a n ce  fo r  e f f e c t i v e  a c t io n .  I t s  a b i l i t y  
t o  do t h i s  depends on i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  t o  a c t i v e  to u c h . T h is r e l i e s  on t h e i r  
b oth  b e in g  form s o f  a c t i o n ,  i . e .  th e y  b oth  c o n s is t -  o f  th e  o p e r a tio n  o f  
schem ata  w hich  a re  a t  th e  same tim e  g u id e s  fo r  a c t io n  and p ro d u cts  o f  a c t io n .
The secon d  c h a p te r  r e l a t e s  how v e r s io n s  o f  t h e s e  p o s t u la t e s  have  
a p p ea red , s in g ly  or in  p a ir s ,  in  p r e v io u s  t h e o r ie s  e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  o f  
B e r k e le y , Kant and S c h e l l i n g .  Then MacMurray's th e o r y , which em bodies a l l  
t h r e e  p o s t u la t e s  i s  in tr o d u c e d , and t h i s  i s  r e la t e d  t o  G ib so n 's  th e o r y .
C hapter Three d i s c u s s e s  how th e  key term s in  th e  th e o r y , im age, p e r c e p t  
and schem a, r e l a t e  t o  each  o th e r , and a rg u es  th a t  th e y  a l l  r e f l e c t  th e  same 
u n d e r ly in g  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p r o c e s s .
C hapter Four i s  con cern ed  w ith  dynamic and h e d o n ic  a s p e c t s ,  w ith  how 
p e r c e p t io n  r e l a t e s  t o  m o tiv a t io n  and f e e l i n g .  C o n v en tio n a l t h e o r ie s  s e e  
any such  r e la t io n  a s  e x te r n a l  and a s s o c i a t i v e  w h ile  th o s e  based  on p e r c e p tu a l  
schem ata a l lo w  b o th  e x te r n a l  and in t e r n a l  r e la t io n s h ip s .  These d i f f e r e n t  
s o r t s  o f  th e o r y  a r e  compared over  a w ide range o f  phenomena. Only th e  
schem ata based  th e o ry  can a cco u n t f o r  a l l  o f  th e  e f f e c t s .
C hapter F iv e  s t a r t s  w ith  a b r i e f  d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e  l im i t a t io n s  o f  in fo rm a ­
t io n  p r o c e s s in g  ty p e  m odels in  p s y c h o lo g y , p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith  r e s p e c t  t o  dynam ic 
a s p e c t s .  With t h e s e  in  m ind, i t  g o e s  on t o  d e v e lo p  an o u t l in e  m odel. 
C o n str u c tio n  o f  th e  m odel draws a t t e n t io n  t o  two im p ortan t a s p e c t s  o f  th e  
th e o r y ;  th e  n o n - e x is t e n c e  o f  a pure m e tr ic  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  and th e  la c k  o f  
any s t r i c t l y  c a u s a l  l in k  betw een r e t i n a l  s t im u la t io n  and p e r c e p t .
C hapter S ix  exam in es th e  l i t e r a t u r e  on a d a p ta t io n  to  o p t ic a l  
r e -a r r a n g e m e n t, a c o n v e n ie n t  method o f  s tu d y in g  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een  
s p a t i a l  v i s i o n  and tou ch  which i s  a key i s s u e  fo r  th e  th e o r y . W hile th e  
c r u c i a l  re -a rra n g em en t i s  im p o s s ib le  t o  p rod u ce , th e  w e ig h t o f  e v id en ce  
su p p o r ts  th e  s o r t  o f  th e o r y  proposed  h e r e .
C hapter Seven com pares t h i s  th e o r y  t o  o t h e r s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  N e i s s e r ’ s ,  
and s u g g e s t s  o th e r  a r e a s  o f  a p p l ic a t io n  in  both  v i s u a l  p e r c e p tio n  and g e n e r a l  
p s y c h o lo g y .
I d e c la r e  th a t  th is  t h e s is  i s  ny own unaided work, ex cep t where 
due acknowledgement i s  made, and has n ot been subm itted  fo r  any degree  
or diplom a in  any o th e r  u n iv e r s i t y .
John M Gray
I  c e r t i f y  th a t th is  t h e s i s  i s  th e  unaided work o f  th e  author, 
excep t where due acknowledgement has been  made, and has n ot been  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.
1.1 INTRODUCTION.
The major q u e stio n  in  philosophy i s  the nature o f  
the re la tio n sh ip  between our c o g n it io n  and the w orld , 
and the major q u e stio n  in  psychology i s  ju s t  how th is  
r e la t io n sh ip  i s  r e a l i s e d .  These a r e , o f cou rse , h ig h ly  
in ter-dependent q u e s t io n s , but the focus here i s  on the  
l a t t e r .  Any attem pt to answer t h is  q u estio n  must a llow  
hope of p la u s ib le  answers to other major q u estio n s  in  
psychology -  about the r o le  of our f e e l in g s ,  emotions 
and m otivations in  our m ental economy, and about th e ir  
r e la t io n sh ip s  to  the world or our thoughts about the 
w orld . Not a l l  re ce n t a ttem pts have allowed t h i s .
The o u t lin e  of one s o r t  of answer i s  g iv en  in  
modern in form ation  p r o cess in g  type th e o r ie s  of c o g n it iv e  
psychology. These have been a p p lied  both to co n cep tu a l, 
v e r b a lise a b le  thought and to p e rcep tio n . In the form er, 
the concern i s  w ith  r e p r e se n ta tio n ;  w ith the s tr u c tu r e s  
w ith  which we rep resen t the world to  o u r se lv e s , and w ith  
the procedures w ith  which we m anipulate th ese  
s tr u c tu r e s . îiuch work has been devoted to the  
understanding of t h is  s o r t  of p rocess in  adu lt humans. 
Thanks to M ille r  (1 9 5 6 ), Bruner e t  a l  (1 9 5 6 ), New ell e t  
a l (1958) and many o th e r s , we know a,good d ea l about
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th is  a sp ect of c o g n it iv e  p sych o logy . However, a l l  th is  
knowledge turns out to  be s tr a n g e ly  d isa p p o in tin g . What 
i s  e x p lic a te d  in  such th e o r ie s  i s  not mind, not any so r t  
of human, or even an im al, mind, but som ething l ik e  the 
ru les  fo r  perform ing some ra th er  sim ple symbol 
m anipulation ta sk s which humans fin d  u s e fu l to  perform, 
or som ething l ik e  the r u le s  fo r  b u ild in g  or programming 
a computer to do them. Part of the reason  fo r  t h is  i s  a 
la ck  of concern fo r  em otional and m o tiv a tio n a l fa c to r s  
in  c o g n it io n . I f  they are con sid ered  a t a l l ,  they are 
treated  as som ething e x t r in s ic ,  som ething a f fe c t in g  the 
natural course of even ts from the o u ts id e . More 
r e c e n t ly , some p rogress has been made. This l e v e l  o f  
mainly sym bolic o p era tion s i s  la r g e ly  a s o c ia l  
phenomenon, and cannot be understood apart from the  
s o c ia l  and l in g u i s t i c  forms which embody i t .  This is  
in c r e a s in g ly  a p p r e c ia te d . R ecen tly , in te r e s t  has been 
d irected  to the in f lu e n c e  of language on co g n itio n  ( e .g .  
Clark, 1969; Meyer, 1970). U n fortu n ately , th is  
development was v i t ia t e d  by the f a c t  th a t language was 
treated  more or l e s s  as an i n t e l l e c t u a l  s k i l l ,  a form of 
c o g n it io n . T his was la r g e ly  due to the in flu e n c e  of 
Chomsky (1957 , 1965). N e v er th e le ss  work i s  now being  
done on the s o c ia l  and in te r p e r so n a l b a s is  o f c o g n it iv e  
ta sk s , e s p e c ia l ly  in  developm ental psychology  
(Donaldson, 1978), However, the work i s  s t i l l  la r g e ly  
s t r u c t u r a l i s t  in  o r ie n ta t io n  in  th a t i t  reduces those  
s o c ia l  and in te r p e r so n a l fa c to r s  to r e p r e se n ta tio n s ,  
com petences, and the l i k e .  Thus, a lthough som ething i s
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gained , in  th a t the range of phenomena stu d ied  i s  
widened to in c lu d e  e s s e n t i a l ,  h ith e r to  Ignored a sp ec ts  
of c o g n it iv e  fu n c tio n in g , som ething i s  a lso  l o s t ,  in  
that the nature of th ese  w ider a sp e c ts , i s  m isconstrued  
hy th e ir  being a ss im ila te d  to the m erely i n t e l l e c t u a l .
The s i t u a t io n  i s  much the same in  p e r c ep tio n .  
Although i t  i s  much and w e ll  s tu d ie d  in  p sych o logy , i t  
i s  not stu d ied  in  r e la t io n  to any wider th e o r ie s  of 
p sy c h o lo g ic a l fu n c tio n in g . I t  i s  o f te n  concerned w ith  
more p er ip h era l p r o c e sse s , and o f te n  concerned w ith  the  
a n a ly s is  of very  a b stra c t fu n c tio n s  and p ro cesses  which 
operate in  i s o la t io n  in  on ly  the most a r t i f i c i a l  of 
laboratory  s i t u a t io n s .  The in te r - r e la t io n s h ip s  both  
w ith in  v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n , and between i t  and other  
asp ects of p sy c h o lo g ic a l fu n c tio n in g  are ign ored . Yet 
these are not only  in te r e s t in g  in  th e ir  own r ig h t ,  but 
can i llu m in a te  our understanding o f the p ro cesses  and 
fu n ction s stu d ied  in  la b ora tory  exp erim en ts. Perhaps the  
answer i s  to ask , n ot about knowledge and 
r e p r e se n ta tio n , but about c o n sc io u sn ess  o f the w orld . 
Since con sc iou sn ess  i s  the t o t a l i t y  of our r e la t io n sh ip  
w ith  the w orld , t h is  o f fe r s  g r e a te r  promise o f the so r t  
of in te g r a t io n  of c o g n it iv e  and o r e c t ic  a sp ects  of  
mental fu n c tio n in g  which i s  req u ired .
Now, what fo llo w s i s  a d is c u ss io n  of variou s  
th eo r ies  of v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n . This i s  a v a s t  f i e l d ,  of 
cou rse, in c lu d in g  p ercep tion  of space and form, of
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persons and personal or em otional e x p r e ss io n , of 
sym bolic form s, and so on . H ere, the primary fo cu s i s  on 
th ose  most b a s ic  a sp e c ts  of form and o b je c t  p e r c e p tio n . 
However, s in c e  the concern  i s  to  provide the b a s is  o f a 
theory capable of being In teg ra ted  w ith  the whole range 
of human m ental fu n c t io n s , the d is c u s s io n  w i l l  embrace 
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e se  a sp e c ts  of p e r c ep tio n  and 
emotion and m o tiv a tio n . S ince person p ercep tio n  i s  not 
in c lu d ed , th e  concern w ith  em otion and i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  
to p ercep tio n  w i l l  le a n  h e a v i ly  on a e s t h e t ic s .  However, 
i t  i s  hoped to show th a t  t h is  a sp ec t of the study of 
v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n , u s u a lly  con sid ered  p e r ip h e r a l, i s  in  
f a c t  b a s ic  to an understanding o f the r e la t io n s h ip  
between p ercep tio n  and th e  w orld .
To beg in  w ith , we s h a l l  be d is c u ss in g  the th e o r ie s  
of p h ilosop h ers l ik e  B erk e ley , Hume and Kant. These are  
th e o r ie s  about how humans fu n c tio n , in  t h is  ca se  about 
how humans fu n c tio n  when they s e e  t h is  or t h a t .  They are 
couched in  more or l e s s  ord inary lan gu age, but they  are 
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s , in  the se n se  th a t ex p er im en ta lly  
t e s ta b le  hypotheses in  o p e r a tio n a l terms are d erived  
from them. Most s c ie n c e  has t h is  dual a sp ect where 
ordinary exp erien ce  i s  d escrib ed  and qu estion ed  f i r s t l y  
in  more or l e s s  ordinary language, but the search  fo r  
answers req u ires a s p e c ia l ,  t e c h n ic a l language, norm ally  
used to d escr ib e  a s p e c ia l  s o r t  of r e s t r ic t e d  or 
a r t i f i c i a l  s i t u a t io n .  In s o c ia l  s c ie n c e , the two h a lv es  
of the e n te r p r ise  have norm ally been conducted by
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d if fe r e n t  p eo p le . The ordinary language th e o r ie s  have 
g en era lly  been in tend ed  to account fo r  ra th er  broad 
a sp ects  of our e x p e r ie n c e , and have g e n e r a lly  been  
accorded the s ta tu s  of p h ilo so p h y . However, th a t should  
not d isg u ise  th e  f a c t  th a t what i s  a t is s u e  h ere are  
q u e stio n s , not of m etap h ysics, but of t h e o r e t ic a l  
p sychology.
N e v e r th e le ss , we s h a l l _ have to concern o u r se lv e s
w ith  two r e la te d  m etap h ysica l assum ptions which we s h a l l
c a l l  in te l le c tu a l is m  and dualism . These are im portant
because they have b e d e v ille d  a l l  attem pts to  g iv e  a
coherent account o f e x p e r ie n c e . By in t e l le c t u a l i s m  i s
meant the b e l ie f  th a t human knowledge i s  o r ig in a l ly  and
ty p ic a l ly  in t e l l e c t u a l  ra th er  than p r a c t ic a l .  I t  thus
in clu d es a l l  the t r a d it io n a l  e p iste m o lo g ie s  of
r a tio n a lism , em p iricism , and id e a lis m , and i s  opposed by
<Xjpragmatism. Dualism is ^ c o r o lla r y  o f t h i s ,  and i s  used in  
a ra th er  w ider sen se  than u s u a l. In t h is  s e n s e , i t  
ap p lies  not on ly  to  t r a d it io n a l  d u a l is t  p h ilo s o p h ie s ,  
but to many forms of id e a lism  and m a ter ia lism . I t  r e fe r s  
to any theory which se e s  co n sc io u sn ess  p r im arily  as 
something sep a ra te  from i t s  o b je c t s .  I n t e l l e c t u a l i s t
th e o r ie s , whether e m p ir ic is t  or r a t i o n a l i s t ,  are always 
d u a l i s t ,  and always d u a l is t  in  two s e n s e s . F i r s t l y ,  they  
separate o f f  mind from i t s  o b je c t s , whether th ese
o b jec ts  are seen  as products of the mind, or as e x te r n a l  
o b jects  or in f lu e n c e s . This r a is e s  a l l  s o r ts  o f problems 
in  ep istem ology, v ir t u a l ly  in s o lu b le  w ith in  t h is  frame
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of r e fe r en ce . M oreover, d erived  from t h is  s u b je c t-o b je c t  
dualism , th ere  i s  a second s p l i t  beween co g n itio n  and 
em otion, em otion becoming a s o r t  of In ter n a l o b jec t of 
our c o g n it io n , ra th er  l ik e  a s o r t  of m ental s e n sa t io n .  
This r a is e s  p a r a l l e l ,  e q u a lly  in s o lu b le  problems in  
p sychology. In p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  a llow s fo r  on ly  ex tern a l  
r e la t io n s  between co n ten ts  of c o n sc io u sn e ss .
I t  has become a common theme among p h ilosop h ers  
th at t r a d it io n a l  w estern  attem pts to understand  
psychology and ep istem ology  have su ffe r e d  from an over ly  
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  approach. For exam ple, Kenny (1963) 
sa y s ,
"Research has been centred  on the contem plative rather  
than the a c t iv e ,  on th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  ra th er  than the 
em otional and v o lu n tary  a sp e c ts  of human l i f e .  Knowledge 
rath er than a c t io n , b e l i e f  ra th er  than em otion, the  
i n t e l l e c t  ra th er  than the w i l l  have been the ce n tr a l  
to p ics  of p h ilo so p h ic a l concern ."
Accompanying t h i s ,  perhaps as a ca u se , perhaps as a 
consequence, has been an overinvestm ent in  a p a r t ic u la r  
metaphor which se es  v is io n  as the prototype of a l l  
p ercep tio n , indeed of a l l  know ledge. Macmurray (1957) 
puts i t  so;
" P h ilo sop h ica l th e o r ie s  of p ercep tio n  . , tend to  be 
th eo r ies  of v is u a l  p e r c e p tio n . They.assume the primacy
7
of v is io n  . . . proceed as i f  a true theory of v is u a l
p ercep tion  w i l l  app ly , rautatis m utandis, to a l l  o th er  
modes of sense*-perception .
. v is io n  has tended to  be the model upon which a l l  
knowledge i s  construed . Thought i s  taken to  be inner  
v i s io n .  R e f le c t io n  i s  'c o n te m p la t io n '. The b a s is  of 
sc ie n c e  i s  'o b s e r v a t io n ', and the s c i e n t i s t  i s  'th e  
o b se r v e r '. When we ta lk  o f the world which we d isc o v e r  
in  sen se-p ercep tio n  as th e  world which we come to  
understand by r e f l e c t iv e  thought, we u su a lly  mean the  
world th a t we se e  when we use our eye ."
Among p s y c h o lo g is t s , as among p h ilo so p h e rs , t h is  concern  
w ith r e c e p t iv ity  as the b a s is  o f knowledge has led  to  
error not only  in  th e o r ie s  o f p e r c ep tio n , but in  
th e o r ie s  of wider a sp e c ts  of m ental fu n c tio n in g . The 
need i s  fo r  a theory u sin g  a c t io n  as th e  primary mode of 
r e la t in g  to  the w orld . The focu s w i l l  be on v is u a l  
p ercep tio n , but th ere  w i l l  always be a concern to  r e la t e  
to  more general i s s u e s , to  provide an o u t lin e  of a 
theory of how we know th e  w orld , and o f how t h is  knowing 
i s  a part of our t o t a l  r e la t io n  w ith  the w orld .
Of course, a c tio n  based th e o r ie s  of con sc iou sn ess  
have th e ir  p recu rsors . B erk e ley , fo r  in s ta n c e , c o r r e c t ly  
in tu ite d  that the con n ection  between our exp erien ce  of 
space and the world depended on b o d ily  a c t io n .  
U n fortunately , h is  d u a l i s t ic  assum ptions led  him in to
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am biguity and in c o h e re n c e . Kant, fo llo w in g  Hume, 
challenged  th ese  a ssu m p tion s. He showed th a t th ere  were 
p r e - co n d itio n s  fo r  e x p e r ie n c e , any e x p e r ie n c e , and th a t  
th ese  took the form o f  an a c t iv e ,  o r g a n is in g  s u b je c t .  
However, the a c t iv i t y  In vo lved  was purely  m en ta l, and as 
long as t h is  remained th e  c a s e ,  there was no obvious 
connection  between p e r c e p tio n  and r e a l i t y .  The o n ly  way 
of so lv in g  t h is  i s  by r e je c t in g  the d u a l i s t i c  
assum ption. T his can be done e it h e r  by absorbing the  
world in to  the mind, as in  F ic h te ,  or by absorbing mind 
in to  the w orld , as in  S c h e l l in g . However, even in  
S c h e llin g  the con n ectio n  rem ains somewhat ten uous, fo r  
although he r e l i e s  on a c t i v i t y ,  i t  i s  of a ra th er  
refin ed  s o r t ,  a r t i s t i c  c r e a t io n  and a p p r e c ia t io n .  
Macmurray c lo s e s  the c ir c le  by firm ly  ro o tin g  
im agination in  our c a p a c ity  fo r  b o d ily  a c t io n .
The n o tion  supported h ere  i s  th a t co n sc io u sn ess  i s  
prim arily  c o n sc io u sn ess  o f doing som ething ra th er  than 
of something happening to  u s .  No-one d e n ie s , o f co u rse , 
th a t we are co n sc io u s  of both what we do and what i s  
done to u s , but the tendency has been to  a s s im ila te  
a c tiv e  con sc iou sn ess  to  r e c e p t iv e .  We do som ething, and 
we know th at we do i t  on ly  because of s p e c ia l  in te r n a l  
sen ses l ik e  k in e s t h e s i s .  T his was D e sc a r te s ' p o s i t io n ,  
and a lso  th at of e m p ir ic is t s  such as Locke, B erkeley and 
Hume. The n otion  stem s from , and i s  g iven  some support 
by, the fa c t  th a t we sometim es do th in gs w ithout being  
aware of what we are d o in g . ÏVhen we turn our a t te n t io n .
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or have i t  drawn, to  our a c t io n s , we may even be 
su rp r ised . The im p lic a t io n  would seem to be th at in  
order to  know what we are about, we have to  observe  
o u r se lv e s , d ir e c t  our sen ses  inward. Of cou rse , t h is  i s  
not pure r e c e p t iv it y ;  d ir e c t in g  the a t te n t io n  i s  a form  
of a c t io n . N e v e r th e le s s , here we have a c t iv e  
con sc iou sn ess reduced to a form of p ercep tu a l
co n sc io u sn ess . There a re , o f c o u r se , many other s ta t e s  
or co n ten ts  or a sp e c ts  of co n sc io u sn ess; m o tiv es , 
em otions, f e e l in g s ,  and so on . They are seen , in  th ese  
terms, as o b je c ts  o f  inward g a ze .
I t  might be doubted, how ever, that we need to
monitor o u r se lv e s  to know what we are doing or f e e l in g ,  
to see  i f  we are happy, fo r  in s ta n c e . Indeed, i t  m ight 
be doubted th a t i f  we are n e d r o t ic a l ly  checking up on 
ou rse lves a l l  the tim e, we cou ld  be happy. Another
p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  th a t we have s e v e r a l c o n sc io u sn e sse s , 
sensory , m otor, m otive , em o tio n a l, and so on . In
p a r t ic u la r , we might be aware s u b je c t iv e ly  when we are  
p e r c e iv in g , and aware a g e n t iv e ly  when we are a c tin g  
d e l ib e r a te ly . One d i f f i c u l t y  i s  in  sep aratin g  out 
p ercep tion  and a c t io n , fo r  a c t io n  req u ires some minimal 
knowledge of the w orld . The o th er  p o s s ib i l i t y ,  the one 
adopted h ere , i s  to  a s s im ila te  p ercep tu al to a c t iv e  
c o n sc io u sn ess .
This d octr in e  of the primacy of a c tio n  can be
understood in  a number of s e n s e s . F ir s t ly  i t  can be
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taken to mean th a t v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n  i s  fo r  a c t io n , th a t  
i t  i s  the p ercep tio n  of a fford an ces fo r  a c t io n .  
Secondly, i t  can be taken as s ig n if y in g  th a t p ercep tio n  
i s  r e la ted  to a c tio n  in  the se n se  th a t i t  depends on 
ordinary, in strum enta l a c t io n . That i s  to  say th a t  
p ercep tion  d ev e lo p s, o n t o g e n e t ic a l ly , p h y lo g e n e t ic a lly , 
or both , and th a t t h is  developm ent i s  guided by
co n tin g en c ies  which, whether o p era tin g  through lea rn in g  
by re-in forcem en t or n atu ra l s e l e c t i o n ,  are dependent on 
instrum ental a c tio n  in  th e  e x te r n a l w orld . T h ird ly , i t  
can be taken as s ig n ify in g  th a t p e rcep tio n  i s  a s o r t  of 
a c tio n , th a t the exp er ien ce  o f se e in g  an o b je c t i s  the  
conscious c o r r e la te  of a p a r t ic u la r  type of a c tio n
supported by th a t o b je c t .
Perhaps no-one would want to deny the f i r s t
p r o p o s itio n . A fter  a l l ,  we are used to  th ink ing of a l l  
our fu n c tio n s , m ental and p h y s ic a l,  as being fo r  
som ething, and u lt im a te ly  fo r  s u r v iv a l .  I t  might be 
argued th at t h is  says noth in g  about the op era tion  of 
p e rcep tio n . An automaton could  be con stru cted  w ith  some 
so r t  of sensory system  to  guide i t s  a c t io n s . Whatever 
the system , i t  might co n stru c t and use any one o f a
number of d if f e r e n t  s o r ts  o f r e p r e se n ta tio n ,  
tw o-dim ensional im ages, o u t l in e  maps, sym bolic
d e s c r ip t io n s . I t  might produce th e  same behaviour u sin g  
any of th e s e . Here we have som ething for  a c t io n , but the  
nature of the operations i t  perform s i s  not r e la te d  to 
a c tio n . However, i f  we drop th e  n o tio n  of an im age, or a
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p ercep t, or some oth er  c o n ten t, we g e t  a t o t a l ly  
d if fè r e n t  p e r s p e c t iv e . Of co u r se , i t  s t i l l  says noth ing  
about the hardw are, or the type o f energy carry in g  the  
in form ation , but i t  does say something about the nature  
of the in form ation  e x tr a c te d . S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  i t  says th a t  
i t  i s  s p a t ia l ,  and s p a t ia l  in  a sen se  th a t a llow s fo r  no 
argument as to  whether space i s  v i s u a l ,  t a c tu a l ,  or r e a l  
and independent. S p a t ia l in  th is  co n tex t means about the
so r t  of space in  which our bod ies move and a c t .  Of
cou rse , th e  system  was not c o n str u c te d , i t  develop ed ,
and i t  developed dependent on a c t io n . Perhaps, again  
th is  can be taken fo r  gran ted . But i t s  im p lica tio n s  are  
enormous, and not f u l ly  in teg ra ted  in to  p ercep tu a l
theory . Here a g a in , i t  i s  not the case  th at an a b str a c t  
problem about th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  of l ig h t  i s  s o lv e d .  
Simply, l i g h t  i s  tr a n s la te d  in to  fu tu re  touch , and touch  
i s  not THOUGHT to  be r e a l or tru e or o b j e c t iv e ,  fo r  i t  
i s  not a s e n s a t io n , but the exp er ien ce  o f r e s is ta n c e .  
Taken to g e th e r , the f i r s t  two p r o p o s itio n s  imply :
(1 )  There i s  no su r p lu s , no over-refin em en t in  
p ercep tio n , though th ere  may be in  any p ercep t.
(2 ) There i s  no proxim al stim u lu s to be processed  
fu rth er  to g iv e  an image; the la y o u t of space i s  
perceived  d ir e c t ly .
(3) P la n s, la y o u ts  and o b je c ts  are p erceived  in  terms of 
th e ir  a fford an ces fo r  a c t io n . What i s  seen  i s  what they
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w i l l  a c tu a lly  a ffo r d  to  a c t iv e  touch or instrum ental 
a c tio n .
(4 ) There i s  no problem of e p is te m ic  markers. P ercep tion  
i s  c e r ta in , a lthough not always c o r r e c t , and the laws 
r e la t in g  i t  to  th e  world are th e  laws o f p h ysics and not 
of thought.
However, th ere  i s  a gap h e r e , as long as v is io n  i s  
trea ted  as a kind of r e c e p t iv i t y .  We s t i l l  have the
problem of the r e la t io n s h ip  between the e f f e c t s  of
\r e f le c te d  l ig h t  on the mind or on the nervous system ,
and th ese  r e p r ese n ta tio n s  fo r  a c t io n .  This i s  the same 
problem as B erkeley ta c k le d , but our so lu tio n  i s  
somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  The th ird  p r o p o s it io n  in v o lv es  an 
a c t iv e ,  c o n s tr u c t iv e  model of p e r c e p tio n , something l ik e  
N e is se r 's  (1967) a n a ly s is  by sy n th e s is  m odel, or h is  
(1976) p ercep tu a l c y c le  m odel. However, th at i s  not 
enough to c lo s e  the gap, fo r  N e is s e r 's  models s t i l l  
require a lo w est l e v e l  o f p e rcep tio n  or se n sa tio n  whose 
appearance in  co n sc io u sn ess  i s  sim ply a m atter of 
r e g is t r a t io n .  I t  i s  not enough to say th at p ercep tion  
in vo lves  a c t io n , or th a t the f in a l  p ercep tion  i s  the
r e s u lt  of a c tio n s  on or tr a n sa c t io n s  w ith  the w orld. The
process o f p ercep tio n  i s  the a p p lic a t io n  of p ercep tual 
schemata d ir e c t ly  on the w orld . The a c t iv a t io n  of 
p a r tic u la r  schemata g iv es  r i s e  to  an image which i s  
experienced as e ith e r  a p ercep t or a mental image, 
depending on c ircu m stan ces. This b e l ie f  that the
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op era tion s o f schemata d ir e c t ly  on the world provide the  
b a s is  fo r  a l l  forms of co n sc io u sn ess  of the world might 
be c a lle d  'r a d ic a l  c o n s tu c t iv is m '. The key term in  the 
theory i s  'sch em a '. A schema i s  a p lan  fo r  a c tio n  which 
i s ,  a t  the same tim e , an in t u i t io n  or p r e sen ta tio n  of 
som ething in v o lv e d  in  the a c t io n  as o b je c t , g o a l,  
ground, or in stru m en t. A lt e r n a t iv e ly ,  i t  might be 
d efin ed  as an organised  s e t  of a c t i v i t i e s  which 
presuppose a d e f in i t e  world and thereby bring i t  in to  
b ein g .
Im agination , and p ercep tio n  as a s p e c ia l  case of 
im ag in ation , are in tim a te ly  r e la te d  to  a c t io n . The 
nature of t h is  l in k  i s  th a t im agin ation  c o n stru c ts  the  
world in  order th a t we may a c t in  i t .  The world we see  
i s  the world we act in ,  not because we se e  i t  as i t  i s  
and our a c tio n s  must conform to  i t ,  but because we must 
act in  c e r ta in  ways, and we se e  a world adjusted  to  
th ese  w ays.
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CHAPTER 2 î HISTORICAL.
2 .1  RATIONALISM and EMPIRICISM.
Epistem ology asks j u s t  what i s  the r e la t io n s h ip  
between our p e r c ep tio n  and the w orld , psychology asks 
how th is  r e la t io n s h ip , however c h a r a c te r ise d , i s  
r e a lis e d  in  terms of mechanism or p r o c e ss , and 
developm ental p sychology asks how the r e la t io n s h ip  i s  
e s ta b lish e d  in  the l i f e  o f the in d iv id u a l. D esca rtes  
tr ie d  to g iv e  an answer to  a l l  th ese  problem s, which he 
saw as a sp ec ts  of th e  same problem.
C artesian  r a t i o n a l i s t  theory i s ,  more or l e s s ,  as 
fo llo w s . Knowledge gained by the a p p lic a t io n  of reason  
i s  c e r ta in , th a t gained through the s e n s e s , u n c e r ta in . 
In order to apply our rea so n ,’ however, we must have some 
b a s is ,  some s ta r t in g  p o in t . I t  would be a p ity  i f  t h is  
b a s is  were to be s e n s u a l, fo r  then a l l  our th in k in g  
would be contam inated w ith  the so r t  of u n cer ta in ty  th a t  
belongs to t h is  s o r t  of know ledge. So, we must look  fo r  
another b a s is ,  and we f in d  i t  in  id e a s , c le a r  and 
d is t in c t  id e a s . C lear and d i s t in c t  id eas are formed by 
the fr e e  a c t iv i t y  of the mind, and owe noth ing to the  
world of s e n s e s . However, they may be app lied  to  i t .  The 
id ea  of a su b sta n ce , and i t s  d iv is io n  in to  two modes.
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mind and m atter , we may know sim ply by taking thought; 
they are c le a r  and d i s t in c t  id e a s . That m atter has 
e x te n s io n , lo c a t io n ,  a l l  the primary q u a l i t i e s ,  we may 
a lso  know m erely by co n sid er in g  the id ea  o f m a tter . We 
already know, th en , the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f m atter tak in g  up 
any p a r t ic u la r  c o n fig u r a tio n ;  our sen ses sim ply t e l l  us 
which c o n fig u r a tio n  on t h is  o c c a s io n . Their accuracy i s  
guaranteed by God, whose b en evo len ce , and, th e r e fo r e ,  
u n w illin g n ess  to  ch eat us can a lso  be known sim ply by 
taking thought. R a t io n a lis t s  a r e , th en , r e a l i s t s  w ith  
regard to the w orld . As regards the q u estio n  of 
mechanism, they are not so d i f f e r e n t  from e m p ir ic is ts  
l ik e  Locke and Hume who se e  the r e t in a l  image, or  
something very l ik e  i t ,  both as a con ten t of 
co n sc io u sn ess  and an accu rate  p r o je c t io n  of the w orld . 
This p r o je c t io n  becomes a v e r id ic a l  p ercep t by the  
a p p lic a t io n  of c e r ta in  r u le s  of geom etry, r u le s
which d er iv e  th e ir  v a l id i t y  and c e r t itu d e  from 
geom etry's s ta tu s  -  in  D e sc a r te s ' eyes -  as an a p r io r i  
s c ie n c e . As regards the q u estio n  of how the mechanism 
a r is e s ,  they are n a t i v i s t .  So, th ere  are two d eb a tes:
(1 ) Em piricism  versu s R ealism , 
and
(2) Em piricism  v ersu s N ativ ism ,
In the h is to r y  of ph ilosop hy  th e se  two q u estion s are 
confused and compounded, as they n e c e s s a r i ly  would be 
xdien the on ly  a lte r n a t iv e  to lea rn in g  was s p e c ia l
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c r e a t io n . However, the advent of th e o r ie s  of e v o lu t io n  
changed the s i t u a t io n  d r a m a tic a lly . These th e o r ie s  
varied  as to d e t a i l s  o f the p r o cesses  in v o lv e d , but a l l  
had in  common the n o tio n  of p r o g r e ss iv e  ad ap ta tion  o f a 
sp e c ie s  to i t s  environment over a number of g e n e r a tio n s .  
E vo lu tion a lism  i s  f u n c t io n a l is t ;  th a t i s  i t  a llow s
str u c tu r e s  and p r o c e ss e s , p h y s ic a l and m ental, to be 
seen  as a response to a need , and as part o f a
tra n sa c tio n  w ith  the environm ent. I t  would be p o s s ib le  
to have an e v o lu tio n ism  th a t was about growth towards
some a b stra c t goal l ik e  knowing the world as i t  r e a l ly
i s ,  but t h is  would not be b io lo g ic a l ,  adaptive  
e v o lu t io n . I f  e v o lu t io n  i s  accep ted , in  one s e n s e , 
ra tio n a lism  d is s o lv e s ;  n a ive  rea lism  in  p ercep tio n  i s  
su r e ly  out in  any f u n c t io n a l is t  account. M oreover, i t  
changes the second debate in to  one about where the  
connection  i s  e s ta b l is h e d , in  the l i f e  of the in d iv id u a l  
or the l i f e  of the s p e c ie s .  However, in  another sen se  i t  
i s  r e - in s ta te d , in  th a t a c t io n , not s e n s a t io n , becomes 
the determ ining fa c to r  in  secu rin g  our r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  
the ex tern a l w orld ,
B erkeley, of co u r se , i s  an e m p ir ic is t ,  and r e je c t s  
the n o tion  th at a c t iv i t y  i s  the b a s ic  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of 
mind. He sees  c o n sc io u sn e ss  as p a s s iv e , r e c e p t iv e .  
N ev e r th e le ss , he i s  im portant fo r  he makes the  
connection  between space and b o d ily  a c t io n , although h is  
em piricism  makes him t o t a l ly  m isunderstand the nature of 
b o d ily  a c tio n .
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Berkeley i n s i s t s  th a t the o b je c ts  of v is io n  and 
touch are e n t ir e ly  d i f f e r e n t .  The primary and proper 
o b jects  of v i s io n  are l ig h t  and c o lo u r . D istan ce  i s  not 
an o b ject of v i s io n ,  nor i s  e x te n s io n , form or m otion. 
B erk eley 's  p o s i t io n  i s  so o f te n  rep resen ted  as being  
that a 2 -d im en sion a l p ic tu r e  on the r e t in a  i s  somehow 
made 3 -d im en sion a l by a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  touch th a t i t  i s  
perhaps n ecessa ry  to e s ta b l is h  f i r s t l y  th a t he 
e x p l ic i t l y  r e je c te d  th a t  p o s it io n :
"From a l l  which we may con clu d e, th a t p lanes are no 
more the immediate o b je c t  of s ig h t  than s o l i d s .  . . . . .  so  
th at we se e  p lanes in  the same way th a t we see  s o l id s ;  
both being e q u a lly  su ggested  by the immediate o b je c ts  of 
s i g h t . . . . " .
C erta in ly  he s t a r t s  o f f  the book d isc u ss in g  f i r s t  
d istan ce  e s t im a tio n  and then s i z e ,  as i f  th e  problem  
were to g e t  from a two d im ensional r e p r ese n ta tio n  to a 
th r ee , but t h is  i s  sim ply h is  mode o f proceed ing; to  
show that f i r s t  d is ta n c e  and s i z e ,  then o r ie n ta t io n , are 
not the f i r s t  or proper o b je c ts  of s ig h t ,  and to move on 
a t  l a s t  to f ig u r e .
For B erk eley , n e ith e r  touch nor v is io n  has any 
s p e c ia l  c la im  to a b so lu te  p r io r i t y .  This im p lies  that 
there i s  no q u estio n  of e it h e r  or both sen ses  provid ing  
a true p ic tu r e  of th e  world in  any m etaphysica l s e n se . 
Indeed he i s  q u ite  prepared to contem plate the e x is te n c e
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of an in fo r p o r e a l  in t e l l ig e n c e  fo r  whom sp ace , form, 
exten sion  w ould a l l  be m ean in g less.
"I s h a l l  n e v e r th e le s s  . , . c o n s id er  the case of an
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  or  unbodied s p i r i t ,  which i s  supposed to  
see  p e r f e c t ly  w e l l ,  i . e .  to have a c le a r  p ercep tion  of 
the proper and immediate o b je c ts  o f s ig h t ,  but to have 
no sense o f to u ch . . . .  i t  i s  c e r ta in  the a fo resa id  
in t e l l ig e n c e  cou ld  have no id ea  o f a s o l i d ,  or q u a n tity  
of three d im en sio n s, which fo llo w e th  from i t s  not having  
any idea of d i s t a n c e .” ) cwu g c L_\v )
To be c o n s is t e n t ,  o f co u rse , he should  a lso  argue th a t  
such a being cou ld  have no id ea  of a p lane or qu an tity  
of two dim ensions e i t h e r .  He goes on to say th a t the  
o b jects  o f geom etry are o b je c ts  of tou ch , but th a t they  
are no more r e a l  fo r  th a t .  The in te r p r e ta t io n  of v is u a l  
sen sa tio n s in  terms o f space and o b je c ts  i s  not a m atter  
of tru th , th e n , but of a d a p ta tio n .
"for th is  end the v i s lv e  sen se  seems to have been
bestowed upon an im als, . .th a t  by the p ercep tion  o f
v i s ib le  id e a s  (which in  them selves are not capable of
a f fe c t in g , or any w ise a lte r in g  th e  frame of t h e ir
b od ies) they may be ab le to  fo r s e e  (from  the exp erience
they have had . . )  the damage or b e n e f it  l ik e  to ensue,
upon the a p p lic a t io n  of th e ir  own b od ies to  th is  or th a t
body which i s  a t a d is ta n ce :"  , . .wx)
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Berkeley b e l ie v e d , th en , that the con n ection  between 
s ig h t  and touch i s  a m atter of c o n tin g e n t , p r o b a b i l is t ic  
a s s o c ia t io n ,
" We are not to  th in k  th a t brutes and c h ild r e n , or even
grown reason ab le  men, whenever they p e r c e iv e  an ob ject
to approach, or to  depart from them, do i t  by v ir tu e  of
geometry and d em onstration , . . That one id ea  may
su ggest another to  the mind, i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  th a t they
have been observed to go to g e th e r :  w ithout any
dem onstration of the n e c e s s ity  o f th e ir  c o e x is te n c e , or
w ithout so much as knowing what i t  i s  th a t makes them 
wc o e x is t .
X X V v )
Of co u r se , he b e lie v e d  th a t t h is  con n ection  was 
e s ta b lish e d  by ex p er ien ce  in  the l i f e  of the in d iv id u a l.  
Now, as has been s a id , n a tiv ism  i s  now ju s t  an is s u e  in  
developm ental p sychology divorced from em piricism  versu s  
r a tio n a lism , and th a t  is su e  i s  not being argued h ere . 
However, B erkeley toys w ith  what i s  a very modern idea  
in  experim en tal p sych ology , 'r e a d in e ss  to  le a r n ' .  This 
means th a t an organism  may be p r e -  adapted to make 
c e r ta in  s o r ts  of s tim u lu s-resp o n se  or s tim u lu s-stim u lu s  
connections ra th er  than others (G arcia and K o e llin g ,  
1966). B erkeley seem s, a t one p o in t , to  r e je c t  th is  
id e a , c a l l in g  i t  a p r e ju d ic e , but what he means i s  th at  
i t  i s  a p reju d ice  to  b e lie v e  th a t th ere  are any grounds, 
e ith e r  lo g ic a l  or on the b a sis  of s im i la r it y  fo r  making 
the c o n n ec tio n . He does a llow  th a t the f a c t  th at the
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a s s o c ia t io n s  to  be learned  are u n iv e r sa l and in s t i tu te d  
by other than man makes them e s p e c ia l ly  easy to le a r n ,  
and, e v e n tu a lly  he says;
"Upon th e  w h ole , I th in k  we may f a i r l y  conclu de, th a t  
the proper o b je c ts  of v i s io n  c o n s t i t u te  a u n iv e r sa l  
language o f th e  Author of n a tu r e , wherebye we are  
in stru c ted  how to  r e g u la te  our a c t io n s ,  in  order to  
a tta in  th ose  th in gs th a t are n ecessary  to  the  
p reserv a tio n  and w e ll-b e in g  of our b o d ie s , as a lso  to  
avoid whatever may be h u r tfu l and d e s tr u c t iv e  o f them."
Given th e  id e n t i t y  of the A uthor, i t  might be assumed 
th at i t  i s  a language e s p e c ia l ly  w e l l  su ite d  to  i t s  
purpose.
There are a number of i s s u e s  involved  in  the  
em p ir ic is t  v iew  o f  space p e r c ep tio n . One of th ese  might 
be c a lle d  'o b je c t  knowledge em p ir ic ism ', s in c e  i t  
Involves r e c o g n is in g  o b je c ts  and u sin g  knowledge about 
th e ir  s iz e  and shape to  help  co n stru c t the space around 
them. Although th ere  are th ose  who seem to deny such 
e f f e c t s ,  Gibson (1950, 1966), i t  seems th a t such a
p o s it io n  i s  sim ply  wrong, as I t t e l s o n  (1 9 5 1 ), among many 
oth ers , has c le a r ly  dem onstrated. However, th is  i s  a 
very weak e f f e c t ,  and in  a l l  but the most favourable  
circum stances i t  i s  swamped by 'w hole f i e l d '  e f f e c t s  
(Ames, 1946; I t t e l s o n ,  1952). A v a r ia n t  of th is  which
has to do w ith  knowledge of the s tr u c tu r e  of whole
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f i e l d s ,  how ever, i s  c le a r ly  dem onstrated , in  the Ames 
room, fo r  in s ta n c e  (Ames, op c i t ;  I t t e l s o n ,  op c i t ;  
Segal e t  a l ,  1966). Another is s u e  has to do w ith  
o r ie n ta t io n . The b a s ic  phenomenon i s  th a t o b je c ts  in  
p e c u lia r  o r ie n ta t io n s  look p e c u l ia r .  Of cou rse , t h is  i s  
due to  memory fo r  prev iou s v i s u a l  e x p e r ie n c e . One is su e  
i s  whether o r ie n ta t io n  i s  measured w ith  r e sp ec t  to the  
body, th e  w orld , g r a v ity  or the r e t in a . Rock (1954, 
1956) has shown th a t th ere  i s  a r e t in a l  e f f e c t  
independent of any oth ers th a t  may occu r . However, t h is  
need not imply th a t tra c e s  o f s t im u li  are s to r e d . We 
s h a l l  se e  l a t e r ,  th a t th is  e f f e c t  can be derived from 
the form of sen sori-m otor  em p iricism  advocated h ere . 
There i s ,  however, a th ird  i s s u e ,  which i s  a t the heart  
of B erk e ley 's  th eory . This i s  u s u a lly  re ferred  to  as 
' ta c tu a l  em p ir ic ism ', but every th in g  h inges on what
in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  g iven  to  the word ' t a c t u a l ' .  Although  
Berkeley ta lk s  about touch, he r e a l ly  means a c t io n .
" . . . what he means by s a y in g , he se e s  th is  or th a t
th ing a t  a d is ta n c e  . . ( i s )  . . th a t  what he se es  only
su ggests  to  h is  und erstand ing, th a t  a f te r  having passed  
a c e r ta in  d is ta n c e , to  be measured by the motion of h is  
body, which i s  p erce iv a b le  by touch , he s h a l l  come to
perceive  such and such ta n g ib le  id ea s  which have u su a lly  
been connected w ith  such and such v i s i b l e  id e a s ."
x u v )
He i s  ta lk in g  not only about b o d ily  movements, or 
movements of those parts of th e  body which were l ik e ly
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to be app lied  to the o b je c t  and to w hich, th e r e fo r e ,  
"damage or b e n e f it  was l ik e  to ensue" , but to 
eye-raovements. He su g g e sts  th a t i t  might be the  
n e c e s s ity  of d ir e c t in g  the eyes upwards or downwards in  
order to  f ix a t e  th ose  p arts  o f the o b ject which are  
painted  on the low er and upper p a rts  of the r e t in a
r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  th a t en ab les us to  la b e l th ese  parts
c o r r e c t ly .
"And i t  seems to me the tru e reason  why he should think  
those o b je c ts  uppermost th a t are pain ted  on the lower 
part of the ey e: f o r ,  by turn ing the eye up they s h a l l  
be d i s t i n c t l y  seen ; as l ik e w is e  th o se  th a t are painted  
on the h ig h e s t  p a rt of the eye s h a l l  be d i s t in c t ly  seen , 
by turn ing th e  eye down, and are fo r  th a t reason
esteemed lo w est:"
x c v \ u )
L ater, i t  w i l l  be seen  th a t t h is  i s  co r re c t  and
im portant, but B erkeley does not develop  t h i s .  He 
i n s i s t s  on c a l l in g  both w alking towards an o b je c t , and 
moving th e  eyes to f ix a t e  an o b je c t , tou ch , and tr e a t in g  
them as forms of p a ss iv e  s e n s i b i l i t y .
B erkeley i s  r ig h t  in  alm ost a l l  he sa y s . Where he 
is  wrong, i t  i s  because of a c o n v ic t io n  shared by a l l  
h is  contemporo-fies and alm ost a l l  h is  su c c e s s o r s , that  
p ercep tion  i s  p r im arily  a m atter of p a ss iv e  r e c e p t iv i t y ,  
and th a t t h i s ,  in d eed , i s  what guarantees i t s  accuracy. 
True, he does maximise the part played by a c tio n  in
23
p rovid in g  the b a s is  fo r  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  of the v is u a l  
im pression  in  terms of sp a c e . However, he t r ie s  to  do 
th is  by reducing the a c tu a l s p a t ia l  con ten t of the  
v is u a l  se n sa tio n s  to z e r o . He does not m aintain  t h is  
c o n s is t e n t ly ,  and, in d eed , he can n ot. Colour w ithout the 
b a s ic  s p a t ia l  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f f ig u r e  and ex te n s io n  i s  
unim aginable, and th a t means im p o ss ib le , as a form of 
sensory  c o n sc io u sn e ss . As s h a l l  be argued l a t e r ,  when . 
Macmurray's theory i s  under d is c u s s io n , a n o n -sp a tia l  
co n sc io u sn ess  would be m erely a f e e l in g ,  and could not 
en ter  in to  a p ercep tion  in  th e  manner of a s e n s a t io n . He 
comes very c lo s e  to  denuding v is u a l  s e n sa tio n s  of a l l  
c o n te n t. What he should do, of c o u rse , i s  d isp en se  w ith  
them a l l  to g e th e r , but t h is  he cannot do. C onsciousness  
fo r  B erk eley , as fo r  a l l  e m p ir ic is t s ,  i s  a m atter of 
being a su b ject ra th er  than an agent; a m atter of 
becoming aware of s t im u l i ,  whether in te r n a l ly  generated  
or a r is in g  from the e x te r n a l w orld , which impinge on a 
p a ss iv e  organ of s e n s i b i l i t y .  He does not a llow  th a t we 
can be im m ediately aware o f what we do; we are con sc iou s  
of our a c tio n s  only  through the medium of the s t im u li  to  
vdiich they g iv e  r i s e .  What i s  su r p r is in g  i s  that he goes 
as fa r  as he does towards a pragm atic view  of knowledge. 
The im portant th ing i s  th a t th e  p e rcep tio n  of space and 
o b je c ts  i s  an ad ap tation  to and con tin gen t upon our 
a c t io n s . This i s  the h ea rt of B e r k e ley 's  theory . The 
remainder of th is  chapter i s  the h is to r y  o f attem pts to 
r e c o n c ile  the r a t io n a l is t  in t u i t io n  o f id ea s or schemata 
operating  in  p ercep tion  w ith  the e m p ir ic is t  in s ig h t
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about the r e la t io n s h ip  between v is io n  and a c t iv e  touch. 
They are reco n c iled  only in  a m a te r ia l is t ,  or a t l e a s t  
m on ist, pragm atic e v o lu tio n a ry  theory. An e s s e n t ia l  part 
of th is  theory w i l l  be an account of im agination  as a 
fa c u lty  which c r ea te s  and operates schemata which owe 
th e ir  re lev a n ce  to  the world to th e ir  con n ection  w ith  
a c t iv e  touch and instrum ental a c t io n , and which operate  
in  p ercep tio n  as w e ll  as memory and pure im a g in a tio n .
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2 .2  IMAGINATION and PERCEPTION In HUME and KANT.
Im agination i s  the fa c u lty  o f producing p r e s e n ta t io n s .  
I t  i s ,  th e r e fo r e , c r u c ia l ly  in vo lved  in  a l l  o th er  m ental 
fu n c tio n s , c o g n it iv e  and o r e c t ic .  I t  l in k s  the p h y s ic a l  
world and the se n ses  w ith  the i n t e l l e c t u a l .  This i s  
K ant's th eory , o f c o u r se , but he got i t ,  in  o u t l in e  at 
l e a s t ,  from David Hume. They both in h e r ite d  the  
t r a d it io n a l  and obvious d iv is io n  o f the mind in to  
p ercep tio n  and und erstan d in g . Hume developed a proto  
theory about the r o le  o f im agination  in  lin k in g  th e s e .  
Kant took t h is  theory and developed i t  t i l l  i t  was very  
n early  r ig h t ,  as p sy c h o lo g ic a l th eo ry , but, m iss in g  an 
a p p rec ia tio n  of the pragm atic b a s is  of m ental l i f e ,  got  
h im se lf  in to  an e p is te m o lo g ic a l ta n g le  which obscured  
th is  c o n tr ib u tio n  to p sych o logy .
In Hume, th ere  i s  no c le a r  d i s t in c t io n  between  
having an idea  and p e r c e iv in g  som ething; no c le a r  
d is t in c t io n  between 'p e rc e iv in g  apparently  in  the  
presence of an o b je c t ,  and th in k in g  about i t  in  i t s  
absence' (Warnock, 1976 ). He ta lk s  about im pressions and 
id eas as d i f f e r e n t  s o r ts  of co n ten ts  of c o n sc io u sn e ss , 
but the d if fe r e n c e  turns out to  be one of d eg ree . I f  we 
could know im m ediately what we do, th is  would s u f f i c e ,  
but in  em p ir ica l p h ilo so p h y , where we know only  products 
or c o n ten ts , th is  can not d is t in g u is h  between them.
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In so fa r  as we can t e l l  whether we are p e r c e iv in g  or 
im ag in in g , t h is  i s  m erely a m atter of stren g th  and 
v iv a c i t y .
Im agination  i s  fr e e  to  ' transpose and change i t s  
Id ea s' which i s  the b a s is  of complex id e a s , and the  
c r e a tio n  o f th ese  i s  i t s  ordinary fu n c tio n . Im agination  
a lso  a llo w s us to th in k  about o b je c ts  in  th e ir  absence. 
By t h is  Hume means we can c a l l  to  mind an example o f a
type of o b je c t , as w e ll  as remember a p a r t ic u la r
in d iv id u a l or in c id e n t . Indeed , he goes on to  say th a t  
i t  i s  im ag in ation  th a t a llow s us to think about types o f  
o b je c ts  a t  a l l ,  fo r  we do th is  by im agining a p a r t ic u la r  
o b je c t , but take i t  -  by the power of im agination  -  as 
an exam ple.
" . . .  the h earin g  of th a t name r ev iv es  the id ea  of one
o f th e se  o b je c t s ,  and makes the im agination  con ce ive  of
i t  w ith  a l l  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  circum stances and p roportions  
. . . .  the word not being ab le  to  rev iv e  the d e t a i l s  of
a l l  th e se  in d iv id u a ls  r e v iv e s  th a t custom which we
have a cq u ir 'd  in  surveying them. They are not r e a l ly  and 
in  f a c t  p resen t to  the s o u l ,  but only in  power. 
M oreover, im agin ation  produces or th reaten s to produce a 
s tr in g  o f d i f f e r e n t  images of the same typ e ."
L ater , he goes on to c la im  th at we a lso  req u ire  
im agination  to hold  togeth er  the complex s e r ie s  of 
im pressions which are our exp erien ce  of the a p a r t ic u la r
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in d iv id u a l o b je c t  as c o n s t i tu t in g  a permanent o b je c t .
In Hume a p a r t ic u la r  o p era tio n  of the im agination  
in v o lv es  som ething l ik e  a d e c is io n ,  or act of w i l l .  This 
i s  most ob v iou s, perhaps, in  the case where i t  
a ttr ib u te s  cau sa l con n ection  on the b a s is  of con stan t  
con ju n ction . I t  goes beyond m erely n o tin g  the 
conjunction ; the a t t r ib u t io n ,  the b e l ie f  in  c a u s a li t y ,  
i s  something in je c te d  in to  the s i t u a t io n  \diich binds the 
events to g eth e r  and g iv e s  to  th e  complex a new str e n g th  
and v iv a c i t y  as a s in g le ,  u n if ie d  item  of e x p e r ie n c e . 
B e lie f  in  Hume i s  a m atter of a c tiv e  sy n th e s is  and 
taking up, and t h is  in v o lv e s  im ag in a tion . O rd in a r ily , we 
b e lie v e  our p e r c e p tio n s , and so vhy does not Hume
7in v o lv e  im agination  h e r e . C e r ta in ly , th ere  i s  no reason  
to b e l ie v e  th a t Hume th in k s th at im agination  i s  
n ecessary  in  th e  p ercep tio n  of the layou t of a room, 
say , in  terms of s u r fa c e s , corners and ed ges. The reason  
i s ,  not so much the d o c tr in e  of im p ression s, as the  
actu a l word, w ith  i t s  con n ota tion s of something formed 
as a w hole, m ech a n ica lly . Hume sometimes allow s a ra th er  
d if fe r e n t  view ; he c e r ta in ly  a llow s th a t sim ple id eas  
can be p r e tty  sm all d e t a i l s ,  something l ik e  ju s t  
n o tic e a b le  d if f e r e n c e s ,  or minimum d iscr im in a b le  
fea tu res
"V'rtierever the im agin ation  p e rce iv es  a d iffe r e n c e  
among id e a s , i t  can e a s i ly  produce a sep a ra tio n ."
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and w h ile  i t  i s  not q u ite  tru e th a t fo r  every sim ple  
id ea  th ere  i s  a sim ple im p ression , they are n e v e r th e le s s  
s u b je c t  to th e  same degree of d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  However, 
Hume was not very in te r e s te d  in  im pressions from the 
s e n s e s ,  or se n sa tio n s ;
"The exam ination  of our se n sa tio n s  belongs more to  
an atom ists  and natural p h ilosop h ers than to  m oral; and 
th e r e fo r e  s h a l l  not a t p resen t be e n te r 'd  upon."
Had he e n te r 'd  upon and fo llow ed  the bent of h is  
th ou gh t, he would have been led  to p o s tu la te  the  
e x is te n c e  of something l ik e  atoms o f s e n sa tio n  from 
which p ercep tio n s  were b u i l t .  He would have been wrong, 
but i r o n ic a l ly ,  th is  would alm ost c e r ta in ly  have led  him 
to a s c r ib e  to  im agination  the same r o le  in  h o ld in g  
to g e th e r  se n sa tio n s  to c r ea te  a p ercep tio n  as he d id  in  
h o ld in g  to g th er  momentary im pressions to c r e a te  an 
o b je c t .  T his would have brought him very c lo s e  indeed to  
K ant's theory  which he p r e -  f ig u red  in  so many ways.
In Hume, as in  Kant, im agination  o f fe r s  a s o r t  of 
s c a f fo ld in g  to e x p e r ie n c e . I t  holds to g eth er  a s e r ie s  of 
sen se  im pressions to c o n s t i tu te  a permanent o b je c t .  I t  
en ab les us to th ink  in  general id e a s , th at i s  i t  t i e s  
th ese  o b je c ts  in to  a system  which r e la te s  them to  other  
o b je c ts  as being of the same or d if f e r e n t  ty p e s . I t  
allow s us to f i l l  in  the gaps in  our ex p e r ie n c e , a llow s  
us to th ink  about th in gs and q u a l i t ie s  we have not se en .
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not only by com bination , but by in te r p o la t io n  ( as in  
the case of a co lo u r  between red and orange which we 
have not se e n , but which we can in  some way apprehend 
because we have seen  both red and o ra n g e). The part 
played by im ag in ation  in  Hume's theory i s  summed up by 
Raphael (1977);
" The most im portant fu n c tio n  of im a g in a tio n , as 
d ep icted  in  Hume's accou n t, i s  not to  form m ental images 
(which i s  r e la t iv e ly  in freq u en t anyway) but to  provide a 
c o n str u c tio n a l framework so to  speak in to  which our 
im pressions of sen se  are f i t t e d  as b u ild in g  b lo c k s . "
Kant takes o b je c ts  to be the b a sic  u n its  of our 
exp erien ce  of the w orld . N e v e r th e le ss , he a ccep ts  Hume's 
p o in t th at they are s y n th e t ic .  The b a s ic  fu n c tio n  of 
im agination i s  to produce th ese  sy n th eses  from the 
m ater ia l of s e n s i b i l i t y .  In Hume, o f co u rse , im agination  
operates on co n ten ts  o f co n sc io u sn ess; in  Kant, i t  
operates to  produce them. This i s  K ant's b a sic  
rev o lu tio n a ry  in s ig h t .  S e n s ib i l i t y ,  through* im ag in a tion , 
produces p ercep tio n s o f o b je c t s , w h ile  understanding  
m anipulates c o n cep ts . Im agination , th en , m ediates 
between s e n s ib i l i t y  and understanding, and shares 
something of the c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f both , p a ss iv e  and 
a c t iv e ,  m echanical p ro cess  and in te n t io n a l  a c t .
Kant d is tin g u ish e d  two types or fu n c tio n s  of the 
im agination , em p ir ica l and tra n scen d en ta l. The f i r s t  i s
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the ord inary p erson al Im agination . This i s  most obvious 
in  'p u re ' im ag in ation  where each person in h a b its  a 
fa n ta sy  world created  and populated e n t ir e ly  according  
to h is  own b e n t . I t  operates in  p ercep tio n  to the ex ten t
that when we each look  out on a common f i e l d ,  we see  a
d if f e r e n t  w orld , a world con stru cted  according to our 
d if f e r e n t  e x p e r ie n c e s , i n t e r e s t s ,  and e x p e c ta tio n s . 
T ranscendental im agination  i s  b e s t  seen  in  what we would 
now c a l l  form p ercep tio n ; where we a l l  s e e  more or l e s s  
the same p h y s ic a l shapes, n o t , accord ing to Kant,
because th ese  shapes e x is t  independently  of our 
p e r c e p tio n , but because we a l l  impose the same, 
u n iv e r s a l ,  tran scen d en ta l form of space upon the
s e n s ib le  m a te r ia l . R elated  to t h i s ,  Kant reco g n ises  two 
l e v e l s  a t  which im agination  may o p era te . One i s  
ex em p lified  in  o b je c t  r e c o g n it io n , and i s  c a lle d  
s y n th e s is  o f r e c o g n it io n  in  co n cep ts . This has to do 
w ith having " a c o l l e c t io n  of images w ith  the general 
form of o b je c ts  " w ith  which to compare. The content and 
s tr u c tu r e  of t h is  c o l le c t io n  in  any in d iv id u a l i s  a 
m atter of the em p ir ica l im ag in ation , i t s  e x is te n c e  i s  
n o t. The o th er  l e v e l  has to do w ith  imposing the general 
forms of space and time on s e n s a t io n , and i s  c a lle d  
s y n th e s is  o f a p p ercep tion . I t s  e x is te n c e  i s  a m atter of 
tran scen d en ta l im ag in a tion , i t s  con ten t not so , in  
p r in c ip le ,  but i t  i s  perhaps tru e th a t th ere  i s  no rea l  
v a r ia t io n  p o s s ib le  a t t h is  l e v e l .
For K ant, gen era l id e a s , such as o b je c t , space,
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e t c . ,  are l ik e  more s p e c i f ic  o n es , a t  the same time both  
the product and m a ter ia l of im a g in a tio n . This i s  very  
l ik e  P ia g e t ' s  treatm ent o f supposed ly  a p r io r i  concepts  
such as number, through very gen era l th e o r e t ic a l  
concepts l ik e  m ass, to very s p e c i f i c  concepts such as 
dog or ta b le  as a l l  being v a r io u s l e v e l s  of schem ata. 
Whether gen era l schemata l ik e  space or more s p e c i f i c  
ones l ik e  dog are in v o lv ed , they are a l l  forms of 
a c t io n . The more p a r t ic u la r  schem ata sometimes sound a 
b it  l ik e  g e n e r a lise d  p ic tu r e s ,  or l ik e  Rosch's (1973) 
p r o to ty p e s . G en era lised  p ic tu r e s  have been s in c e  Locke a 
very em barassing concept in  p sych o logy . I t  w i l l  be one 
of the aims of the theory developed here to ex p la in  how 
a c tio n  schemata can have t h is  dual nature as p lans for  
a c tio n  and im ages, images which can vary from in c id e n t  
to in c id e n t  y e t  s t i l l  p reserve t h e ir  id e n t i t y .
So f a r ,  we have been concerned w ith  the use of  
im ag in a tion , th a t i s ,  w ith  the a p p lic a t io n  of schemata 
to  the w orld . Now, we come to  co n s id er  the form ation of 
th ese  schem ata. An e x p lic a t io n  of t h is  is su e  may h elp  us 
r e so lv e  the e p is te m o lo g ic a l problem of what p o s s ib le  
r e la t io n  can a p ercep tion  co n stru cted  by im agination  
have to the w orld . The fu n c tio n  of im agination in  
c r ea tin g  concepts and th e o r ie s  and the fu n c tio n  in  
cr ea tin g  and a p p rec ia tin g  beauty in  a r t  and n atu re , are 
fo r  Kant c lo s e ly  r e la te d . They are d iscu ssed  in  the  
th ird  c r i t iq u e ,  which Kant c a l l s  a 'C r itiq u e  of
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Judgem ent', but which we would say , now, was about 
c r e a t iv i t y .
There are th r e e  h igh er  f a c u l t i e s  in  Kant, understanding, 
judgement and reason . At one p o in t , Kant says th a t each 
of the h ig h er  f a c u l t ie s  t r e a t s  of i t s  own m a te r ia l,  
co n cep ts , judgements and c o n c lu s io n s . L a ter , however, he 
says ;
"If understanding in  gen era l be d efin ed  as the fa c u lty  
of laws or r u le s ,  the fa c u lty  o f judgement may be termed 
the fa c u lty  of subsumption under th ese  r u le s ;  th a t i s ,  
of d is t in g u is h in g  whether t h is  or th a t does or does not 
stand under a g iven  r u le ."
The r e la t io n s h ip  between judgement and understanding can 
be understood i f  a judgement i s  consid ered  as a 
p r o p o s it io n . There are two s o r ts  of p r o p o s itio n  which 
might be c a l le d  d e ic t i c  and d e s c r ip t iv e .  The f i r s t  s o r t ,  
d e i c t i c ,  m erely d ir e c t s  th e  a t te n t io n  to  some part of 
the f i e l d  of v i s io n ,  sep a ra tes  out the part as f ig u r e ,  
and apprehends i t  in  some p a r t ic u la r  way, i . e  
sy n th e s ise s  i t  under one p a r t ic u la r  con cep t.
'Look! There i s  a haw k.'
The second, d e s c r ip t iv e ,  p r e d ica tes  something of a th ing  
or s ta t e  of a f f a ir s  which i s  presumed to  already e x is t  
in  terpe r s o n a lly .
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'The King of France i s  b a ld .'
What Kant ia  say in g  i s  th a t th ere  are tim es when our 
im agination  s y n th e s is e s  o b je c ts  fo r  us which we then use  
in  judgem ents, h igh er  l e v e l  sy n th e se s , and th ere  are  
tim es when th e  sim ple s y n th e s is  under an o b je c t  i s  a t  
i s s u e .  U nderstanding i s  c e r t a in ly  capable of combining 
and recom bining con cep ts to g iv e  new co n cep ts . However, 
th ese  would be mere a b s tr a c t io n s  w ithout p o s s ib le  
r e fe r e n c e . Judgement i s  the fu n c tio n  by which con cep ts  
are ap p lied  to  th e  world by forming and reform ing the  
schemata which r e a l i s e  them to f i t  the data  of 
ex p er ien ce . I t  i s  c r e a t iv e  ra th er  than co m b in a to r ia l, 
and i t s  products are genuine syn th eses ra th er  than  
com plexes. I t  i s  in  s c ie n c e  th a t we can most e a s i ly  see  
judgement in  o p e r a tio n . H ere, i t  operates to  c r e a te  
ru le s  which subsume and u n ify  many d if f e r e n t  
e x p e r ie n c e s . But judgement a lso  operates in  a r t ,  and 
here i t  fu n c tio n s  to  capture the whole o f the s i t u a t io n  
and u n ify  i t  under a concept s p e c ia l ly  created  fo r  j u s t  
that purpose. The ex p er ien ce  o f beauty , a b e a u t ifu l  
o b je c t , i s  th e  t o t a l  harmony of form and co n ten t.
K ant's v iew s on a e s th e t ic s  are an im portant part o f
h is  th eory . Kant i s  op era tin g  h is  own v e r s io n  of
dualism . Like many o th e r s , he makes a d is t in c t io n
between the world known through the se n s e s , and the
world known through reason . The world known through
reason i s  the r e a l w orld , and in c lu d es a l l  n o tio n s  of
/
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o b je c t iv e  v a lu e , th at i s  of value which can oppose 
i t s e l f  to  p referen ce  or in c l in a t io n ,  and th is  in c lu d es  
m o r a lity , most o b v io u s ly . A e sth e tic  e x p e r ie n c e s , he 
f e e l s ,  partake of both w orld s. They are undeniably  
se n su a l, y e t ,  e q u a lly  und en iab ly , they presen t  
them selves as m atters of v a lu e . Later on, we s h a l l  see
t h is  view  th a t exp er ien ce  of beauty o f fe r s  unique a ccess  
to r e a l i t y  developed in  S c h e l l in g .
K ant's theory captures the notion s th at the  
exp er ien ce  of beauty i s  ak in  to  the exp erien ce  of
d isc o v e r y , and th a t i t  i s  a return  to a newness or 
fre sh n e ss  in  p e r c ep tio n . I t  does th is  by d e sc r ib in g  the  
exp erien ce  as occurring  o u ts id e  the domain of the 
em p ir ica l ( i . e .  lea rn ed ) con cep ts of the understanding. 
S im ila r ly , i t  cap tu res the n o tio n s of com pleteness and
harmony. A ll th e  p a r ts , a sp e c ts  and fea tu r e s  o f the
o b jec t are sy n th e s ise d  under one concept, each of them 
i s  e s s e n t ia l  and noth ing i s  la ck in g ; th is  i s  harmony of 
form and c o n te n t. I t  might a lso  be describ ed  as a 
harmony of understanding and im ag in ation . H ere, the id ea  
i s  th a t , in  normal c o n sc io u sn e ss , there i s  some so r t  of 
f r i c t i o n  or com p etition  between the sy n th e s is in g  a b i l i t y  
of im ag in ation , i t s  a b i l i t y  to  produce schemata which 
e x a c t ly  capture the unique nature of the o b je c t , and the 
demands of the understanding to  subsume i t  under a lready  
e x is t in g  co n cep ts , even at th e  expense of d is to r t in g  i t .  
A lso , the two p a rts  or fu n c tio n s  of the mind, em p ir ica l 
and tra n scen d en ta l, fu n c tio n  in  harmony, and s in c e  the
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tran scen d en ta l I s  v ir t u a l ly  the u n con sc iou s, th is  means 
th at co n sc io u s  and unconscious fu n c tio n  in  harmony,
although t h is  i s  on ly  im p l ic i t  in  Kant. The g r e a te s t
d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  th is  th eory , o f co u rse , i s  th a t i t
cannot a llo w  any p ercep tio n  o f meaning or s ig n if ic a n c e  
in  nature or a r t  (ex c e p t in  the very s p e c ia l  and lim ite d  
case of th e  su b lim e ), and th a t i t  cannot handle any form 
of r e p e se n ta t iv e  a r t ,  which i t  must t r e a t  o f as second 
ra te  and d e r iv a t iv e .  This i s  a consequence o f the rath er  
sp e c ia l  s o r t  o f harmony which ob ta in s between the
em p irica l and tra n scen d en ta l minds in  the p ercep tio n  of  
beauty, wherby the em p ir ica l mind must sim ply hold  i t s  
peace.
Kant r e c o g n ise s  one o th er a e s th e t ic  e x p e r ie n c e , 
apart from b eau ty , th e  sub lim e. We exp erien ce  t h is  when 
our judgement f a i l s  in  the fa ce  of som ething so v a s t  or 
profound th a t  i t  i s  outw ith  our sco p e . We exp erien ce  
th is  not because i t  f a i l s ,  but because in  f a i l in g  i t  
p o in ts  to  som ething beyond i t s e l f ,  ïfhat i t  p o in ts  to ,  
what i t  sym b olises, i s  an id ea  o f rea so n . For Kant id eas  
of reason are t o t a l ly  d i s t in c t  from the phenomenal 
world, and cannot p o s s ib ly  be r e a lis e d  in  i t .  They can 
only b e , as i t  were, in d ica te d  by sym bols.
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2 .3  KANT'S SUCCESSORS and the RELATIONSHIP of 
IMAGINATION and the WORLD.
K ant's ep istem o lo g y  was a f a i lu r e .  I t  f a i l e d  to  
o ffe r  any j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for  our b e l i e f  in  our 
p e r c ep tio n s , any r e a l  d is t in c t io n  between p e r c ep tio n  and 
i l l u s io n ,  and any account o f v e r id i c a l i t y . The reason  
fo r  th is  i s  th a t ,  d e s p ite  K ant's d e l ib e r a te  m in im isa tion  
of the r o le  o f p sych o logy , the theory i s  b a s ic a l ly  a 
p sy c h o lo g ic a l th eo ry , an account of p ro cesses  going , on 
in s id e  the head. I t  i s  not su rp r is in g  then th a t i t  could  
not d is t in g u is h  p ercep tio n  from i l l u s i o n ,  fo r  th a t i s  
not a d i s t in c t io n  which can be made in  p ro cess  term s. 
S im ila r ly , i t  i s  not p o s s ib le  for  the account to  e x p la in  
the su c c ess  of our p e r c ep tio n s , fo r  th a t in v o lv e s  the 
world as w e l l  as th e  s u b je c t . The su cceed in g  th e o r ie s  
were a l l  a ttem p ts to  e s ta b l is h  a r e la t io n s h ip  between 
p ercep tion  and the w orld . Some of them were a retu rn  to  
dualism , in  the form ' o f p sy ch o -p h y sica l p a r a l le l is m ,  
some were i d e a l i s t ,  and some, l ik e  F echner's  
panpsychism , were h y lo z o is t ic .  The trend d iscu sse d  here  
s ta r t s  as s u b je c t iv e  id e a lism , and track s through 
o b je c t iv e  id e a lism  to something l ik e  h y lozo ism . A ll  
these th e o r ie s  f a i l e d  as ep istem ology . As in  Kant, th is  
fa i lu r e  obscured th e ir  p o ss ib le  re lev a n ce  to p sych o logy . 
Although m etap h ysica l e p is te m o lo g ic a l, and p sy c h o lo g ic a l  
is su e s  are c lo s e ly  in tertw in ed  in  the d is c u s s io n , the  
main purpose i s  to understand and e v a lu a te  what was sa id
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about the psychology of Im agination  at th is  time when 
the id ea  of im agination  was a t  the ce n tr e  of 
p h ilo so p h ic a l  and l i t e r a r y  concern .
F ic h te  b e lie v e d  th a t  any sc ie n c e  should be a
l o g ic a l  s tr u c tu r e  d erived  from one b asic  p r o p o s it io n ;  
th a t i s ,  each s c ie n c e  had one and only one fundam ental 
id e a , and the whole of th a t s c ie n c e  c o n s is te d  in  m erely  
drawing out i t s  im p lic a t io n s . P h ysics would c o n s is t  of 
drawing out a l l  th a t i s  im p lied  in  the id ea  o f m a tter , 
or energy , or some id ea  behind them b oth . Now,
ph ilosop hy  i s  the s c ie n c e  o f s c ie n c e s , and i t s  ta sk  i s  
to make c le a r  th e  ground of a l l  ex p er ien ce , the b a s ic  
p r e r e q u is ite s  of any e x p e r ie n c e . So the f i r s t  ta sk  i s  to  
e s t a b l i s h  the one fundamental p r o p o s itio n  o f p h ilo so p h y . 
As w ith  D e sc a r te s , F ic h te  s ta r te d  w ith  the b a s ic ,
in d isp u ta b le  f a c t s  of m ental l i f e ,  th a t I  have 
e x p e r ie n c e , or p r e s e n ta t io n s . P resen ta tio n s  are o f two 
k in d s , th is  much i s  im m ediately and c e r ta in ly  c le a r  to 
r e f l e c t io n ,  and on ly  one of th ese  has the q u a lity  o f  
appearing to be in  any way f r e e  or vo lu n tary . This group 
in c lu d es  our im ag in in gs, p la n s , d e s ir e s ,  where we c r e a te  
a s t a t e  o f a f fa ir s  and adopt an a t t itu d e  to i t  o f  
.w is h in g , in te n d in g , hoping, \-diich im p lies th a t i t  i s  
n o t . Some p r e s e n ta t io n s , on th e  other hand, con fron t us 
as r e a l and e x te r n a l . F ich te  has to ex p la in  how some of 
our products appear to us s o . This i s  the  
e p is te m o lo g ic a l problem in  an i d e a l i s t  g u is e .
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There are two ways of r e so lv in g  the problem, or 
rather two d ir e c t io n s  in  which we can look  fo r  a 
so lu tio n ;  towards id e a lism  or towards what he c a l l s  
dogmatism. That i s ,  we can proclaim  the primacy of the  
m ental, and e x p la in  every th in g  in  terms of the  
operations of mind, or we can proclaim  the primacy of 
the m a te r ia l ,  and e x p la in  everyth in g  in  terms of the  
operations o f m a tte r . There i s  no way our ch o ice  can be 
determ ined, save by p erson a l in c l in a t io n ,  by the so r t  of 
person we a r e . T his has to  be s o , fo r  we are  
co n stru c tin g  p h ilo so p h y , the sc ie n c e  of s c ie n c e s ,  and 
there i s  n oth in g  beyond or behind t h is  to  which we can 
appeal. N e v e r th e le s s , the ch o ice  i s  more than a whim; on 
i t  depehds the whole working out of our p h ilosop h y , and 
i f  we choose dogmatism we are bound to  m ater ia lism  and 
determ inism , whereas i f  we choose id e a lism  we are bound 
to a p h ilosop h y  which a llow s man h is  d ig n ity  as a 
r a t io n a l ,  e t h ic a l  b e in g . F ic h te  i s  in  no doubt, th a t not 
only does id e a lism  prove to  be the b e tte r  as i t  i s  
worked o u t , but th a t no mature p erson a l i n t e l l e c t  could  
f a i l  to choose to r e co g n ise  th e ir  own r a t io n a l it y  and 
moral freedom , and make th ese  ce n tr a l to  th e ir  
p h ilosop h y .
The consequence of choosing id ea lism  i s  th a t  
everyth ing  has to  be derived  from the s e l f ,  the pure 
tran scen d en ta l s e l f  which d e f ie s  o b j e c t i f i c a t io n .  In a 
passage rem in iscen t o f the U panisads, F ich te  asks what 
i s  i t  th a t o b serv es , som ething th a t i t s e l f  im m ediately
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becomes the o b ject o f o b serv a tio n  when we ask th at  
q u e s t io n , and what observes th en , something th a t always 
escap es u s , d e f ie s  o b j e c t i f i c a t io n ,  d e f ie s  in s p e c t io n .  
We cannot fin d  i t ,  cannot in sp e c t  i t ,  but t h is  does not 
mean th a t  i t  i s  t o t a l ly  beyond our e x p e r ie n c e , fo r  we do 
enjoy an in t e l l e c t u a l  in t u i t io n  o f i t .  However, u n lik e  
the w r ite r s  of the U panisads, fo r  F ic h te  t h is  i s  not a 
m y stic a l in t u i t io n  o f a s p e c ia l  s o r t  of e lu s iv e  e n t i t y ,  
i t  i s  sim ply  a part of my s e lf -c o n s c io u s n e s s  th a t when I 
am doing som ething, ' I '  am doing i t .  This in t u i t io n  i s  
then not of an e n t i t y ,  but of an a c t i v i t y .  In the  
e x is te n c e  of t h is  tra n scen d en ta l ego F ic h te  b e l ie v e s  he 
has found the b a s is  fo r  h is  s c i e n t i f i c  p h ilo sop h y . His 
f i r s t  p r o p o s it io n  i s ,  th en ,
"the ego sim ply p o s it s  in  an o r ig in a l  way i t s  own
b ein g ."
From t h is  i s  derived a second p r o p o s it io n ,
"a non-ego i s  sim ply op p osited  to  the ego."
I t  i s  not c le a r  in  what sen se  t h is  i s  derivedJ n o t,
c e r ta in ly  by formal l o g i c ,  but then we are s t i l l  a t  the
fo u n d a tio n s , b efore  l o g i c ,  perhaps. Anyway, i t  cannot be 
denied th a t a c o n sc io u sn ess  r e q u ir e s , and perhaps 
im p lie s , an o b je c t . In any c a s e ,  as a phenom enological 
r e c o n str u c tio n  of c o n sc io u sn e ss , both  p r o p o sitio n s  are  
se cu re . As regards the th ir d  p r o p o s it io n , F ich te  has
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th is  to  say ,
"I p o s i t  in  the ego a d iv i s ib le  non-ego as opposed to  a 
d iv is ib le  ego"
C e r ta in ly , F ic h te  has to g e t  from an ab so lu te  ego 
contem plating a p e r fe c t  o b je c t  in to  the world of
d iv e r s i t y ,  but i t  i s  c e r ta in ly  not c le a r  how th is  th ird  
step  i s  d e r iv e d , and i t  i s  no lo n g er  c le a r  whether the  
sta tem ents are to  be taken as phenomenology or 
m etap h ysics. Of co u r se , he has to  g e t  from phenomenology 
to m etap h ysics, f o r ,  although h is  method i s  the
t h e o r e t ic a l  r e c o n str u c tio n  of c o n sc io u sn e ss , h is  g o a l i s  
the t h e o r e t ic a l  r e c o n str u c tio n  of the cosmos. F ich te
wants to  say th a t mind a c tu a lly  brings in to  being  the  
world i t  in h a b its .  I f  he i s  ta lk in g  about in d iv id u a l  
minds, apart from th e dubious v a l id i t y  of h is  method, he 
has two problem s. The f i r s t ,  a lread y  m entioned, i s  how
i t  i s  th a t mind ex p er ien ces  some o f i t s  p r e sen ta tio n s  as
(being determ ined by something o th er  than mind; and the  
second i s  how i t  i s ,  i f  each mind crea tes  the world i t  
in h a b its , th a t  s o lip s is m  i s  to be avoided . The f i r s t  
poin t i s  met by p o s it in g  an unconscious a c t iv i t y  o f mind 
which c r e a te s  what i s  experienced  by the con sc iou s mind 
as r e a l and e x te r n a l , and the second by supposing th a t  
th is  unconscious power i s  a u n iv e r sa l a t tr ib u te  of a l l  
m inds. T h is, of c o u rse , i s  noth ing other than the  
T ranscendental Im agin ation . However, i t  does not q u ite  
f i t  the b i l l .  A u n iv e r sa l power o f c r e a t iv e  im agination
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w i l l  guarantee us an in te r s u b je c t iv e ly  v e r id ic a l  world  
in  K ant's th eo ry , because i t  w i l l  impose the same form 
of appearance every  tim e i t  meets the same e x te r n a l  
(noumenal) c ircu m sta n ces, but in  F ich te  th ere  are no
circum stances a t  a l l .  E ith er  we could have no
d if f e r e n t ia te d  world a t a l l ,  or i t  could d i f f e r e n t ia t e  
on the b a s is  of in te r n a l m ental even ts l ik e  d e s ir e s  or  
hopes, and in  t h is  c a s e , i t  would not be co n sen su a lly  
v a l id .  I f ,  how ever, he means, not in d iv id u a l m inds, but 
some s o r t  o f 'one mind' or a b so lu te , th ere  are problems 
about the r e la t io n  between t h is  mind and ordinary  
in d iv id u a l m inds. I f  i t  c rea tes  in d iv id u a l m inds, i t  i s  
not c le a r  how t h is  d i f f e r s  from dualism .
Of c o u r se , F ich te  c e r ta in ly  did not so lv e  the
problems r a ise d  by Kant. Indeed , h is  ph ilosophy i s
always obscure and sometimes b iz a r r e . N e v e r th e le s s , he 
does rep resen t an advance in  th a t  he does p reserve  many 
of K ant's in s ig h t s  about the nature o f our ex p er ien ce  
and the r o le  o f an a c t iv e  c o n str u c t iv e  fa c u lty  in
shaping i t ,  and he does try  to express th ese  w ith in  a
genu inely  m onist framework. He choses the wrong form of 
monism, tr u e , but w ith in  the l im ita t io n s  imposed by th is
choice he works out the framework of a c o n s tr u c t iv e ,
m onist ep istem o lo g y . This in v o lv es  him in  ra th er  stran ge  
sp ecu la tio n s  on th e  nature of A bsolute Hind, which are 
not p a r t ic u la r ly  r e le v a n t to psychology . However, we 
can, perhaps e x tr a c t  from F ic h te 's  theory what i t  i s  he 
i s  saying about the op eration  of in d iv id u a l m inds. There
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are , b a s i c a l ly ,  four p ro p o s itio n s  :
(1 ) C onsciousness i s  an a c t i v i t y .
(2 ) C on sciousness i s  always co n sc io u sn ess  o f som ething.
(3 ) C onsciousness and i t s  o b jec t are m utually  
determ in ing.
(4 ) The a c t i v i t y  of c o n sc io u sn ess  i s  able to  come to 
grip s w ith  i t s  o b je c t  -  to  know i t ,  i f  we are ta lk in g  
about con sc iou s c o n sc io u sn e ss , or to determ ine i t ,  i f  we 
are ta lk in g  about unconscious co n sc io u sn ess  -  because i t  
i s  of the same s t u f f .
F ich te  was b a s ic a l ly  a thoroughgoing su b je c t iv e  
i d e a l i s t .  He ta lk ed  fo r  most o f ' h is  l i f e  as i f  the 
in d iv id u a l mind co n stru cted  the world i t  in h a b ite d , and 
i t  i s  a l l  but im p ossib le  to  make any se n se  o f h is  
theory , o r , a t  any r a t e ,  of i t s  deduction  on any other  
term s. L a ter , how ever, he was to rep u d ia te  t h is  v iew  and 
claim  -  under th r e a t  of d ism is sa l from h is  p o st fo r  
heresy -  th a t he had always meant the A bsolute Mind, 
God, but when he did th is  he was not b e lie v e d  by h is  
t h e i s t i c  opponents, and he was accused of p la g ia r ism  by 
h is  one tim e p u p il ,  S c h e llin g  (C op p leston , 1 963 ).
S c h e llin g  very  e a r ly  on saw the in coh eren ce of 
F ic h te 's  s u b je c t iv e  id e a lism , the im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f going  
from a phenom enological a n a ly s is  to a theory o f the 
w orld. So he s ta r t e d ,  not w ith  the in d iv id u a l em p ir ica l  
mind, but w ith  the A b so lu te . His v e r s io n  was th a t the
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cosmos i s  one s in g le  a c t ,  or rath er -  s in c e  th ere  i s  no 
agent to  stand apart and perform -  one s in g le  a c t i v i t y .  
S c h e l l in g 's  A bsolute was n e ith e r  agent nor a c t ,  su b je c t  
nor o b je c t ,  mind nor m a te r ia l , but a movement of the  
w hole, a t f i r s t  m a te r ia l , always f in a l ,  and becoming 
s e lf -c o n s c io u s  in  i t s  own product, mind. T his
s e lf -c o n s c io u s n e s s  in tro d u ces a r i f t  in to  the fa b r ic  o f  
the cosm os, whereby man co n fro n ts  th e  world as som ething  
over and a g a in st  h im se lf , ra th er  than p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  
i t .  T his i s  the source of a l l  our an gst and
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n ,  as w e ll  as our in t e l l e c t u a l  erro r  and 
c o n fu sio n . However, we cannot r e s to r e  the o r ig in a l  u n ity  
by becoming unconscious -  remember S c h e llin g  fo llo w s  
F ich te  in  the d i s t in c t io n  between dogmatism and
r e sp o n s ib le  philosophy -  we must r e s to r e  i t  a t a h ig h er  
l e v e l .  The so r t  of r e f l e c t iv e  a c tio n  he had in  mind,
th is  h igh er  l e v e l ,  was a e s th e t ic  ra th er  than
in t e l l e c t u a l  In t h is  th eo ry , the l in k  between man and 
the world i s  not the id e a l ,  which we vaguely  d isc e r n  
through the v e i l  o f the m a te r ia l, but the m a te r ia l  
i t s e l f ;  we are the same s t u f f  as the world through and 
through. This i s  not to sa y , however, th a t S c h e llin g  was 
a m a t e r ia l i s t ,  in  the modern sen se  o f the word, anyway. 
For him, mind and body were one, and, in d eed , one
consequence of h is  ph ilosop h y  was th at he b e lie v e d  he
could more or l e s s  deduce the s tr u c tu r e  o f n a tu r a l  
s c ie n c e , and he s e t  out to  do s o . So S c h e llin g  avoided  
both dualism  and s o lip s is m . He a lso  avoided arguing from  
a th e o r e t ic a l  r e c o n str u c tio n  of co n sc io u sn ess  to  a
44
theory o f the cosm os. However, i t  was ju s t  the f a c t  th at
i t  was based on our r e f l e c t iv e  knowledge o f our own
co n sc io u sn ess  th a t gave F ic h te 's , theory any s e c u r ity  i t  
had. We have to  ask what i t  i s ,  i f  anyth ing, th a t makes 
th is  theory  more than u n su b stan tia ted  s p e c u la t io n . For 
S c h e llin g , the ex p er ien ce  th a t guaranteed a l l  t h is  was
the ex p er ien ce  of b eau ty , o f the a e s th e t ic  a p p rec ia tio n  
of an o b je c t .  He b e lie v e d  th a t a e s th e t ic  a p p r e c ia tio n  
c o n s is t s  of in  some way re-d o in g  c o n sc io u s ly  the
unconscious work of th e  tran scen d en ta l im a g in a tio n , and
th is  tim e f r e e ly  and f r e s h ly  and not as a s la v e  of the  
everyday c o n c e p tu a lisa t io n s  o f the und erstand ing .
In S c h e ll in g , what was im p lic i t  in  Kant becomes 
e x p l i c i t .  Art i s  d efined  as the harmony of co n sc io u s and 
u n con sc iou s. However, S c h e ll in g 's  unconscious i s  much 
r ic h e r  than K ant's; i t  con ta in s not only a l l  p o s s ib le  
forms -  t h is  i s  true o f Kant -  but a l l  th e ir  p o s s ib le  
s ig n if ic a n c e s ,  th e ir  p o s s ib le  connections w ith  the l i f e  
of man. This im p lies  a v a s t  ex ten sio n  of the n o tio n s  of 
idea  and sym bol. An id ea  now becomes anything th a t could  
e x e r c ise  any c o n tro l over human a c t io n , m oral, r e l ig o u s ,  
em otional, se n su a l, and a symbol i t s  r e p r e se n ta tio n  in  
the e x te r n a l w orld . A s u c c e s s fu l work of a r t  i s  s t i l l  
one which e x h ib it s  form and con ten t in  p e r fe c t  harmony, 
but the con ten t now can be any id e a . The t r ic k  o f the 
a r t i s t  i s  to capture com p letely , but com p letely  
econ om ica lly , the id ea  he w ishes to  e x p ress .
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S c h e llin g  was, th en , a s o r t  of e v o lu t io n is t .  Indeed 
•he knew about s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  of e v o lu t io n , and saw 
them a s , in  some s e n s e , p a r a l le ls  of h is  system . And 
some e v o lu t io n i s t s ,  n otab ly  th e  supporters of emergent 
e v o lu t io n , saw them selves as supp ortin g  h is  system , o r , 
perhaps, as tr a n s la t in g  i t  in to  s c i e n t i f i c  term s. 
H ow ever,' S c h e llin g  was not o f fe r in g  a s c i e n t i f i c  
h y p o th e s is  the ch o ice  between see in g  l i f e  and 
co n sc io u sn ess  in  terms o f m atter and energy, or m atter  
and energy in  terms o f  l i f e  and c o n sc io u sn e ss , was fo r  
him com p letely  undetermined by m atters of f a c t ,  i t  was 
sim ply another v e r s io n  of the ch o ice  between dogmatic 
m a ter ia lism  and r e sp o n s ib le  p h ilo so p h y . Of co u rse , he 
b e lie v e d  th a t h is  ch o ice  would u lt im a te ly  be v in d ica te d  
by th e  ob v iou sly  g r e a te r  adequacy of the theory which 
fo llow ed  from th is  c h o ic e . N e v e r th e le s s , the theory does 
r e s t  on the claim  th a t  one o f the p r o p e r tie s  of s t u f f  i s  
th a t i t  can become c o n sc io u s , become capable of th e se  
c r e a t iv e  im ag in a tive  a c ts  th a t are the bases a l ik e  of 
our knowledge of th e  d eterm in ate w orld , and o f the  
d eterm in ation  of th a t world i t s e l f .  In S c h e ll in g 's  works 
th is  i s  m erely a sser te d  on th e  b a s is  of how c e r ta in  
a c t s ,  a c ts  of a r t i s t i c  c r e a t io n  or a p p r e c ia tio n , appear 
to  us. I t  must be adm itted th a t th e se  a c ts  are of a very  
r e f in e d , in t e l l e c t u a l  s o r t .  Perhaps we s h a l l  have gone 
some way towards r e c o n c ilin g  them w ith  th e ir  m a ter ia l  
base i f  we can r e la t e  them to human b o d ily  a c t io n . When 
we do t h is  we are changing p o in t o f view d r a s t ic a l ly .  
T r a d it io n a lly , ph ilosop hy has always accepted the
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primacy of the th e o r e t ic a l  -  what we do i s  to determ ine 
the world and then act upon i t .  But i f  we d er ive  our 
th e o r e t ic a l  d eterm in ation  from our p r a c t ic e ,  we admit 
the primacy of the p r a c t ic a l .  T h is , o f cou rse, i s  ju s t  
what Macmurray s e t  out to  do in  'S e lf  as A gent'.
îlacmurr a y 's  b a s ic  t h e s i s  i s  th a t con sc iou sn ess i s  
co n sc io u sn ess  in  and fo r  a c t io n . He asks what i s  the  
b asic  form of c o n sc io u sn e ss , th e  most elem entary form to  
which we cou ld  apply th e  l a b e l .  In order to answer t h i s ,  
he su g g e sts  th a t we should proceed " by d is t in g u ish in g  a 
hierarch y  of l e v e l s  w ith in  our own human co n sc io u sn e ss , 
such th a t although each l e v e l  i s  a con ceivab ly  v ia b le  
form of c o n sc io u sn ess  by i t s e l f ,  every h igher l e v e l  i s  
v ia b le  on ly  i f  i t  in c lu d es the le v e ls  below i t . "  He 
c la im s, u n c o n tr o v e r s ia lly  perhaps, th at th is  would 
rev ea l th a t the lower l im it  of con sc iou sn ess would 
c o n s is t  in  " a bare ca p a c ity  to d is t in g u is h  between  
comfort and d iscom fort, which i s  the low est form of  
p leasu re  pa in  d iscr im in a tio n ."  He argues th at below th is  
there i s  on ly  an organism which r e a c ts  to s tim u lu s , 
although th a t  r e a c t io n  may be ad ap tive and adjusted to  a 
s p e c i f ic  end. Indeed, the whole idea  of a
s t im u lu s -r e a c t io n  im p lies a t e l e o lo g ic a l  s tr u c tu r e ,  
im p lies th a t  an adequate d e s c r ip t io n  in clu d es re feren ce  
to an end. Such an adaptive t e l e o lo g ic a l  s tru c tu re  i s  
contained w ith in  the idea  of cause and e f f e c t  as a 
s p e c ia l ,  more elab orated  form, d i f f e r in g  from the o th ers  
by th is  added elem ent o f t e le o lo g y . In the same way, the
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idea  of a co n sc io u s  r e a c t io n  (we are not y e t  ta lk in g  
about a c t io n s )  i s  conta ined  in  the id ea  of a r e a c t io n ,  
d iscr im in a ted  from o th er  r e a c tio n s  by th is  added a sp ect  
of c o n sc io u sn e ss . At th is  l e v e l  co n sc io u sn ess  i s
e n t ir e ly  m otive . According to Macmurray, i t  i s  
occasioned  by a stim u lu s from the environm ent, and i s  a 
fa c to r  in  determ in ing a r e a c t io n  which i s ,  a t l e a s t
p u ta t iv e ly , an ad ap ta tion  to  the environm ent. However, 
i t  i s  not an awareness of the environm ent.
"It i s  an aw areness, but not an awareness of anything; 
not of the stim u lu s nor o f the r e a c tio n  nor of the  
environm ent."
M oreover, n oth in g  would be l o s t  i f  the requirem ent fo r  
an environm ental stim u lu s were dropped. Hunger and 
t ir e d n e ss  are both f e e l in g s ,  both e n ter  in to  the
determ in ation  of c e r ta in  behaviours, y e t  they are 
in te r n a l ly  g en era ted . Of cou rse , whether or not such
in te r n a l d r iv es  are more or le s s  p r im it iv e ,  
b io lo g ic a l ly ,  than b a s ic  i r r i t a b i l i t y  i s  a moot p o in t .  
However, i t  need not concern us h e r e . The e x is te n c e  of 
such f e e l in g s  i s  the c le a r e s t  case of th is  n o n -sen so ry , 
m otive c o n sc io u sn e ss . Macmurray's th ird  p o in t about th is  
l e v e l  of c o n sc io u sn ess  i s  th at i t  depends on and 
presupposes unconscious ad ap ta tion . That i s  not to say 
th a t i t  i s  epiphenom enal; fa r  from i t ,  i t  i s  a fa c to r  in  
the determ in ation  o f the resp on se. N e v e r th e le ss , i t  i s  
an o p tio n a l e x tr a , as i t  w ere. The ad ap tation  could  be 
u n con sciou s, and con sc iou sn ess  could not occur in  any 
s tr u c tu r e  th a t did not have th is  adaptive asp ect to  i t .
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This i s  much the same as P o ly a n i's  p o in t . The l a s t  p o in t  
i s  that t h is  l e v e l  a llow s fo r  co n sid era b le  e la b o r a t io n ,  
i . e .  co n sid era b le  d isc r im in a tio n  among d i f f e r e n t  
f e e l in g s ,  and co n sid era b le  co r re la te d  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  
among d i f f e r e n t  r e a c t io n s . I t  might be argued th at t h is  
so r t  of d isc r im in a tio n  lead s to a d i f f e r e n t  so r t  of 
c o n sc io u sn e ss . The id ea  of con sc iou sn ess  of d i f f e r e n t  
b o d ily  r e a c t io n s  would seem to  imply c o n sc io u sn ess  o f a 
body, and c o n sc io u sn ess  o f a body might perhaps imply 
co n sc io u sn ess  of a non-body, of a f i e l d  or environm ent. 
However, the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f an in term ed ia te  s t a t e  o f  
n on-sensory  environm ental co n sc io u sn ess  i s  ir r e le v a n t .  
l\!hatever th e  nature of the t r a n s i t io n ,  Macmurray's f i r s t  
l e v e l  of f e e l in g  co n sc io u sn ess  g iv es  r is e  to  h is  second  
l e v e l  of sen sory  c o n sc io u sn e ss .
Sensory co n sc io u sn ess  i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  c o n sc io u sn ess  
of som ething not the s e l f .  Macmurray c a l l s  t h i s ,  the  
"other", u sin g  t h is  as o p p o s ite  and c o r r e la t iv e  o f the  
ag en t, in  th e  same way th a t  o b je c t  i s  the o p p o s ite  and 
c o r r e la t iv e  o f the s u b je c t . The exp erien ce  of the o th er  
i s  p r im arily  an exp er ien ce  of r e s is ta n c e , of som ething 
thw arting the w i l l .  T his i s  the b a s ic  l e v e l  of sensory  
c o n sc io u sn e ss . A daptation to t h is  other as i t  i s  
d iscovered  in  a c tio n  provides a fu r th er  e la b o r a t io n , as 
in  the case  when we s i t  in  an arm c h a ir . The f u l ly  
developed form of sensory  co n sc io u sn ess  i s  achieved  when 
we can d isco v e r  the o th er  independent o f s p e c i f ic  
in strum ental a c t s ,  th a t i s  when we can c r ea te  an image
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of i t  by s p e c i f i c a l ly  exp lora tory  a c t s .  The p ro g ress io n  
from a c tio n  to  contem plation  i s  shown below . (Remember, 
t h is  i s  a h ie r a r c h ic a l  r e co n str u c tio n  of co n sc io u sn ess  
such th a t any h ig h er  l e v e l  in c lu d es a l l  lower l e v e l s . )
LEVEL 1: MOTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.
LEVEL 2 : SENSORY CONSCIOUSNESS
2a; b a sic  c o n sc io u sn ess  of 'o th e r ' .
2b: image in  a c t io n .
2c: image fo r  a c t io n .
2d : m ediated im age.
Perhaps 2a i s  not a r e a l p o s s ib i l i t y ,  and a l l  sensory  
co n sc io u sn ess  req u ires  an image, however sim ple and 
u n d if fe r e n t ia te d . I t  does not m atter e ith e r  way fo r  
p resen t p u rposes. Nor i s  i t  s t r i c t l y  n ecessa ry  th a t 2c 
and 2d be seen  in  an ascending s e r ie s ;  perhaps they are 
a l t e r n a t iv e s • The im portant th in g  i s  th a t they each 
imply 2b. L evel 2d i s  achieved when the image of the  
f i e l d  or o b je c t  of a c tio n  i s  achieved through a medium 
other than b o d ily  c o n ta c t . I t  i s  a t t h is  l e v e l  we begin  
to  ta lk  about sen se  data which have to be re ferred  to  
o b jects  \diich somehow g iv e  r is e  to them. Although th is  
i s  undoubtedly, in  some se n se , m ediated p ercep tio n , 
there i s  in  p r in c ip le  no d i f f i c u l t y  about r e fe r r in g  the 
image to the o b je c t  which does not a r is e  w ith  the 
previous l e v e l .  Of c o u rse , there are fu r th e r , more
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e la b o ra te  le v e ls  of c o n sc io u sn e ss , in  humans a t any 
r a te , but th ese  are not r e le v a n t  h ere .
Sensory co n sc io u sn e ss  i s ,  th en , ju st  l ik e  f e e l in g  
con sc iou sn ess p r im a rily  m otive . Of cou rse , in  the case  
of v i s io n ,  i t  does not seem s o . Our v isu a l p ercep tio n  
seems sim ply to a ffo rd  us images of the world, knowledge 
of the w orld , and, th e r e fo r e , to  be prim arily  c o g n it iv e .  
Moreover, i t  i s  sim ply unden iab le th a t of a l l  the 
se n se s , v i s io n  g iv e s  us the most e la b o ra te  exp er ien ce  of 
the o th er . In most c a s e s ,  th ere  i s  fa r  more a v a ila b le  to  
us through v is io n  than we cou ld  p o ss ib ly  u se . Perhaps, 
th is  i s  vhat g iv es  us the n o tio n  th at v is io n  i s  
prim arily  fo r  knowing ra th er  than d o in g . However, th is  
i s  sim ply a fu n c tio n  of v i s io n  p resen tin g  to us 
sim u ltan eou sly , the a ffo rd a n ces fo r  a l l  p o s s ib le  
a c tio n s , in strum enta l and ex p lo ra to r y .
Macmurray cla im s th a t v i s io n  develop s from tou ch , 
and in  t h i s ,  of co u r se , he i s  in  agreement w ith  
B erkeley. However, th ere  are im portant d if f e r e n c e s .  
F ir s t ly ,  Macmurray i s  ab le  to  assume th a t v is io n  does in  
some sense d eve lop , and, s in c e  he has se v er a l d i f f e r e n t  
models of development a v a i la b le ,  he i s  ab le to sep a ra te  
out is su e s  of how v is io n  and touch r e la te  to each o th er  
and the w orld , from is s u e s  about the p r e c ise  mechanisms 
involved  in  e s ta b l is h in g  and m aintain ing t h is  
r e la t io n s h ip . Secondly, he i s  q u ite  c le a r  th at touch i s  
a form of a c t io n  ra th er  than a form of s e n s ib i l i t y ,  and
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th is  more than anything e l s e  en ab les him to g ive  a
coherent account as Berkeley was n o t . T h ird ly , in  the  
passage from instrum ental a c tio n  to contem plative  
v is io n ,  we s e e  the p ro g ress iv e  developm ent of co n ten ts  
of c o n sc io u sn e ss , p e r c e p ts , im ages, s e n s a t io n s , as 
elem ents in  and programs fo r  a c t io n .
Macmurray r eco g n ises  th at i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  imagine 
a person w ith ou t a ta c tu a l s e n se , b u t , he wants to sa y , 
only in  a ra th er  im poverished sen se  o f im ag in a tion . As 
soon as any attem pt i s  made to  f i l l  in  the d e t a i l s  of 
th e ir  l i f e ,  thoughts f e e l in g s ,  e t c . ,  i t  becomes obvious  
th a t such a being could never become c o n sc io u s . This may 
be tr u e , i f  com plete motor p a r a ly s is  and com plete  
ta c tu a l a n a e sth es ia  i s  m eant. However, th ere  are  
c e r ta in ly  people w ith  no fu n c tio n a l a c t iv e  touch, xdio 
never have had any r e a l use of a c t iv e  touch (p eop le  w ith  
extreme c o n g e n ita l cereb ra l p a lsy  fo r  in s ta n c e ) , and 
they are c e r ta in ly  not u n co n sc io u s. In any c a se , the  
q u estio n  i s  not whether or n ot th ere  could be such a
person , but whether such a s tr u c tu r e  could e v o lv e , and 
the answer to t h is  i s  su r e ly  no.
D iscu ssio n  of the e v o lu tio n  of con sc iou sn ess r a is e s
the q u estio n  of on what ev id en ce can we a t tr ib u te  a 
s p e c i f ic  l e v e l  of con sc iou sn ess  to a s p e c i f ic  organism . 
To get from m otive to sensory  co n sc io u sn ess  n e c e s s i ta te s  
exp erien cin g  the other as r e s i s t in g  the w i l l ,  i . e .  
fa c t u a l ly .  Macmurray says th a t the other i s  both
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o p p o s itio n  to  and support fo r  a c t io n , and t h is  i s  
e m p ir ic a lly  true fo r  humans, but perhaps not n e c e ssa r y . 
Free swimmming crea tu res  would not experience the o th er
as the support of th e ir  a c t io n s , but might not on th a t
account, be debarred from sensory c o n sc io u sn e ss , 
provided they  had the exp er ien ce  of r e s is ta n c e . However, 
the e x is te n c e  o f s p e c i f ic  p a ttern s  of complex behaviour  
d irec ted  tow ards, and adapted to , fea tu res  o f the  
ex tern a l w orld does not guarantee the e x is te n c e  o f t h is  
so r t o f aw areness. We cannot say th at an organism  has 
such a c o n sc io u sn ess  on the b a s is  of a p a r t ic u la r  
perform ance, of co u rse , m erely m echanical or p er ip h era l  
p rocesses could  ach ieve the same behaviour, but we can 
say i t  has n o t , or a t l e a s t  does not show i t .
Of co u r se , we are concerned w ith normal human
v is io n , l e v e l  2d. We are look in g  fo r  a theory th a t se es  
v is io n  as a form of a c tio n  on the environment r e s u lt in g  
in  the form ation  of a p ercep tio n  o f th a t environment as 
i t  a ffo rd s  fo r  fu r th e r  a c t io n , instrum ental or 
ex p lo ra to ry . The p r in c ip a l requirem ent -  d is q u a lify in g  
most con ven tion a l th e o r ie s  -  i s  th a t the a c tio n  should  
be performed d ir e c t ly  on the w orld , and not on some
p r im itiv e  l e v e l  of s e n s a t io n . I f  we a llow  any form of 
c o n sc io u sn e ss , however b a s ic , which does not depend on 
a c tio n , but on mere s e n s i t i v i t y  or a b i l i t y  to r e g i s t e r ,  
then we are back to B erk eley . Of co u rse , Gibson (1950, 
1966) i s  th e  obvious cand idate fo r  such a th eory . H is 
b asic  th e se s  are as fo llo w s  :
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(1 ) Features and a sp e c ts  of the percep t are s p e c if ie d  
d ir e c t ly  in  the p a ttern  of l ig h t  f a l l in g  at the eye; not 
o n ly , or even p r im a r ily , in  lo c a l  or momentary e v e n ts ,  
but in  g r a d ie n ts , f lo w s , e t c . ,  , in  events in te g r a te d  
across the whole area of the v is u a l  f i e l d  and a cross  
con sid erab le  p o rtio n s of t im e .
(2 ) Since there i s  t h i s  r ic h  data b ase , there i s  no need 
to p o s it  a r o le  fo r  ex p er ien ce  or in feren ce  to h elp  us 
from an im poverished , im p erfect stim ulu s to  our 
p ercep tio n .
(3 ) There are no m ental e v e n ts , ch a in s of in fe r e n c e , and 
no mental c o n ten ts , e s p e c ia l ly  no s e n sa t io n s , between  
the l ig h t  f a l l in g  on the r e t in a  and the p ercep tio n  of 
the w orld.
(4 )  The p attern  of l ig h t  a t  the r e tin a  un iq u ely  
s p e c if ie s  a p a r t ic u la r  c o n fig u r a tio n  of the w orld , but 
t h is  i s  not a l o g ic a l  or a geom etr ica l tr u th , but a 
b io lo g ic a l  or e c o lo g ic a l  tr u th . The l ig h t  s p e c i f ie s  the  
world through a whole h o s t  o f con tin gen t fa c t s  about 
pattern s of l ig h t  and th e ir  r e la t io n s  to su r fa c e s  and 
o b jects  in  th is  p a r t ic u la r  w orld . The a b i l i t y  to  e x p lo it  
th ese  c o n tin g en c ie s  i s  part o f our b io lo g ic a l  
in h e r ita n c e . This fu n c tio n  of sp e c ify in g  the la y o u t of 
su rfa ces  i s  normal v i s io n .
(5 )  \'3hen in  normal v i s io n  we p er c e iv e  the s tr u c tu r e  of 
the w orld, i t  i s  the world as i t  a ffo rd s  us 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  for  a c t io n . This l e v e l  of p ercep tio n  i s  
b u ilt  on space p ercep tio n  in  the sense th a t,
'Vhen the constan t p r o p e r tie s  of constan t o b je c ts  are
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perceived (th e  shape, s i z e ,  • . . ) ,  the observer can go 
on to d e tec t  th e ir  a ffordances . . . .  What they a fford  
the observer a f te r  a l l ,  depends on th e ir  p r o p e r tie s ."
At th is  fu r th er  l e v e l ,  exp erien ce  and lea rn in g  p lay  a 
part in  p er c ep tio n .
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CHAPTER 3: IMAGES and PERCEPTS.
3.1  INTRODUCTION.
The p reced in g  chapter used the terms image and 
percept, term s which apparently r e fe r  to  c e r ta in  o b je c ts  
in  our e x p e r ie n c e . In th is  c h a p te r , an attem pt i s  made 
to say som ething about th ese  o b j e c t s .  The hope i s  th at  
i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  say som ething about the 'bare  
e x p er ien ce ' o f  p ercep tion  and im agery. The co n ten tio n  
w i l l  be th a t t h is  experience tu rn s out to be something 
s tr a n g e ly  in d eterm in ate and e q u iv o c a l, and th a t  t h is  i s  
not a f a u l t  of our way of sp eak in g , but part of the  
nature o f th e  ex p er ien ce , or perhaps of ex p er ien ce  in  
g en era l. S a r tr e 's  book on im agin ation  (1940, trans 1972) 
i s  d iscu sse d  and t h is  i s  used to  r e v e a l t h is  ra th er  odd 
nature as i t  a p p lie s  to the m ental im age. I t  has long  
been r e a lis e d  th at the image i s  e lu s iv e ,  but an a n a ly s is  
of p e r c ep tio n  shows e x a c tly  the same to be tru e  of the  
p ercep t. A fter  im agination  and p e rcep tio n , 
W ittg e n s te in 's  (1953) work on im ag in a tive  p ercep tio n  i s  
d isc u sse d , and a t l e a s t  part of th e  ex p la n a tio n  fo r  th is  
indeterm inacy i s  lo ca ted  in  the nature o f the image as a 
procedure fo r  determ ining an o b je c t  as p a r t ic u la r  so r t  
of o b je c t , and a lso  as the r e s u lt  o f th is  procedure.
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Phenom enological d e s c r ip t io n  in v o lv es  rep ortin g  
exp er ien ce  u n d isto rted  by p r io r  know ledge, e x p ec ta tio n s  
or th e o r ie s ;  adopting 'an a t t i tu d e  of d is c ip l in e d  
n a iv e te '  (M acleod, 1954). I t  i s  supposed to be 
p r e -c o n c e p tu a l, th a t i s ,  u n a ffec ted  by any 
p resu p p o sitio n s  about the nature of our exp erience of 
the w orld . S ince such p resu p p o sitio n s  are b u i l t  in to  the  
str u c tu r e  o f our language, i t  cannot be th is  e n t ir e ly ,  
but a t l e a s t  i t  can be p r e - t h e o r e t ic a l , and i t  can be 
p r e -o n to lo g ic a l ( in  the sen se  o f not determ ining b efore  
the even t the in ven tory  of p r im itiv e  ir r e d u c ib le s  th a t  
are used in  our d e s c r ip t io n s ) .  Phenomenology as a sch o o l  
was founded by Franz Brentano in  the la t t e r  part of the  
n in e teen th  cen tu ry , and developed by h is  pup il Edmund 
H u sser l. Adherents to  t h is  sc h o o l c la im , of co u rse , to  
p r a c tis e  th e  phenom enological method. As Act Psychology  
i t  was th e  main contemporary o p p o sitio n  to Wundt's
In tro sp e c tio n ism . Since both p sy c h o lo g ie s  aimed a t an 
accurate and unprejudiced account of human ex p e r ie n c e , 
and s in c e  t h is  i s  what i s  attem pted here w ith  regard to  
im agination  and p e r c ep tio n , i t  w i l l  be w orthw hile, 
perhaps, to  look  a t what d iv id ed  th ese  very d if f e r e n t
sc h o o ls . Wundt was try in g  in  the f i r s t  p lace  to  
e s ta b l is h  the b asic  c o n s t itu e n ts  o f co n sc io u sn ess , and 
then to  d isco v er  the ru les  governing th e ir  aggregation  
in to  more complex mental form s. These b u ild in g  b locks  
co n s is te d  o f sen sa tio n s  and f e e l in g s .  Sensations were 
divided  and l i s t e d  by m odality; fo r  in s ta n c e , w ith in
touch s p e c ia l  sen ses of h eat and c o ld , deep p ressu re ,
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p a in , and touch were r e co g n ise d . F ee lin g s  were
c a teg o r ised  as p le a sa n t, p a in fu l ,  or in d if f e r e n t .  An
accurate unb iased  account of ex p er ien ce  would c o n s is t  of
an in ven tory  o f th ese  b a s ic  m ental co n ten ts  com prising
the e x p e r ie n c e , and th e ir  order o f occu rren ce. I f  asked
what they exp erien ced  when presen ted  w ith  a red book,
su b jec ts  had to  rep ly  in  terms of patches o f red co lou r
of such and such an e x te n s io n , and so on. Any other so r t
of language, any mention of books, fo r  in s ta n c e , was to
commit ' th e  stim ulu s er ro r ' of a ss ig n in g  to  the
.p ercep tual ex p er ien ce  q u a l i t ie s  o f the stim u lu s known 
from oth er  so u r c e s . C learly  Wundt committed what might 
be c a lle d  ' th e  o n to lo g ic a l e r r o r ' .  In try in g  to escape  
from the unconscious p resu p p o sitio n s  of everyday 
language, Wundt only succeeded in  Imposing h is  own more 
r ig id  system  o f c a te g o r ie s , and in  try in g  to  found a 
theory by the a p p lic a t io n  of too  r ig id  m ethodologica l 
p r in c ip le s ,  presupposed the theory  he would a r r iv e  a t .
Phenom enologists succeeded much b e t te r  in  capturing  
the nature o f ex p er ien ce . They allow ed them selves the  
,whole r ic h n ess  of language, and determ ined to capture  
the unique and complex q u a l i t ie s  of each con crete  
ex p er ien ce . M oreover, they tended to con cen tra te  on 
fu ll-b lo w n  ex p er ien ce , ra th er  than the rath er  
impoverished s itu a t io n s  of the p sy c h o lo g ic a l lab oratory  
from Wundt onwards. A ll th is  g iv e s  th e ir  w r itin g s  the  
flavou r  of l i t e r a t u r e  rather than s c ie n c e , but i f  th is  
i s  \diat i s  required to remain true to our a c tu a l
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ex p e r ie n c e , then l e t  i t  be. They d id , m oreover, succeed  
in  e s ta b l is h in g  a number of ra th er  gen era l p r in c ip le s  
about the nature of mental fu n c t io n in g . Their main ten e t  
i s  the in t e n t io n a l i t y  of m ental phenomena. 
I n t e n t io n a l ity  means th a t each p rocess r e fe r s  to  
som ething o u ts id e  i t s e l f .
'P ercep tio n s  are p ercep tio n s of som ething, f e e l in g s  are 
f e e l in g s  about so m eth in g .' (Warnock, 1976).
The c o r o lla r y  o f th is  i s  the d o c tr in e  of 'th e  
in te n t io n a l  in e x is te n c e  of th in g s '  This means, q u ite  
sim ply , th a t we can on ly  be con sc iou s of th in gs as they  
e x is t  in  and fo r  our in te n t io n a l  a c t s .
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3 .2  The INDETERMINACY of the VISUAL D4AGE.
There are a number of th e o r ie s  or ways of ta lk in g  about 
v is u a l  im agery. The most w idespread i s  th a t images are a 
s o r t  of m ental p ic tu r e  which we view w ith  our m ind's
e y e . T his view  i s  rath er o b v io u s ly  inadequate s in c e  i t
i s  open to  the same c r i t ic i s m  as the e q u iv a len t view  of 
a p ercep t th a t i t  in v o lv e s  an en d less  re g re ss  of 
p ic tu r e s  and homunculi to view  them. N e v er th e le ss  any 
account of v is u a l  imagery ought to  o f f e r  some account of 
i t s  i n t u i t iv e  appeal. S a r tr e 's  (1940) view  i s  th a t  
im agination  i s  a so r t  o f q u a s i-p e r c e p tio n , knowledge 
masquerading as p e rcep tio n . However, Sartre wants to  
d i f f e r e n t ia t e  imagery too s tr o n g ly  from p e r c e p tio n , not 
a llo w in g , perhaps, th a t knowledge en ters  in to  
p e r c e p tio n . So a th ird  view  i s  adopted. An image i s  ju s t  
l ik e  a percep t; ju s t  l ik e  a p e r c e p t, not ju s t  l ik e  a 
p ic tu r e . To image something i s  to  have an exp erien ce
ju s t  l ik e  se e in g  i t  , ex cep t th a t  i t  i s  not experienced
as being  in  behavioural sp a c e . When we image som ething  
we do not b e l ie v e  th a t we can grasp i t  or touch i t ,  or 
th a t we can approach i t  by w alk ing or running up to i t .  
I t  i s  ju s t  th is  b e l i e f ,  or lack  of i t  which 
d is t in g u is h e s  our imaging from our se e in g .
In the f i r s t  part of 'The Psychology of 
Im agination ' Sartre a n a ly ses  the exp erien ce  o f mental 
imagery and t r ie s  to say what i t  i s  to  'have an im age'.
60
F ir s t ly ,  he wants to  e s ta b l is h  th a t imagery i s  a form 
and not a con ten t of c o n sc io u sn e ss . Of c o u rse , he would 
say the same th in g  about thoughts or p e r c e p ts . He i s  not 
saying th a t th e re  are some kinds of con sc iou s c o n ten t, 
but an image i s  not among them, but th a t th e  id ea  of 
con sc iou sn ess as a s o r t  of r e p o s ito r y  fo r  variou s  
con ten ts i s  not very  u s e fu l .  Since a l l  forms of 
con sciou sn ess are in te n t io n a l ,  we have to  ask to  what 
the exp erien ce  of imagery r e f e r s .  S a r tr e 's  answer i s  
th at i t  r e fe r s  d i r e c t ly  to th e  th in g  im agined , and not 
to  an image o f i t .
"The im a g in a tiv e  con sc iou sn ess I  have of P ie rr e  i s  
not a c o n sc io u sn ess  of the image o f P ie r r e ;  P ie rr e  i s  
d ir e c t ly  reached; my a tte n t io n  i s  not d ir ec ted  on an 
image, but on an o b je c t ."
The n o tio n  of an image as something e x is t in g  w ith in  
c o n sc io u sn e ss , which r e la te s  e x t r in s ic a l ly  as a p ic tu r e  
or a symbol -  to  something o u ts id e , i s  d en ied . Only when 
the mind turns round on i t s e l f ,  to  grasp i t s e l f  as being  
engaged in  a p a r t ic u la r  a c t i v i t y ,  im ag in a tion , can i t
say "I have an image". 'For S a r t r e  the mental image
i s  an o b je c t , n o t of im agination but of r e f l e c t io n . '  
(Warnock, 1 976 ).
The second c h a r a c te r is t ic  i s  c a lle d  
q u a s i-o b se r v a tio n . According to S a r tr e , p ercep tion  
always c o n ta in s  a w ealth of u n r e a lise d  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .
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I t  i s  th ese  u n r e a lis e d  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  th a t d i f f e r e n t ia t e  
im agination  from p e r c e p tio n . I f  we look for  them in  
Imagery, we are d isa p p o in te d . The image g iv e s  a l l  i t  has 
to g iv e  im m ediately; th ere  i s  noth ing e x tr a , nothing  
s t i l l  to be r ev ea led  or d isco v e r e d . The b e st  knowm 
i l lu s t r a t io n  of t h is  i s  in  the experim ent (c i t e d  in  
Woodworthj ) where su b je c ts  are asked
to v i s u a l i s e  a w ell-know nj r e la t iv e ly  long word. When 
asked i f  they  can do t h i s ,  su b je c ts  alm ost in v a r ia b ly  
respond th a t they can . They are then asked to  s p e l l  the  
word backwards, and they fin d  t h is  task  a l l  but 
im p o ss ib le . T h is , o f course,* i s  a consequence of the  
image being th e  a c t i v i t y ,  rath er  than something upon 
which th is  a c t i v i t y  i s  perform ed. These f i r s t  two 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of the image c o n s t i tu te  t h is  f l e e t in g  
and e lu s iv e  q u a l i ty .
The th ir d  c h a r a c te r is t ic  i s  "nothingness"; th a t i s ,  
con sc iou sn ess p o s i t s  an o b je c t , whether absent or 
n o n -e x is te n t , and i t  p o s i t s  i t  as NOT being in  the here  
and now. I t  has been assumed, wrongly, says S a r tre , th a t  
f i r s t  an image i s  c o n str u c te d , then i t  i s  trea ted  as a 
p ercep tio n , and f i n a l l y  some some so r t  of q u a l i f ic a t io n  
i s  added, reducin g i t  to  the s ta tu s  of an image. But 
what r e a l ly  happens i s  th at in  p o s it in g  the o b je c t , i t  
i s  p o s ited  as n on -b ein g . The fou rth  c h a r a c te r is t ic  i s  
sp o n ta n e ity . This i s  S a r tr e 's  word fo r  freedom or lack  
of causa l d e term in a tio n . I f  we do something 
sp on tan eou sly , we do i t  sim ply because we choose t o .  Of
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co u rse , t h is  im p lies  th a t we do i t  in t e n t io n a l ly ,  and 
th at we do i t  know ingly. Now, a lthough th ese  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  are g iven  here in  the same order as they  
are g iven  by S a r tr e , in  f a c t ,  they a l l  d er iv e  from the  
fo u r th , sp o n ta n e ity , or the fr e e  nature of 
c o n sc io u sn e ss . S a r tr e 's  great concern i s  w ith  human 
freedom, and fo r  him i t  i s  an a l l  or noth ing m atter. 
This i s  h is  v e r s io n  of dualism . T h erefore , s in c e  
p ercep tion  i s ,  of n e c e s s i ty ,  not e n t ir e ly  undetermined 
by the environm ent, i t  must be separated  o f f  r ig id ly  
from those a sp e c ts  of mental l i f e  which embody our human 
freedom, p r o to ty p ic a lly  im ag in ation .
One of the im p lica tio n s  o f t h is  view  would seem to  
be th a t we cannot be su rp rised  by our im ages, and, 
indeed , S a rtre  makes ju s t  t h is  im p lic a t io n . However, as 
Warnock p o in ts  o u t , i t  i s  ju s t  not the case th at we 
never f e e l  su r p r ise  a t an im age. In f a c t ,  Sartre  
reco g n ises  th a t  t h is  i s  the c a s e , a t  l e a s t  in  s p e c ia l  
circum stances l ik e  hypnagogic im agery. The f a c t  of the  
m atter i s ,  th a t con sc iou sn ess i s  n ot an a l l - o r  -n oth in g  
c o n d itio n . Of co u r se , being su rp rised  a t the occurrence  
of an image i s  not the same as d e l ib e r a te ly  c r ea tin g  or 
r e -c a l l in g  an im age, and then being su rp rised  a t what i t  
co n ta in s . However, Warnock i n s i s t s  th a t in  c e r ta in  
in stan ces  we can d isco v er  something in  an image. Her 
example i s  the case when we are asked i f  P ie rr e  has a 
m oustache. One way of answering th is  i s  to  image P ie r r e ,  
and to answer from t h is  image. This seems to  break the
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p r in c ip le  of m erely q u a s i-o b se r v a tio n . But the image i s  
su r e ly  not formed and then in sp ected  to  fin d  a 
m oustache. One a c t  i s  perform ed, the act of r e c a l l ;  we 
remember P ie rr e  m oustache and a l l ,  and we remember him 
v i s u a l ly .
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3 .3  The INDETERMINACY of the VISUAL PERCEPT.
The f i r s t  c h a r a c te r is t ic  c le a r ly  a p p lie s  to  
p ercep tio n  as to im a g in a tio n . At f i r s t  s ig h t ,  the second  
seems more d o u b tfu l. S u r e ly , our p ercep tion  d o e s , as 
Sartre puts i t ,  "overflow " w ith  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  However, 
i f  we look  c lo s e ly ,  i t  i s  th e  world that overflow s; our 
(momentary) p ercep ts are as im poverished as our im ages, 
and in  p r e c is e ly  the same way. IHien we g lan ce  a t  a 
sc en e , a t a p o r tio n  of th e  v isu a l w orld , we are not 
con sciou s of any sharp d iv is io n  between what i s  in  our 
f i e l d  of view  and what i s  not; we do not p er c e iv e  our 
f i e l d  of view  as a so r t  of h o r iz o n ta l oval s e c t io n  of 
the w orld . (See G ibson, 1966 p255 fo r  i l l u s t r a t i o n . )  Nor 
are we con sciou s of any d is c o n t in u ity  between our fovea  
and our p erip h ery . We do n o t , fo r  in s ta n c e , have a c le a r  
fo v ea l reg ion  and a b lurred  perip hery . There i s  no 
se n sa tio n  of b lu rred n ess a t a l l ;  we are sim ply  more 
con sciou s o f what i s  in  the fo v e a . S u b je c tiv e ly , what we 
have i s  a so r t  of g ra d ien t o f con sciou sn ess from the  
c e n tr e , out to the p er ip h ery , and round behind our 
heads. Where our v is u a l  f i e l d  ends, co n sc io u sn ess  i s  
already so l im ite d  th a t we do not n o t ic e  any 
d is c o n t in u ity . O b je c t iv e ly , we have a so r t  of grad ien t  
of e f f o r t .  At the c e n tr e , everyth in g  i s  a lready th e r e , 
presen t to co n sc io u sn e ss , a t the perip hery , i t  would 
requ ire eye movements to  bring the ob ject in to  fo c u s , 
fu rth er  out head movements, and imm ediately behind u s .
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whole body movements. When we im agine som eth ing, we have 
the same s o r t  of e x p e r ie n c e , a c e n tr a l area where we are 
f u l l y  con sc iou s o f what i t  i s  we are im ag in in g , and a 
f e e l in g  o f something th ere  a v a ila b le  i f  we should need 
i t .  When we go fo r  t h is  som ething i t  i s  not th e r e , not 
s u r p r is in g ly ,  because th ere  i s  no sc e n e , no p ic tu r e  we 
can read o f f .  The image i s  the e x p e r ie n c e , s im p ly .
We have another s o r t  of v is u a l  e x p e r ie n c e , a more 
common s o r t ,  the p ercep tio n  we have o f a sc e n e , a room, 
say , which i s  got not from a s in g le  g la n c e , but made up 
from a whole s e r ie s  of g la n ces  over a period  of tim e. 
Made up 'from ' not ' o f ' :  t h is  i s  a s in g le  p e r c ep tio n , a 
s in g le  v is u a l  e x p e r ie n c e , not a s e r i e s ,  a lthough i t  can, 
of co u rse , be broken down in  r e f l e c t io n .  But we can 
in te g r a te  in form ation  gathered  over tim e as w e ll  as over 
sp ace . When we remember, we r e -e x p e r ie n c e  the sc e n e . I f  
we fr e e z e  t h is  e x p e r ie n c e , we f in d  part of the scen e in  
c o n sc io u sn e ss , and part o f i t  a v a i la b le .  This tim e, 
however, i t  r e a l ly  i s  a v a i la b le ,  and when we go fo r  i t ,  
we g e t  i t .
Not only are p a r t ic u la r  p a r ts , p a r t ic u la r  s p a t ia l  
a rea s, of the v is u a l  world more or l e s s  c o n sc io u s , so 
too are p a r t ic u la r  a s p e c ts . I t  i s  a common o b je c t io n  to  
v is u a l  imagery th a t , w h ile  peop le w i l l  o f te n  rep o rt that 
memory fo r  ep iso d es o f te n  takes the form of v isu a l  
im agery, when they are asked about what one of the 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  was w earing, or about some o th er  asp ect of
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the s i t u a t io n  th a t would be a v a i la b le  i f  the s it u a t io n  
were b ein g  v iew ed , they can not respond . T his i s ,  
perhaps, an o b je c t io n  to  a p i c t o r ia l  theory  o f imagery, 
but n ot to  a theory which says th a t  an image i s  sim ply  
the e x p e r ie n c e . The p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  the ep iso d e  were 
taken j u s t  as p eop le; what was attended  to  a t  the tim e, 
and what i s  r e c a lle d  as an image are the s i t u a t io n a l ly  
r e le v a n t  a sp e c ts  of th e ir  p r e se n c e , l ik e  t h e ir  f a c ia l  
e x p r e ss io n s . The co lou r and cu t of th e ir  d ress  i s  not 
fo r g o tte n  or l e f t  o u t, i t  sim ply was not seen  in  the  
f i r s t  p la c e .  I t  was not p a rt o f th e  i n i t i a l  v isu a l  
e x p e r ie n c e , and so i s  not part o f the v is u a l  image.
I t  m ight be o b jected  th a t i t  must be the case  th at  
our v i s u a l  p ercep ts  con ta in  co lou r  and form , because  
when asked about them, we are always ab le  to  report  
colour and form . This i s  because of the s o r t  of 
indeterm inacy of meaning m entioned. Is  the percep t the  
percept of the room b u i l t  up over tim e, the p ercep t of 
th a t corner of i t  in  the v is u a l  f i e l d ,  or i s  i t  the 
percep t now, t h is  twenty m illis e c o n d s ?  Perhaps, i t  i s  
not ju s t  an indeterm inacy o f m eaning, but a more r a d ic a l  
indeterm inacy in  th a t our v is u a l  system  i s  always 
e x tr a c t in g  in form ation  over d i f f e r e n t  tim e s c a le s ,  
always in te g r a t in g  over d i f f e r e n t  tim e s c a le s  to y ie ld  
p ercep ts of sp a ce , o b je c t s , c o lo u r s , con tou rs, 
movements, e v e n ts . The number of in te g r a t io n s ,  the 
in form ation  u sed , the time s c a le :  a l l  are indeterm inate  
for  any one of th ese  p e r c ep ts . Anyway, our p ercep t of
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the room w i l l  c e r ta in ly  in c lu d e  co lou r  and form, but our 
percept now -  e s p e c ia l ly  i f  we mean a very sh ort now -  
may n o t .
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3 .4  WITTGENSTEIN and IMAGINATIVE PERCEPTION.
W ittg e n ste in  d is c u ss e s  the r o le  of im agination  in  
p e r c e p tio n . U n fortu n ately , he co n cen tra tes  m ainly on 
p ic tu r e s  ra th er  than r e a l o b je c ts , although he does want 
to apply what he says to r e a l o b je c t s . He ta lk s  about 
's e e in g  a s '  or 'se e in g  an a s p e c t ' ,  by which he means 
se e in g  accord ing to  a p a r t ic u la r  in te r p r e ta t io n . He does 
not want to apply see in g  an asp ect in  a l l  s i t u a t io n s ,  
but on ly  where there i s  some s o r t  of am bigu ity . Where 
th ere  i s  am biguity in  a p ic tu r e , i t  i s  g e n e r a lly  crea ted  
d e l ib e r a t e ly ,  as in  the d u ck -rab b it. I f  I s e e  i t  on ly as 
a r a b b it ,  I  would not say th a t I  see  i t  as a
p ic tu r e - r a b b it , but sim ply th a t I  s e e  a p ic tu r e -r a b b it . 
N e v e r th e le s s , I  am not doing anything d if f e r e n t  from 
someone who does know the am bigu ity, but i s  p r e se n tly  
se e in g  i t  as a p ic tu r e  r a b b it .  Someone e l s e  m ight say o f
me th a t I  was se e in g  as; he Is  not d isa g ree in g  w ith  me,
he ju s t  knows about the other p o s s i b i l i t y .  I f  there were 
no am biguity a t a l l ,  no one would say th a t I was se e in g  
a s , but i t  would s t i l l  be the same th in g  I was d o in g , 
W ittg e n ste in  i s  not here making a d i s t in c t io n  between  
two p r o c e ss e s , se e in g  and se e in g  a s , but between two 
c o n tex ts  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  He i s ,  n e v e r th e le s s ,
r e v ea lin g  som ething about p rocesses  th at go on in  
p ercep tion  whether or not there i s  am biguity. The 
s itu a t io n  i s  ra th er  s im ila r  to using  o p t ic a l  i l lu s io n s  
to re v ea l p ro cesses  th a t go on in  ordinary v e r id ic a l
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p e r c ep tio n .
When you look  a t  the p ic tu r e  o b ject which i s  the  
d u ck -rab b it, you se e  one o f two p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which are  
m utually e x c lu s iv e .  Y et, a t  th e  same time you se e  the  
same th in g  w hichever p o s s i b i l i t y  you ch o o se . This i s  
what lea d s  W ittg e n ste in  to  sa y ,
" 'S eein g  as . . . '  i s  not p art of p e rcep tio n . And fo r  
th at reason  i t  i s  l ik e  s e e in g ,  and again not l ik e ,"
( st-ev n, M53) p
The asp ect may change b efo re  your e y e s . I t  i s  no good
saying th a t what changes i s  the o r g a n isa t io n , and then
try in g  to pretend th a t o r g a n isa t io n  means shape; in  t h is  
c a se , anyway, the shape remains the same whether a duck 
or a r a b b it .
"If you put o r g a n isa t io n  o f an o b je c t on a l e v e l  w ith  
colou r and shape you are p r o c e e d in g .. , .(w r o n g ly ) ."
Although in  the ca se  of the duck-rabbit we have to  
'know' both duck and r a b b it  p r io r  to  see in g  the p ic tu r e ,
th is  i s  not true in  the case  of the d o u b le -cr o ss . This
i s  p a r t ly  b ecau se,
"Those two a sp e c ts  ................( , , ,  a sp ects A) might be
reported sim ply by p o in tin g  a lte r n a te ly  to an i s o la t e d  
w hite and an is o la te d  b lack  c r o ss ."
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In the case  of the p ic tu r e  o b je c t , th en , we r e la t e  to 
the stim u lu s as two th in gs; th ere  i s ,  on the one hand, 
the a c tu a l p e r c ep tio n , th a t i s ,  the a c tu a l shape and 
co lou r of the f ig u r e ,  and on the o th e r , a concurren t, 
a lso  v is u a l  ex p er ien ce  of th a t shape as a p ic tu r e  of  
som ething s p e c i f i c ,  but not n e c e s s a r i ly  recogn ised  or 
fa m ilia r .  Here there i s  the su g g e stio n  of two l e v e l s ,  
one of which i s  com pletely  determ ined , and hence 
com p letely  secu re  in  i t s  r e la t io n sh ip  to  the w orld .
Now,' W ittg e n ste in  goes on to ta lk  about the  
s i t u a t io n  where there i s  am biguity in  view ing an o b je c t ,  
a rea l o b je c t  ra th er  than à p ic tu r e - o b je c t , and the  
example he takes i s  'a  fa m ilia r  o b je c t , but in  an 
unusual p o s it io n  or l ig h t i n g ' .  He has th is  to sa y ,
" . . . . t h e  lack  of r e co g n it io n  l a s t s  on ly  a few secon ds. 
I s  i t  co r re c t  to  say he has a d i f f e r e n t  v is u a l  
e x p e r ie n c e . . . ?
D if fe r e n t ,  th a t i s ,  from the person who sees  and 
r e co g n ise s  the o b je c t .  There a r e , o f co u rse , o b je c tio n s  
to t h is  v iew . For might someone be ab le  to  d escr ib e
an u n fa m ilia r  shape ju s t  as a c c u r a te ly  , . . .O f  course i t  
w i l l  not g e n e r a lly  be so . And h is  d e sc r ip t io n  w i l l  run 
q u ite  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  ( I  say , for  exam ple, the animal had 
long ears -  h e: There were two long a p p e n d a g es ,..."
So, i t  seems th ere  are two le v e ls  even w ith  r e a l  
o b je c t s ,  W ittg en ste in  goes on to ta lk  about the case of
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see in g  an old  fr ie n d , not re co g n is in g  him a t  f i r s t ,  and 
then coming to reco g n ise  him. Something changes in  the  
v is u a l  exp er ien ce; so much so th a t he sa y s ,
"I b e l ie v e  th a t I  should  do a d i f f e r e n t  p o r tr a it  o f him 
now I f  I  cou ld  p a in t .”
The same a p p lies  h ere; a form , a body, i s  a lready
c o n s t i tu te d , and on top of t h is  comes an in te r p r e ta t io n
as a p a r t ic u la r  person . However, se e in g  as i s  more than  
ju s t  r e c o g n it io n , but i s ,  perhaps, a tendency to  
rep resen t th in gs in  a p a r t ic u la r  way.
How do we r e so lv e  t h i s ,  then? I t  i s  c le a r ly  the 
case th a t the shape o f what i s  seen  i s  in  most 
circum stances f ix e d , y e t  the d e sc r ip t io n  o f i t  -
in c lu d in g  i t s  rep roduction  as a p o r tr a it  -  v a r ie s .  
W ittg e n ste in  d isc u sse s  t h is  w ith  referen ce  to 'th e  
r e p r e se n ta tio n  of what i s  s e e n ' ,  which, he s a y s , i s  the  
c r it e r io n  of a .  p a r t ic u la r  v is u a l  e x p er ien ce . This 
con cep t, 'th e  r e p r e se n ta tio n  of what i s  seen ' i s  very  
e l a s t i c ,  'and so TOGETHER WITH IT i s  the concept o f what 
i s  seen ' (W ittg e n ste in 's  em p h asis). Speaking about
view ing a landscape, W ittg e n ste in  says we rep resen t what 
we se e  th r ee -d im e n sio n a lly . I t  might be th at by 'what i s  
seen ' i s  meant,
(1 ) The w orld , what i s  th ere  fo r  us to  s e e .
(2) The p ercep tio n , th e  s u b je c t iv e  'what we s e e '  th a t
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corresp on d s, h o p e fu lly , to  what i s  th e r e .
(3 ) Something which i s  n e ith e r  of th o se , perhaps 
som ething in  between.
W ittg e n ste in  means the t h ir d ,  • but th is  can be 
in te r p r e te d  in  two w ays,
(1 ) As som ething in  th e  eye or b r a in , or in  the m ind, 
l ik e  an im pression  or s e n s a t io n . Something in  the head, 
but on th e  periphery towards the o b je c t .
(2 ) As som ething in  the w orld , but somehow at the  
boundary; proximal s tim u lu s , or in form ation  sam ple, 
perhaps.
W ittg e n ste in  d ism isses  the id ea  of a copy in  the head, 
and goes s tr a ig h t  on to  ta lk  about how our g lan ce  moves
when we are lo o k in g , and about th e  tangled  im pression
t h is  m akes. Here W ittg e n ste in  i s  ta lk in g  about 
c o n str u c tin g  a s in g le  p e rcep tio n  o f a scene from a 
number of g la n c e s , j u s t  as was d iscu ssed  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  
p er c ep tio n  o f a room e a r l i e r  in  th is  ch ap ter . What i s  
meant by 'what i s  seen ' i s  the fragm ented, jumbled
sample o f the w orld . The 'r e p r e se n ta t io n  o f what i s  
seen ' i s  one of a la rg e  number of p o s s ib le  d e s c r ip t io n s ,  
any one of which would be a unique v is u a l  e x p e r ie n c e . 
R eferrin g  to the v is u a l  e x p e r ie n c e , he says th a t th ere  
i s
"not (o n ly )  one genuine proper case o f such
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d e sc r ip t io n " .
The e a r l i e r  c a s e s , in c lu d in g  th e  p ic tu r e  o b je c t s ,  turn  
out to be those s p e c ia l  ca ses  where the 'r e p r e se n ta t io n  
of what i s  seen ' and 'what i s  seen ' r e la t e  to each other  
in  the very s im p lest of w ays, sim ply because 'what i s  
seen ' in v o lv e s  on ly  one g la n c e . IHiat W ittg en ste in  does 
not sa y , a t th is  p o in t , i s  th a t the d e sc r ip t io n  u su a lly  
comes f i r s t ,  and i s  f i l l e d  out by what we s e e .  He ta lk s  
as i f  the d e sc r ip t io n  were p o st  h o c , the ' dawning of an 
a sp e c t' , fo r  in s ta n c e .
In the next s e c t io n , W ittg e n ste in  i s  ta lk in g  about 
the a sp ects  of a plane f ig u r e  of a t r ia n g le .
"This t r ia n g le  can be seen  as a tr ia n g u la r  h o le , as a
s o l id ,  as a geom etrica l drawing; as standing on i t s
b ase , hanging from i t s  apex; as a m ountain, as a wedge, 
as an arrow or p o in te r , as an overturned o b je c t  which i s  
meant to  stand on the sh o r ter  s id e  o f the r ig h t  a n g le , 
as a h a lf  p ara lle logram , and as var iou s other th in g s ."
ç-ÎCsoe)
The l i s t  i s  d e l ib e r a te ly  h eterogen eou s. He t r i e s  to  
ex p la in  th ese  d if f e r e n t  a sp e c ts  by the n o tion  th a t ,
'TThat I s e e  something a s , i s  what i t  can be a p ic tu r e  
o f ,"  aW ',
This might be p la u s ib le  fo r  f ig u r e s ,  but not fo r
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o b j e c t s .  However, perhaps i t  can be extended to the 
s i t u a t io n  where someone se es  a b lock of wood in  two 
c o n te x ts ;  in  one they  take i t  as a s t o o l ,  and in  the 
other as a chopping b lo ck . This i s  ju s t  the n o tio n  th at  
what we see  som ething as i s  how we rep resen t i t ,  but now 
how we rep resen t i t  has som ething to  do w ith c o n te x t ,  
and som ething to  do w ith  i t s  r o le  in  l i f e .
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3 .5  IMAGES and PICTURES.
There a re , as Warnock (op c l t )  p o in ts  o u t, two 
d if f e r e n t  types of im agln& tive a c t;  im agining an absent 
or n o n -e x is te n t  o b je c t , and, g iven  some so r t  of 
p ercep tu a l ex p er ien ce , a p a in tin g  or a photograph, for  
in s ta n c e  im agining i t  as something e l s e .  With regard to  
the secon d , Sartre c la im s th a t there i s  no d if fe r e n c e  
between u sin g  " a p h y s ic a l analogue ( e .g .  a photograph) 
or whether we use an analogue whose m ater ia l d er iv es  
from the mental w orld ,"  Warnock r e p l ie s ,  " e ith e r  i t  i s
sim ply f a l s e  to say i t  makes no d i f f e r e n c e ______ or _  __
we sim ply have to  concede th a t  images are th in g s  o f some 
so r t  which e x is t  in  the mind as photographs e x i s t  in  the 
w orld."
We do not use an image to  remember a fr ie n d , we remember 
him im a g in a tiv e ly , or some o th er way; an image i s  a mode 
not a t o o l  of remembering. But a p ic tu r e  i s  a t o o l ,  or 
at le a s t  p a r t ly , and so th ere  i s  a d if f e r e n c e . When we 
imagine som ething, s im p ly , w ith  no supp ort, th ere  i s  
nothing th ere  in  c o n sc io u sn e ss . I t  i s  part of the  
d e f in i t io n  of a th in g  th a t i t  i s  indépendant, o f fe r s  
some r e s is ta n c e . In pure im agination  there i s  no 
r e s is ta n c e , no c o n str a in t;  we imagine what we p le a s e .  A 
p ic tu r e , however, i s  a th in g , i t  o f fe r s  some r e s is ta n c e .  
There i s  a r e s t r ic t e d  s e t  of s o lu t io n s ,  a r e s t r ic t e d  se t  
of a c t i v i t i e s  which i t  w i l l  support; and th ese
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a c t i v i t i e s  must each bear some r e la t io n  to the  
a c t i v i t i e s  which would be supported by the presen ce of 
the th in g  which the p ic tu r e  r e p r e se n ts , or the p ic tu r e  
would have a m erely con ven tion a l r e la t io n  to i t s  o b je c t ,  
l ik e  a word. W ittg e n ste in  has an example o f a p ic tu r e  of 
a sphere which we may se e  as e i t h e r  f lo a t in g  in  the a ir  
or ly in g  down. THien we change from se e in g  one a sp ect to  
the other what changes i s  c le a r ly  not 'what i s  s e e n ' ,  
the v is u a l  im p ressio n , but some s o r t  o f r e p r e se n ta tio n . 
We do not see  the sphere f l o a t ,  r e a l ly ;
"(And y e t  my im pression  i s  not th a t of a r e a l f lo a t in g  
sphere e i t h e r .  There are var io u s forms of  
'th ree -d im en sio n a l s e e in g ' .  The th ree-d im en sion a l 
ch aracter  of a photograph and the th ree-d im en sion a l 
ch aracter  of what we se e  through a s te r e o s c o p e .)
This i s  because the r e p r ese n ta tio n  i s  not of what i s  
seen  -  the p ic tu r e -  o b je c t -  but of a s t a t e  o f a f fa ir s  
not im m ediately p r e se n t . TThen we have a p ercep t, there  
are two th in g s , what i s  seen  and the r e p r ese n ta tio n  of 
what i s  se en , Ifhen we have an image, we s ta r t  w ith  the 
r e p r e se n ta tio n , and the eq u iv a le n t o f what i s  seen  i s  
generated out of i t .  That i s  why i t  can never co n ta in  
anything fr e s h . The case  of a p ic tu r e  i s  l ik e  th a t of an 
image in  th at there i s  a r e p r e se n ta t io n , but the th in g  
represented  i s  not a v a ila b le  to  support i t .  In stead  o f  
gen eratin g  t h is  su p p ort, however, we have a s u b s t i t u t e .  
This w i l l  support our r e p r e se n ta tio n  o f x in so fa r  as i t
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can be g iven  the same o r g a n isa t io n  as x* Of c o u r se , one
of the fu n c tio n s  of a p a in tin g  i s  to persuade \js to
rep resen t som ething in  a p a r t ic u la r  way. This seems to  
be W ittg e n s te in 's  v iew , a t any r a te ,  f o r ,  speaking of 
the a sp e c ts  of the t r ia n g le ,  he sa y s ,
" It was as i f  an image had come in to  c o n ta c t , and fo r  a
time remained in  c o n ta c t , w ith  the v is u a l  im p ression ."
I t  i s ,  o f c o u r se , p o s s ib le  to  bring the image " in to  
co n ta ct w ith  the v is u a l  im pression" v o lu n ta r i ly .
W ittg e n ste in  goes on to  d isc u ss  the a c t iv e  asp ect  
of im agination; i t s  r e la t io n  to  w i l l  and a c t io n . He
ta lk s  about c h ild r e n  p lay in g  w ith à c h e s t ,  and
pretend ing i t  i s  a h o u se . For them, he cla im s,' i t
a c tu a lly  i s  a h o u se . N e v e r th e le s s , i t  i s  in  some sen se  
volu n tary; they choose to  p la y  t h is  game ra th er  than 
th a t .  A lso , i t  in v o lv e s  a kind of knowledge or s k i l l ;  
one can know how to p lay  a game. Later on, ta lk in g  about 
'a sp ec ts  of o r g a n is a t io n ' ,  he says see in g  som ething as
having one asp ect and then  another could on ly  be p o s ite d  
of 'someone capable of making c e r ta in  a p p lic a t io n s  of 
the f ig u r e ' .  And th en ,
"The substratum  of ex p er ien ce  i s  the m astery of a 
tech n iq u e ."
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What so r t  of a c t iv i t y  i s  a t issu e ?  C erta in ly  more 
i s  in vo lved  than a s k i l l  or com petence, l ik e  being ab le  
to  do a r ith m e tic . For a s k i l l  may l i e  fa llo w , or may be 
brought in to  op era tion  a t w i l l .  C er ta in ly , w i l l  i s  
in vo lved  h e r e , in  some c ircu m stan ces, but in  o th e r s , i t  
i s  n o t . Whatever i s  operating  here i s  immanent in  every  
v is u a l  e x p e r ie n c e , and w i l l  i s  in vo lved  not in  having an
e x p er ien ce , b u t, and on ly  som etim es, in  sw itch in g  from
one exp erien ce  to  an oth er . Yet i t  in c lu d es a s k i l l .  What 
we are ta lk in g  about i s  a h a b it ,  a tendency to produce a 
c e r ta in  p a ttern  of behaviour in  a p a r t ic u la r  s i t u a t io n ,  
and a tendency th a t  i s  more than ju s t  a p r o b a b ility , so 
th a t i t  i s  th ere  as a dynamic fo rc e  even when i t  does 
not o p e r a te . To c a l l  i t  a h a b it , o f cou rse , i s  to  take  
one s id e  of th e  n a tu re \ nurture con troversy , so  a
tendency i s  b e t t e r .
U n til  now, the r e p r ese n ta tio n  and th e  v is u a l
im pression  have been spoken of as i f  they are two 
d if f e r e n t  th in g s which come to g eth er  somehow to make a
p ercep t. R e a lly , th ese  are ju s t  conven ien t a b stra c tio n s  
to handle the fa c t  th a t the d iffe r e n c e  between v isu a l  
exp er ien ces may be one of rep r ese n ta tio n  ( i . e .  
o r g a n isa tio n ) or v is u a l  im p ression , or both . The 
o rg a n isa tio n  i s  always an o rg a n isa tio n  of som ething, and 
the v isu a l im pression  i s  always organised  in  some way. 
They are not d if f e r e n t  th in gs any more than the words of 
an u tteran ce  are d if fe r e n t  from the phones which 
comprise them. This means that they are of the same
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s t u f f ,  and s o , s in c e  the r e p r esen ta tio n  i s  a s e t  o f  
affordances fo r  a c t io n ,  th e  v is u a l  im pression  must be 
a ls o .  In g e n e r a l, th e .h ig h e r  le v e ls  are a ffo rd a n ces for  
Instrum ental a c t io n ,  and the lower fo r  e x p lo r a to r y . Of 
co u rse , they can be the same s t u f f  on ly  because the 
world a ffo rd s in  much th e  same way for  both types of 
a c t io n , B erkeley i s  wrong when he says th a t  depth, 
s o l i d i t y ,  e t c .  are a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p a r t ic u la r  p a ttern s  
of l i g h t  and shade in  the same way that shame or anger 
i s  a sso c ia te d  w ith  b lu sh in g . However, the r e la t io n s h ip  
between in stru m en ta l and exp loratory  a c tio n  i s  b est  
examined in  tou ch .
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3 .6  IMAGES and SCHEMATA in  ACTIVE TOUCH.
What we are doing when we exp lore  som ething  
ta c tu a l ly  i s  to c r e a te  a schema of i t .  The fu n c tio n  of 
th is  i s  tw o -fo ld , to  gu ide fu r th er  e x p lo r a tio n , and to 
aid a c tio n  on or w ith  the o b je c t . The q u estio n  i s ,  how 
fa r  th is  schema resem bles a v is u a l  image, how fa r  i t  i s  
a genuine s p a t ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n . I f  the theory argued 
for  here i s  to have any v a l id i t y ,  i t  must be a genuine  
s p a t ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n . I t  might be thought th a t t h is  
would be r e la t iv e ly  easy  to  t e s t ,  by experim ents on 
ta c tu a l lea r n in g  and v is u a l  r e c o g n it io n  o f form s, for  
in s ta n c e . U n fo r tu n a te ly , the is s u e  i s  com plicated by the 
fa c t  th a t the ta c tu a l exp lora tory  p ro cess , in  s ig h te d  
and in  l a t e  b lin ded  p erson s, i s  o fte n  h e lp e d , or a t  
l e a s t  accompanied by, ' o p t i f i c a t i o n ' , th a t i s ,  by the  
c o n str u c tio n  of a v is u a l  image (R evesz, 1950). Hence the 
im portance of ev id en ce  from the very e a r ly  or 
c o n g e n ita l ly  b l in d . One v iew  i s  th a t such peop le  have no 
genuine s p a t ia l  sen se  a t a l l .  This i s  the p o s it io n  of 
von Senden (1 9 6 0 ), a lthough i t  i s  co n tra d ic ted  both by 
the ev idence he h im se lf  c i t e s ,  and by ev id en ce from 
oth er  sources (Gregory and W allace, 1963),
We have to  ask what i s  s p e c i f ic a l ly  v is u a l  about 
the exp er ien ce  of sp a ce . O bviously, colour i s  one th in g , 
but a n o n -v isu a l r e p r e se n ta tio n  of space would be more, 
or ra th er  l e s s ,  than a v is u a l  scene drained of c o lo u r .
81
I t  would la c k , fo r  in s ta n c e , the idea of a p e r sp e c t iv e  
tran sform ation . The s im p le s t  case of t h is  i s  a sim ple  
sc a le  tran sform ation ; we know th at a square sh e e p -fo ld  
on the other s id e  o f the g le n  has something in  common, 
v is u a l ly ,  w ith  the su r fa c e  o f a matchbox h eld  in  the  
hand, because the proxim al s t im u li  are s im ila r .  But what 
i s  the s im i la r it y  fo r  a b lin d  man? In one c a s e ,  the  
s t im u li c o n s is t  o f a s e r ie s  of hand grasp s, and in  the  
other a s e r ie s  o f w alks and tu rn s . In f a c t ,  i t  i s  known 
th a t on recovery o f s ig h t ,  e a r ly  b linded persons fin d
d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  s c a le  tra n sfo rm a tio n s, as in  th e  famous 
C hiselden case quoted by both von Senden and Gregory and 
W allace. Indeed, i t  would seem th a t th is  i s  what lead s  
von Senden to h is  c o n c lu s io n . Another source of ev id en ce  
on th is  p o in t i s  work which has been done on the 
development of ta c tu a l  maps as an aid to  b lin d  m o b il i ty .  
A ta c tu a l map i s  more or l e s s  a s c a le  model o f an a rea , 
or a plan view  w ith  r a ise d  fe a tu r e s . The su b je c t  
fa m ilia r is e s  h im se lf  w ith  the map, and i s  then t e s t e d  in  
f in d in g  h is  way about the a r e a . I f  s c a le  tran sform ation s  
are purely  v i s u a l ,  then th e  c o n g e n ita lly  b lin d  should  be 
t e r r ib ly  d isadvantaged  a t t h i s ,  as indeed they a re .
However, th is  cannot be used as ev idence th a t they  are 
unable to co n stru c t s p a t ia l  r e p r e se n ta tio n s , s in c e  i f  
they are g iven  e x p er ien ce  in  walking round the a rea ,
they are much l e s s  d isadvantaged compared to  la t e
b linded and s ig h te d  g iv en  s im ila r  e x p er ien ce . They a re , 
of cou rse, te s te d  on ro u tes  they have not walked b e fo r e .  
(Dodds, 1980).
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There Is  a d is t in c t io n  between near and fa r  sp a ce , 
and th is  corresponds approxim ately  to  the d iffe r e n c e  
between an image and a p la n . I f  I want to p resen t m yself 
w ith  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  a c t io n  of a sm all o b je c t in  
near sp a ce , I conjure up a v is u a l  image of i t .  I f ,  on 
the other hand, I want to p resen t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
la rg e  o b je c ts  in  fa r  sp a c e , I  most n a tu r a lly  operate  
w ith  a plan or map. T his i s  a h ig h ly  schem atised o u t lin e  
image. A plan v iew , a r e a l con crete  image from a 
p a r t ic u la r  p o in t of v iew , would do as w e l l ,  and indeed  
our a b i l i t y  to make and use maps i s  p a r a s it ic  on our 
a b i l i t y  to  make ord inary  im ages. However, the 
r e la t io n sh ip  between a map or a p lan  view  and my a c tio n  
i s  t o t a l ly  d if fe r e n t  from th a t between an ordinary image 
and my a c t io n . There i s  no reason  at a l l  to  exp ect th at  
b lin d  people should be ab le  to  tr a n sfe r  from one to  the 
o th e r , because th is  a b i l i t y  i s  p a r a s it ic  on th e  a b i l i t y  
to handle p e r s p e c t iv e . That i s ,  what i s  la ck in g  i s  not 
s p a t ia l  aw areness, but m erely one asp ect o f v is u a l  
awarenes s .
In v i s io n ,  p e r sp e c t iv e  tran sform ations are invo lved  
in , and to some e x te n t  counteracted  by, s iz e  and 
d is ta n c e  constan cy. The p ercep tion  i s  some so r t  of 
compromise between the proxim al stim ulu s and the d i s t a l .  
This i s  presumably n e c essa ry  in  v is io n  as a so r t  of 
p la y -o f f  between the fu n c tio n s  o f guid ing exp lora to ry  
and instrum ental a c t io n , b u t, of cou rse, t h is  i s  not 
n ecessary  in  touch . So, we would expect p e r fe c t  
constan cy. The same would apply to o r ie n ta t io n
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constancy, Indeed , th ere  i s  reason to  b e l ie v e  th a t for  
the c o n g e n ita lly  b lin d  -  those in cap ab le  of 
' o p t i f ic a t lo n '  -  th ere  i s  no decrement in  a r e c o g n it io n  
task w ith change of o r ie n ta t io n  of ta rg e t  (Dodds, 1980).
There i s  an a sp ec t of our v isu a l ex p er ien ce  which 
i s  very d i f f i c u l t  to  exp ress in  words, and i t  has to  do
w ith the f a c t  th a t we are in  some sense aware o f the
backs of o b je c t s ,  o f  occluded p arts of o b j e c t s ,  and of
o b jec ts  and space con tin u in g  out o f our v is u a l  f i e l d  and 
round behind our h ea d s . This awareness i s  p e r fe c t ly  
in tegra ted  w ith  our awareness o f what i s  a c tu a lly  g iven  
to us in  the l i g h t ,  y e t  i t  cannot be the same; i t  seems 
fo o l is h  to say th a t we can see  the backs o f o b je c t s .
P a r tly , th is  has to  do w ith  the indeterm inacy of the
'what i s  s e e n ' , and p a r t ly  w ith  what was sa id  e a r l ie r
about v isu a l p e rcep tio n  being imposed on the s e n s ib le  
m a te r ia l. To the ex te n t th a t i t  i s  the l a t t e r ,  no such 
problem need e x is t  in  ta c tu a l p e r c ep tio n , s in c e  the
image does not bear the same r e la t io n s h ip  to  the
se n s ib le  m a te r ia l. I t  would be in a c cu ra te , but perhaps
p erm issib le  as a m etaphor, to say th a t in  pure ta c tu a l
p ercep tion  a l l  th in gs are tran sp aren t.
The proximal stim u lu s and the r e p r ese n ta tio n  of the 
ob ject are not r e la te d  in  touch as they are in  v i s io n ,
where the r e p r e se n ta tio n  i s ,  in  some way, on the v isu a l
im pression . In a c t iv e  touch , the r e p r ese n ta tio n  and the 
stim u li are d i f f e r e n t  th in g s , sim ply because the s t im u li
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are not th ere  sim u ltan eou sly  in  q u an tity  to  support the 
r e p r e s e n ta t io n . On the one hand, im ag in ation  r e fe r s  to 
o b je c ts  in  the here and now -  p e r c e p tio n , and on the 
oth er  to  o b je c ts  in  some o th er  time and space than the  
here and now -  memory and fa n ta sy . T a c t i le  images hover 
on the b o r d e r lin e  between those two c la s s e s .
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CHAPTER 4 ; PERCEPTION {SMDTXOf4.
4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP between PERCEPTION and EMOTION and 
FEELING.
In t h is  ch ap ter , an attem pt i s  made to say 
something about the r e la t io n sh ip  between p ercep tio n  and 
o r e c t ic  or 'warm-blooded' a sp ec ts  of human fu n c tio n in g  
l ik e  f e e l in g ,  em otion and m o tiv a tio n , and to a sp ec ts  
which seem to  l i e  between the m erely c o g n it iv e  and the  
o r e c t ic ,  a sp ec ts  l ik e  judgement and v a lu e . Of co u rse , 
th is  i s  an area of c r u c ia l importance fo r  the theory  
d iscu ssed  h e r e , based as i t  i s  on Macmurray. I f  sensory  
con sciou sn ess i s  a development o f f e e l in g  or m otive  
co n sc io u sn ess , then the r e la t io n sh ip  between the 
s tr u c tu ra l fe a tu r e s  of the p ercep tio n  and the f e e l in g s  
that surround i t  i s  more than s im p le , e x te r n a l  
a s s o c ia t io n . This i s  not to  say th a t a s s o c ia t io n  does 
not occu r, but sim ply th a t th ere  are other s o r ts  of 
r e la t io n s h ip , and th at th ese  are the more p r im itiv e  and 
e s s e n t ia l  fe a tu r e s  of our v is u a l  e x p er ien ce . One s o r t  of 
r e la t io n  ob ta in s when s tr u c tu r a l fea tu r e s  of the  
p ercep tion , i t s  shape, s i z e ,  c o lo u r , are determ ined, not 
by o b je c t iv e  fea tu res  of the environm ent, but by 
em otion ally  toned p ro cesses  in s id e  the p erceI v e r 's  head. 
Something w i l l  be sa id  about th is  l a t e r ,  but fo r  now our
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concern Is  w ith  those c a ses  where we can take In d iv id u a l 
s tr u c tu r a l fe a tu r e s  of the p ercep tion  for  granted . 
Another so r t  of r e la t io n  ob ta in s when we se e  an o b jec t  
and re co g n ise  i t ,  and t h is  t r ig g e r s  o f f  a whole s e t  of 
thoughts and memories and em otional r e a c t io n s . These do 
not always feed  back on th e  p ercep tio n  and a f f e c t  our 
d e sc r ip t io n  of the o b je c t . In th is  c a se , we might say 
that the em otional complex was sim ply a sso c ia te d  w ith  
the p ercep tion  of th e  o b je c t .  Of co u rse , th is  p a r t ic u la r  
phenomenon i s  not r e le v a n t  to  a theory of v isu a l  
p e rcep tio n . So, we are p r im arily  concerned w ith  those  
cases where em otion and p e rcep tio n  are so c lo s e ly  link ed  
th a t i f  the em otional s t a t e  were d i f f e r e n t ,  one would 
i n s i s t  th a t the p e r c e p tio n , or a t l e a s t  the v is u a l  
ex p er ien ce , was d i f f e r e n t  ( c f  W ittg en ste in  on 
o r g a n isa t io n ) . The problems invo lved  here are no 
d if f e r e n t  from those in vo lved  in  the idea  of 
o r g a n isa t io n . What i s  d i f f e r e n t  i s  the g rea ter  p r e c is io n  
o f  our vocabulary for  s tr u c tu r a l fea tu r e s  as a g a in st  
em otional f e a tu r e s ,  which a llow s p s y c h o lo g is ts  to come 
to grip s w ith  one more e a s i ly  than the o th e r . Two s o r ts  
of theory are a v a ila b le  to  e x p l ic a te  th is  r e la t io n sh ip ;  
the t r a d it io n a l  e m p ir ic is t  th eory , r e ly in g  on the n o tion  
of a s s o c ia t io n , in  th is  case a p a r t ic u la r ly  c lo s e  form 
of a s s o c ia t io n , and the theory based on a c tio n  schem ata. 
A theory based on a c tio n  schemata sees  co g n itio n  and 
f e e l in g  as two a sp e c ts  of a c t io n . C ogn ition , knowledge 
of the w orld , xdiether as a sim ple v is u a l  image or an 
e lab ora te  sy m b o lic a lly  encoded th eory , i s  the s tr u c tu re
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of an a c t io n  schema. F e e lin g , m o tiv a tio n , emotion are  
asp ects of the fu n ctio n in g  of a c tio n  schem ata. Of 
course, in  order th a t th is  can he so , a c tion  schemata 
must not be seen  as c o n s is t in g  o f s e t s  of procedures, 
but as r e a l p h y sica l a c t io n s , d e sc r ib a b le  only in  terms 
of energy, e f f o r t ,  r e s is ta n c e , and so on. F ee lin g s  and 
emotions a r is e  from the o p era tio n , e ith e r  on the world 
or in  the im ag in ation , o f in strum enta l and exp lora tory  
schemata.
C onsider the fo llo w in g  s i t u a t io n s .
(1) Looking a t very r ic h  food when e ith e r  very hungry or 
very f u l l ,  and seein g  i t  as e it h e r  very a t tr a c t iv e  or 
n au sea tin g .
(2) Looking a t  co in s and se e in g  them as more or l e s s  
a ttr a c t iv e  accord ing to th e ir  v a lu e .
(3) Looking a t  a savage animal and experiencin g  t h is  as 
th r ea te n in g .
(4) Looking a t an armoured tank or a warplane and se e in g  
i t  as th r ea te n in g .
(5) Looking a t an ic o n , and f e e l in g  some so rt of 
r e lig io u s  f e e l in g .
(6) Looking a t a su rface  and see in g  i t  as slim y and 
un p leasan t. Looking a t the p attern  of twigs on the  
branch of a b irch  tre e  and se e in g  i t  as d e l ic a t e .  
Looking a t  a boulder to t te r in g  p r e c ip ito u s ly  on the edge 
of a c l i f f ,  and see in g  i t  as u n sta b le , shaky. Looking at 
a l io n  or a t ig e r ,  and see in g  i t  as pow erfu l, s tr o n g .
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(7) Looking at a lan d scap e , and see in g  i t  as b e a u t ifu l  
or harm onious.
(8 ) Looking a t  a bush in  the dark, and see in g  i t  as a 
footpad or a savage b e a s t .  Looking at a blank f i e l d  when 
hungry, and see in g  food (Sanford , 1936; Levine e t  a l ,  
1942).
These, o f co u r se , are a l l  d i f f e r e n t  c ircu m stan ces, but 
in  each case  we may p er c e iv e  th e se  d if f e r e n t  f e e l in g s  or 
whatever as being in  some sen se  in  the o b je c t . However, 
there are d if fe r e n c e s  among the examples in  the type or 
degree of involvem ent of p r io r  knowledge of the o b je c t  
as a member of a p a r t ic u la r  ca tegory  of o b je c ts  w ith  
th is  or th a t q u a lity  or a t t r ib u t e .  In  cases (1 )  to  ( 5 ) ,  
r e c o g n it io n  i s  c le a r ly  n ece ssa r y , and the r e la t io n  
between the s tr u c tu r a l d e s c r ip t io n  of the p ercep tio n  and 
the em otion i s  purely  e x te r n a l . I t  could be argued th a t  
th ese  cases  in v o lv e  on ly  sim ple a s s o c ia t io n  of thoughts 
and em otional r e a c tio n s  w ith  the o b je c t . There i s ,  
however, some ev id en ce th a t th e se  thoughts and em otions 
do feedback and a f f e c t  p e r c ep tio n , even to  the e x te n t of 
determ ining s tr u c tu r a l f e a t u r e s .  In cases (6 )  and (7 )  we 
do not need to know anything or remember anything about 
the o b ject or type of o b je c t;  we do not even need to 
reco g n ise  i t ,  or s e e  i t  as s im ila r  to som ething e ls e ;  
the r e a c t io n  i s  to the s p e c i f ic  con crete  nature of the 
o b je c t , and here perhaps some other so r t  of r e la t io n  
o b ta in s . We s h a l l  r e fe r  to th e se  two s o r ts  of p ercep tio n  
as c a te g o r ia l  and co n crete  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
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Case (6 )  r e fe r s  to the s o f t  of experience we have 
when we f e e l  th a t we have somehow gauged the q u a lity  o f 
an object through v is io n .  I t  in c lu d es  th in g s , l ik e  
seein g  a su rfa ce  as rough or s lim y , for which an 
exp lanation  in  terms of c r o s s -  modal learn in g  would seem 
both obvious and adequate, a lthough i t  i s  not the
exp lanation  we s h a l l  p r e fe r . I t  a lso  in clu d es the so r t
of experience described  by von H orstob el ( E l l i s ,  1938) 
as supersensuous p e r c ep tio n . These are s im ila r  to the  
amodal p ercep tion s of M ichotte (M ich otte , Thines and 
Crabbe, 1964), bu t, whereas amodal percep tions are
prim arily  o b je c t iv e  and i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  d ea lin g  w ith  such 
th ings as c a u s a lity  and energy t r a n s fe r ,  supersensuous 
p ercep tio n s , as the name im p lie s , are prim arily
s u b je c t iv e . They deal w ith  som ething l ik e  the mood or 
connotations o f the s it u a t io n  or o b je c t . They are o fte n  
expressed in  terms l ik e  ' d u l l ' ,  'sh arp ' , 'b r ig h t ' ,  or 
'h eavy ', terms which c le a r ly  r e fe r  to  sense exp er ien ce , 
but i t  i s  not q u ite  c le a r  to which sense m od ality . 
According to von H orstob el, we can match tones of grey  
to tones of music and even 'f in d  on the piano a tone  
which sounds as b r ig h t as l i l a c  s m e l l s . '  (op c i t ) .  The 
idea i s  fa m ilia r  in  a d if f e r e n t  c o n tex t from the work of 
Osgood, Succi and Tannenbaum (1 9 5 7 ). They asked su b je c ts  
to ra te  a la rg e  number of words fo r  s im ila r ity ,  and 
analysed the r e s u lt s  to r e v e a l the dimensions which 
su b jects  used when making such judgements. A rath er  
lim ited  number of dim ensions were found to account for  
must of the r e s u l t s ,  and th e se  included  fa c to r s  l ik e
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good/bad, strong/w eak and b r ig h t or sharp versus d u l l .  
Osgood claim ed th a t t h is  procedure exposed the 
co n n o ta tiv e  or em otional meaning of the words. Whatever 
they rep resen t th ese  three dim ensions keep on coming up 
in  p sych o logy , e . g .  in  tr i-d im e n s io n a l th e o r ie s  of 
emotion ( e .g .  S ch losb erg , 1954). Case ( 8 ) ,  o f c o u rse , 
rep resen ts  a d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  of p ercep tio n  or 
m isp ercep tio n , ^ e r e  s tr u c tu r a l fea tu r e s  o f the  
p ercep tion  are determ ined by th e  in te r n a l  s ta t e  of the  
p e r c e iv e r , ra th er  than by the w orld .
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4 .2  EMPIRICIST ACCOUNTS o f the RELATIONSHIP.
T r a d it io n a l e m p ir ic is t  th e o r ie s  of p e r c ep tio n  are  
based on th e  b e l i e f  th a t  the p ercep tu a l p ro cess  c o n s is t s  
o f tak ing p e rcep tu a l p r im it iv e s ,  atom ic s e n s a t io n s ,  and 
p u ttin g  them to g eth e r  to form a u n if ie d  p e r c e p t. This 
p u ttin g  to g e th e r  in v o lv e s  the a p p lic a t io n  o f r u le s  which  
are learned-. I t  a lso  in v o lv e s  the use of in form ation  
from oth er  so u r c e s , o th er  s e n s e s , memory, e t c . ,  but i t  
makes no d if fe r e n c e  whether the added in form ation  i s  a 
procedure or sim ply data  upon which th ese  procedures  
o p e r a te . Thus i t  breaks down in to  two p r o p o s it io n s ;  
atomism or th e  e x is te n c e  o f quantum even ts lo c a l i s e d  in  
tim e and space which e x i s t  as part of our con sc iou s  
exp er ien ce  reco v era b le  sim ply . by in tr o s p e c t io n  or
r e f l e c t io n  ra th er  than in fe r e n c e ;  and enrichm ent, which 
se e s  the f in a l  v is u a l  exp er ien ce  as- a r e s u lt  o f
p r o cesses  which add to the in form ation  in  the  
s e n s a t io n s .  True, p r o c e ss in g  i s  not n e c e s s a r i ly  a one 
way flow  from se n s a t io n  to  p e rcep tio n ; products at
h igh er  and in term ed ia te  l e v e l s  can be seen  as a f f e c t in g  
the in te r p r e ta t io n  of item s a t a lower l e v e l ,  but i t  i s  
on ly  th e ir  in te r p r e ta t io n  or o r g a n isa t io n  which i s  a t  
i s s u e .  Whatever the subtletî^S th ere  are b a s ic  b u ild in g  
b lo c k s , th e se  are part of the f in a l  e x p e r ie n c e , and they  
correspond to l o c a l ,  momentary even ts a t th e  r e t in a .  
E m p ir ic is t  th e o r ie s  o f em otion are s im i la r .  Among the
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elem entary co n ten ts  of c o n sc io u sn ess  are the b a s ic  
f e e l in g s .  F e e lin g s  can jo in  w ith  o th er  f e e l in g s  or w ith  
memories or se n sa tio n s  to  form more complex c o n s t itu e n ts  
o f m ental l i f e  l ik e  em otions.
T r a d it io n a l e m p ir ic is ts  w i l l  c a l l  upon lea rn in g  or 
stim ulu s enrichm ent to  e x p la in  the phenomena in  
q u e stio n . This account has a good deal of p l a u s ib i l i t y  
in  cases (1 )  to  ( 5 ) ,  or in  any case  where the id e n t i t y  
of a p a r t ic u la r  o b ject or type of o b je c t i s  in v o lv e d . In  
example ( 1 ) ,  for  in s ta n c e , the argument would be th at  
f e e l in g s  of d e s ir e  or nausea become a sso c ia te d  w ith  the  
stim ulus o b jec t v ia  c la s s i c a l  c o n d it io n in g . The f a c t  
th at e ith e r  resp onse i s  p o s s ib le  in  the same organism  
would be an example of s t a t e -  dependent le a r n in g . The 
f e e l in g  becomes so c lo s e ly  a s so c ia te d  w ith  the stim ulu s  
th at i t  i s  in v ested  in  i t ,  ra th er l ik e  s p a t ia l  
p r o p e r tie s  in  B erk eley . I t  could  be th a t the case of 
see in g  co in s and se e in g  them as a t t r a c t iv e ,  as in  
example (2 )  i s  ra th er  d i f f e r e n t  from se e in g  the food and 
see in g  i t  as e ith e r  d e s ir a b le  or n a u sea tin g , and th a t
w h ile  the former i s  an e n t ir e ly  a r b r ita r y  and co n tin g en t
r e la t io n ,  the l a t t e r  in v o lv e s  a c e r ta in  'r e a d in e ss  to  
le a r n ' .  A s im ila r  d iffe r e n c e  might e x is t  between cases
(3) and ( 4 ) .  However, th ese  are the s itu a t io n s  where the  
r e la t io n sh ip  between p ercep tion  and f e e l in g  i s  e x te r n a l ,  
and so i t  i s  only to be expected th a t some such
mechanism as a s s o c ia t io n  would f i t  the b i l l .
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In cases l ik e  ( 6 ) ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s ib le  to defend 
an e m p ir ic is t  account fo r  some of the exam ples. C learly  
seein g  a p a r t ic u la r  p a ttern  o f s t im u la t io n  a sso c ia te d  in  
fa c t  w ith  a slim y s u r fa c e , and responding to the s ig h t  
by in  some way f e e l in g  the slim y n ess  i s  p e r fe c t ly  w e ll  
accommodated in  an a s s o c ia t io n i s t  lea rn in g  framework. 
The next example i s  s l i g h t ly  more com p licated . A 
p a r tic u la r  p a tte r n  of proximal s t im u la t io n  g iv es  r is e  
through in fe r e n c e  and enrichm ent to  the p ercep tio n  of a 
p a r tic u la r  s p a t ia l  c o n f ig u r a t io n . On the b a s is  of th is  
s p a t ia l  c o n fig u r a tio n  p lu s some em p irica l 
g e n e r a lis a t io n s , l ik e  th e  law of g r a v ity  or the 
knowledge th a t s tr e n g th  i s  o fte n  in v e r s e ly  r e la te d  to  
th ic k n e ss , some fu r th e r  in fe r e n c es  are made, e .g .  'th e  
rock might f a l l '  or 'th o se  tw igs would snap i f  handled 
r o u g h ly '. These in fe r r ed  p o s s ib le  s i t u a t io n s  are 
a sso c ia ted  w ith p a r t ic u la r  em otional s ta t e s  presumably 
through c la s s i c a l  c o n d itio n in g  and stim ulus  
g e n e r a lis a t io n , and th e se  em otional tones are then 
in vested  in  the o b je c t . The th ird  and fo u r th  examples 
are im p o ss ib le . Take the fo u r th , the example w ith  the 
t ig e r .  C lea r ly , i f  we ever encountered a t ig e r ,  the 
emotion we would be most l ik e ly  to  f e e l  and to  learn  to  
a s s o c ia te  w ith  t ig e r s  would be te r r o r . I f  the s itu a t io n  
were somewhat d i f f e r e n t ,  we might lea rn  to a s s o c ia te  
a e s th e t ic  p le a su r e . However, we could  never learn  by 
a s s o c ia t io n  to f e e l  the t ig e r s  power. Y et, th a ts  what a 
t ig e r  means to u s .  O il companies do not spend a fortune  
on a d v e r tis in g  to  fr ig h te n  us away from th e ir  products.
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Case (8 ) prov id es grave d i f f i c u l t i e s  for  an
e m p ir ic is t  accou n t. There are c le a r  cases where the 
e f f e c t s  of in te r n a l s t a t e s ,  whether c o g n it iv e  or
m o tiv a tio n a l, r e s u lt  in  n o n -v e r id ic a l p e rcep tio n . As
regards m o tiv a tio n a l e f f e c t s ,  th ere  i s  the e f f e c t  o f  
hunger on the p e rcep tio n  of food where none i s  p resen t  
(Sanford ,1936; L evine e t  a l ,  1942), and as regards
expectancy or s e t ,  th ere  i s  Bruner's dem onstration th at
'  f  .a red two of spades can be seen as black (Bruner and 
'Postman, 1949). Any e m p ir ic is t  theory must handle th ese  
e f f e c t s  by ad hoc ex p la n a tio n s which run q u ite  counter to  
the s p ir i t  of the gen era l theory .
W ithin the ca teg o ry  o f em otion a lly  toned v e r id ic a l  
percep tion  th ere  are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  p r o j e c t iv e ,  
where the emotion or f e e l in g  i s  p rojected  onto the  
object because of the p e r c e iv e r 's  p r ior  s t a t e ,  and 
r e a c t iv e , where the emotion or f e e l in g  i s  in  some sen se  
more ob viou sly  a consequence o f the p ercep tio n , although  
i t  feeds back in to  i t  to  g iv e  i t  a p a r t ic u la r  q u a l i ty .  
This corresponds to  the d is t in c tio w n  between c a te g o r ia l  
and co n c r ete . Both th ese  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are r e a l i s e d .  
Cases (1 ) to  (5 ) would be examples of p r o je c t iv e  or 
c a te g o r ia l , as would case  (6 ) in  t h is  account, w h ile  
case (7) would be r e a c t iv e  or c o n crete . A e s th e tic  
ap p recia tion  would sim ply be the natu ra l response to 
some perhaps ra th er  complex stim u lu s p ro p er tie s  such as 
harmony and p ro p o rtio n . N otice  th at th ese  are p r o p e r tie s  
of the bare s t im u lu s , or of the se n s a t io n s , and have
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nothing to  do with anything added by memory or 
in fe r e n c e . Because of i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  the n o tion  
of se n sa tio n  th is  so r t  of p ercep tio n  i s  of s tr a t e g ic  
im portance. However, b efore  going on to d iscu ss  i t ,  we 
s h a l l  look at the a lte r n a t iv e  account.
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4 .3  ACTION BASED ACCOUNT of EMOTION.
A sso c ia t io n  i s  an ex tern a l r e la t io n s h ip  in  the 
sense th a t the in d iv id u a l nature of the o b ject i s  not 
conditioned  by the o th er o b je c ts  in  the r e la t io n sh ip  or 
the r e la t io n sh ip  i t s e l f .  The claim  here i s  th at emotions 
and p ercep ts are not d if f e r e n t  types of conscious  
con ten t, but d i i f e r e n t  a sp ects  of a u n if ie d  agen tive  
co n sc io u sn ess . To e s ta b l is h  t h i s ,  we have to show th a t  
f e e l in g  and se n s a t io n  are both r e la te d  to a c t io n , and 
show th at they are in te r n a lly  r e la te d  as a sp ects  of 
a c tio n . In th is  s e c t io n ,  th en , we are concerned w ith  
th eo r ies  of f e e l in g  and em otion. There are two th e o r ie s  
of emotion which dwarf a l l  o thers both in  terms of the 
range of phenomena they han d le , and the r ich n ess  o f the  
d e sc r ip t iv e  schemata they employ. These are the th eo r ie s  
of S t . Thomas Aquinas and Sigmund Freud. Of cou rse , i t  
i s  not p o s s ib le  to  d e sc r ib e , d is c u ss  and defend th ese  
th eo r ie s  h ere . We s h a l l  con ten t o u r se lv e s  w ith showing 
that they are both com patible w ith  the views being  
expressed h e r e .
The phenomena ex em p lified  in  c a ses  (1 ) to  (7 ) seem 
to lend them selves to d e sc r ip t io n  in  terms of concepts  
which f a l l  n a tu r a lly  in to  two c a te g o r ie s ;  the f i r s t  has 
to do w ith  such c o n str u c ts  as d e s ir e ,  m o tiv a tio n , and 
a p p e tite , and the second i:d.th value and reason . In the
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examples above, (1 )  and (2) would be described  in  terms 
of a p p e tite  and (5 )  and (7 ) in  terms of v a lu e . This 
d is t in c t io n  cu ts  across th a t between c a te g o r ia l  and 
co n crete , th en . I t  a p p lies  to  dynamic a sp ects  of the  
p ercep tion  and i t  presupposes two d if fe r e n t  s e t s  or 
sources of em otions in  humans. Of co u rse , in  the v ersio n  
of dualism  cu rren t a t t h is  tim e a p p e t ite  i s  seen  as 
p erta in in g  to  the body, or the animal nature o f man, and 
value to  the s o u l , or d iv in e  n a tu re . T r a d it io n a lly , the  
two are s e t  a g a in st  each o th e r . A common theme in  
medicA-val . l i t e r a t u r e ,  for  in s ta n c e , i s  the need to  
d is c ip l in e  the im agin ation  and so  ehsure that i t ,  and 
hence the s e n s e s , are the servan ts  of reason or value  
and not of a p p e t ite  or p a ssio n  ( e .g .  Richard of S t . 
V ic to r , c l 1 8 0 ). The same d iv is io n  appears in  Aquinas, 
but we s h a l l  se e  th a t i t  i s  not c o n s is t e n t ly  m aintained  
fo r  one so r t  of v a lu e , a e s th e t ic  v a lu e . This i s  the so r t  
of value most r e le v a n t  to  th e o r ie s  of v is u a l  p e rcep tio n .
Aquinas c h a r a c ter ised  im pulse as c o n s is t in g  o f two 
p a r ts , in t e l l e c t u a l  im pulse or w i l l  and sen su al impulse 
or a p p e t ite . I n t e l l e c t u a l  im pulse was d irec ted  towards 
u n iv e r sa l q u a l i t i e s ,  and towards what Kant would have 
c a lle d  id eas of reason , l ik e  God, im m ortality , tr u th . 
A ppetite was d ir e c te d  towards immediate s e n s it iv e  good, 
l ik e  food or s e x . A p p etite  g iv es  r is e  to emotions of two 
kinds, c o n c u p isc ib le  and i r a s c ib le .  C oncupiscible  
emotions were th o se  which in vo lved  th e ir  o b ject as being  
something good in  i t s e l f ,  l ik e  d e s ir e ,  s a t is fa c t io n  and
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disappointm ent. I r a s c ib le  em otions were those which 
re la ted  to t h e ir  o b je c ts  as provid ing  d i f f i c u l t y ,  
danger, support fo r  an a c t iv i t y  o r ig in a l ly  m otivated by 
con cu p iscien ce; f e a r ,  anger, hope and d esp a ir  are 
i r a s c ib le  em otion s. In  terms o f the exam ples, (1 ) and
(2 ) would be d escr ib ed  in  terms of co n c u p isc ib le  
em otions, and (3 )  and ( 4 ) ,  in  terms of i r a s c ib le .  These 
emotions can become organ ised  in to  h a b it s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  
and i n t e r e s t s ,  and. th e se  more long-term  d is p o s it io n s  can 
also'* be sa id  to  und erly  any p a r t ic u la r  m a n ife sta tio n  of 
em otion, whether c o n c u p isc ib le  or i r a s c ib le ,  and whether 
the o b ject o r ig in a l ly  p e r ta in s  to  w i l l  or a p p e t ite .  
Aquinas cannot lo c a te  a e s th e t ic  p leasu re  w ith in  reason  
fo r  i t s  o b je c t i s  c le a r ly  sen su a l and p a r t ic u la r . Y et, 
i t  i s  c le a r ly  not a form of a p p e t ite . In the end, he 
lo c a te s  i t  w ith in  n e ith e r  d iv is io n ,  but w ith in  what he 
c a l ls  'th e  s e n s i t iv e  pow er', which serves both reason  
and a p p e t ite . The Thomist theory of p e rcep tio n , l ik e  
many modern th e o r ie s ,  sees  p ercep tion  as occurring  a t  
two l e v e l s ,  an i n i t i a l ,  b a s ic  p rocess of p a ss iv e  
r e g is t r a t io n , and ah a c t iv e ,  sy n th e t ic  p r o c e ss . The 
a c tiv e  p rocess i s  c a lle d  'th e  s e n s i t iv e  power' and has 
i t s  own dynamics se p a r a te , in  the case of a e s th e t ic  
p ercep tion  a t l e a s t ,  from the c o n cu p isc ib le  and 
i r a s c ib le  em otions.
T ranslated  in to  p sy ch o a n a ly tic  term s, reason ,
in so fa r  as i t  i s ^ fa c u lty  o f mind th at determ ines the 
m orally good, has g iven  way to the superego.
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in te r n a lis e d  s o c ia l  norm. The a p p e tite s  form the b a s is  
of the id ,  which to g eth er  w ith  th e se  in te r n a lis e d  
co n tro ls  c o n s t i tu te s  the m o tiv a tio n a l base of our 
action s and e x p e r ie n c e . C oncupiscib le and ir a s c ib le  
emotions correspond approxim ately to the fu n c tio n s  of 
the id in  p rov id in g  in s t in c t  or energy d ir e c te d  towards 
the s a t i s f a c t io n  of b io lo g ic a l  n eed s, and to  the 
fu n ction s of ego in  coming to gr ip s w ith  the world as i t  
thwarts or en ab les the s a t i s f a c t io n  of th ese  n eed s, “r 
As in  Thomlsm, h a b its  and a t t itu d e s  can be formed which 
serve th e se  b io lo g ic a l  needs on ly  in d ir e c t ly  i f  a t  a l l .  
Modern p sy ch o a n a ly sis  a llow s the e x is te n c e  of 
e g o - in s t in c t s , a b i l i t i e s  and ten d en c ies  to acquire
knowledge of the e x te r n a l w orld , to  fin d  s ig n if ic a n c e  in
events and a c tio n s  o u ts id e  th e ir  immediate re lev a n ce  to
our needs and n eu ro ses. These do not depend on the id
fo r  th e ir  energy, but are v ir t u a l ly  autonomous. They are 
a more e la b o ra te  v e r s io n  of A quinas's sen sory  powers.
The b a sic  s tr u c tu r e  in  Aquinas i s  very s im ila r  to that  
ou tlin ed  a t the end of the l a s t  ch a p ter . There i s  a 
b a sic  l e v e l  of m otiva tion  and w ith in  th is  b a s ic  
o r ie n ta t io n  towards a c t io n , there i s  or develop s a s e t  
of s tr u c tu r e s , a c tio n  schem ata, aimed a t  s a t is fy in g  
th ese  b a s ic  m otiva tion s a g a in st the w orld . These 
stru c tu res  have th e ir  oxra autonomous dynam ics, the 
ir a s c ib le  em otion s. They a lso  req u ire  knowledge of the 
w orld, i . e .  sen se  knowledge. At f i r s t  t h is  i s  embedded 
in  p a r t ic u la r  a c t io n , but e v e n tu a lly  i t  becomes
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autonomous, and a th ird  le v e l  o f s tr u c tu r e  d ev e lo p s. 
This too has i t s  own autonomous dynam ics, in c lu d in g  
a e s th e t ic  em otion . Both Freudian and Thomist th e o r ie s  
are i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t - d u a l i s t .  Thomism has i t s  
a p p e t ite /r e a so n  o p p o s itio n , and p sych oan a lysis  i t s  
p le a su r e / con sc ien ce  or id /  superego o p p o s it io n . As 
regards v a lu e  in  g en era l, Aquinas, as we know, has a 
com plete new l e v e l  of mind, w ith  i t s  own s tr u c tu r e s ,  
m otives and em otion s, and w ith  a com p letely  d if f e r e n t  
s e t  of o b j e c t s .  T h is, of co u rse , i s  a s o lu t io n  forced
upon him by h is  in h e r ite d  and orthodox dualism  o f f le s h
and s p i r i t .  That i t  i s  som ething of a forced  s o lu t io n
can be seen  by h is  ev id en t re lu c ta n ce  to abandon
e n t ir e ly  A r is to t e l ia n  b io lo g ic a l  monism.
"Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken  
in  two ways ; according to the order of n a tu re , forasmuch 
as p e r fe c t  th in g s  are by th e ir  nature p r io r  to im perfect  
th in g s; and according to th e  order of gen era tio n  and 
tim e; forasmuch as from being im p erfec t, a th in g  comes 
to be p e r f e c t .  Thus according to the f i r s t  kind of order  
among the powers, the i n t e l l e c t u a l  powers are p r io r  to 
the s e n s i t iv e  powers; w herefore they d ir e c t  and command 
them. L ikew ise the s e n s i t iv e  powers are p r io r  in  t h is  
order to the powers of the n u t r it iv e  s o u l .
In the second kind of ord er , i t  i s  the o th er  way 
about. For the powers of the n u t r it iv e  so u l are p r io r  by 
way of gen eration  to the powers of the s e n s i t iv e  so u l;
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fo r  which, th e r e fo r e , they prepare the body. The same i s  
to be sa id  of th e  s e n s it iv e  powers w ith  regard to the 
in t e l le c t u a l ."
We can se e  here a s tr a in in g  towards r e p resen tin g  th e  
mind as a s in g le ,  u n if ie d  organism , w ith  each succeed ing  
le v e l  a n a tu r a l outgrowth of the prev iou s l e v e l s  as the 
organism d ev e lo p s a more and more r e fin e d  and 
a r tic u la te d  a d ap ta tion  to  i t s  environm ent. That i s ,  we 
can se e  a tendency to produce a theory  l ik e  that of 
S c h e llin g  or Macmurray. The same movement i s  apparent in  
p sych oan a lysis  in  th e  development from tr a d it io n a l  
Freudian theory  to  modern e g o -a n a ly s is .
We can rep resen t how th ese  variou s ways of 
organ isin g  the phenomena r e la t e  to each other as in  
tab le  ( 1 ) .
TABLE 1
THOMIST
C oncupiscib le
emotions
I r a s c ib le
emotions
Reason
S e n s it iv e
power
PSYCHO­
ANALYTIC
Id
Ego
Super­
ego
Ego-
in s t in c t s
MACMURRAY
M otive 
Consc.
A ction  
Consc.
Sensory  
Consc.
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4 .4  CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT o f the RELATIONSHIP.
E a r lie r , i t  was su ggested  th at the tr a d it io n a l
s e n s a t io n is t  account of p e rcep tio n  could be more or l e s s  
reduced to  two p r o p o s it io n s , enrichm ent and atomism. 
Corresponding to th e s e , the account defended here has 
two opposing p r o p o s it io n s . The f i r s t  i s  about the
a p p lic a t io n  of schemata ra th er  than unconscious  
in fe r e n c e , i . e .  about the c r e a t iv e  or c o n s tr u c t iv e  
a sp ects  of p e r c ep tio n . The second i s  non-atomism, and 
means th at the b a sic  u n its  o f p ercep tion  comprise a much 
r ic h e r  range o f th in gs than sim ple p o in ts  of coloured  
l i g h t .
Any c o g n it iv e  a c t  -  any a c t ,  in  f a c t ,  -  i s  a 
m ixture of two f u n c t io n s , accommodation and 
a s s im ila t io n . A ss im ila t io n  i s  the process by which we 
change the world to make i t  a part o f our a c t io n . This 
may be a t a p h y s ic a l l e v e l ,  as when we grasp and l i f t  
something s o f t ,  and i t  changes to  f i t  our grasping i t ;  
or i t  may be a t an i n t e l l e c t u a l  l e v e l  when we construe
the world in  a p a r t ic u la r  way because of the p a r t ic u la r
i n t e l le c t u a l  s tr u c tu r e s  which we operate in  doing so .  
Here, of cou rse , i t  i s  not the a c tu a l m ateria l s t u f f  of 
the world which changes, but our rep resen ta tio n  of i t .  
The other s id e  of the c o in  i s  accommodation. R e a lity  i s  
not i n f i n i t e l y  m a lleab le  -  not even at the c o g n it iv e
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le v e l;  i t  a lso  changes us when we come in  co n ta ct w ith  
i t .  In th e  case of grasp ing and l i f t i n g ,  not on ly  does 
the o b jec t change shape as we grasp  i t ,  b u t, and even 
more s o , our grasp changes i t s e l f  to  meet the form of 
the o b je c t .  This i s  accommodation. S im ila r ly  w ith  
c o g n it iv e  a c t s ,  they m ust, in  order to come to  gr ip s  
w ith  r e a l i t y  a t  a l l ,  somehow a d ju s t  them selves to i t .  
Now the fu n c tio n  of a p ercep tu a l schema i s  the same as 
that of any o th er  schema, to  guide a c t io n . The a c ts  
involved  h ere  are exp loratory  a c t s .  In the case of 
v isu a l p e r c e p tio n , th ese  in c lu d e  o r ie n ta t io n  movements 
of the body and p a r t ic u la r ly  of the head, eye movements, 
movements o f accommodation and convergence, and they  
include a c ts  which serve  the same s o r ts  of fu n c tio n s , 
but have no outward m a n ife s ta t io n s . A ll th ese  d iv erse  
a c ts  are a c ts  of a t te n t io n . In so fa r  as a p a r t ic u la r  
in c id en t o f p ercep tio n  i s  la r g e ly  a s s im i la t iv e ,  th ese  
acts of a t te n t io n  w i l l  be t ig h t ly  c o n tr o lle d  by a 
p r e -e x is t in g  schema, and we w i l l  be a tten d in g  to  such 
asp ects of th e  world as th at schema d ir e c t s .  That i s  
a tte n tio n  w i l l  be concentrated  or s e l e c t i v e .  In so fa r  as 
a p a r t ic u la r  in c id e n t  i s  accommodation, there w i l l  be no 
such c o n tr o l, and we w i l l  be a tten d in g  to many asp ects  
of the w orld , c r e a tin g  a schema to  embrace them a l l .  
A tten tion  w i l l  be d i f f u s e .
I t  i s  c le a r  th a t our c o n d it io n  a f f e c t s  our 
exp er ien ce . In cases l ik e  (1 ) and ( 3 ) ,  t h is  i s  p a r t ly  a 
case of p ick in g  up d if f e r e n t  s tr u c tu r a l  fea tu r e s  -
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d if f e r e n t  in v a r ia n ts  in  the s tim u la tio n  - ,  but i t  i s  
a lso  p a r t ly  a case o f th e  same s tr u c tu r a l fea tu r e s  
having d i f f e r e n t  a ffo r d a n c e s . Apart from t h i s ,  as fa r  as 
cases (1 ) to  (5 )  go , the a lte r n a t iv e  theory i s  no b e t te r  
and no worse than the t r a d it io n a l  one. In the one case  a 
p a r tic u la r  complex of f e e l in g s  becomes a sso c ia ted  w ith  a 
p a r tic u la r  s e t  of im p ression s or sen sa tio n s  organ ised  as 
a p ercep tio n , and in  the o th er  a p a r tic u la r  d is p o s it io n  
to act in  a c e r ta in  way, w ith  a l l  the a s so c ia te d  
m otivation s and f e e l in g s ,  becomes a sso c ia ted  w ith  a 
p a r tic u la r  so r t of a c t i v i t y  o f the p ercep tu al system s  
c o n s t itu t in g  a p e r c e p tio n . In case ( 6 ) ,  we have
noted the grave d i f f i c u l t i e s  confron ting  an e m p ir ic is t  
account. We must now examine the c o n s tr u c t iv is t  account 
to see  i f  i t  fa res  any b e t t e r .  Amodal and supersensuous 
p ercep tion  seem to  im ply a super-sensory  ord er . This 
n otion  of such an order has been defended by Hayek 
(1952 ), and p la u s ib le  mechanisms fo r  i t s  d e te c t io n  have 
been proposed by E .J . Gibson (1 9 6 7 ). C er ta in ly , th ere  i s  
ev idence which would tend to support t h is .  Von Bekesy 
has shown the s im i la r i t y ,  indeed c o n fu s a b il i ty , between 
sensed v ib r a tio n  on the sk in  and h ear in g . One p o s s ib le  
b a s is  for  such an order i s  th at the s p e c ia l  sen ses  are 
the r e s u lt  of d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  from one, o r ig in a l  u n itary  
se n se . Of co u rse , t h is  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  would occur in  
e v o lu tio n  over a very long time s c a le ,  but Bower has 
suggested  th a t a s im ila r  p rocess occurs in  in d iv id u a l  
development w ith  in fa n ts  i n i t i a l l y  responding to 
in form ation  in  each m od ality  as v ir t u a l ly  id e n t ic a l .  I f
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the modes of p ercep tio n  are trea ted  as forms of
s e n s ib i l i t y ,  they have very l i t t l e  in  common, and i t  i s
very d i f f i c u l t  to  see  what the o r ig in a l  sense might b e .
However, i f  we regard them a l l  as forms of ' exp loratory  
a c tio n , then a c t iv e  touch becomes an obvious p ro to ty p e . 
How much sim p ler  i s  the assum ption th a t th ese
a d j e c t iv a l ,  q u a l i ta t iv e  a s p e c ts  of the s i t u a t io n  are  
picked up d ir e c t ly  from the s tim u lu s  flow  in  the same 
way as co lou r and movement, j u s t  as Gibson su g g e s ts . Of 
cou rse , i t  i s  not denied th a t the use of th ese  'h igh  
le v e l  in v a r ia n c e s ' to  s p e c ify  p a r t ic u la r  s e t s  of
'a ffo rd a n ces' or p a r t ic u la r  'v a le n c e s '  -  the language i s  
a l l  G ibson's -  i s  to  some ex te n t a fu n c tio n  of
ex p er ien ce . A ll th a t i s  required  i s  th a t, as elem ents in  
our p e r c ep tio n , components o f our p ercep tio n , th ese
q u a l i t ie s  are the product of o p era tion s performed on the  
proxim al s t im u la t io n , and not on other hypothesised  
mental c o n te n ts .
So f a r ,  the d is c u ss io n  has been about em otional
a sp ects  of p ercep tio n ; how th e  p r e sen ta tio n  of c e r ta in  
p a r tic u la r  th in gs to v i s io n  can r e s u lt  in  an em otio n a lly  
toned p e r c ep tio n . That i s ,  we have been ta lk in g  about 
how s tr u c tu r a l fea tu r e s  of p ercep tio n  r e la te  to em otion. 
However, the r e la t io n sh ip  c le a r ly  works both ways. There 
are a lso  cases where the in te r n a l  s ta t e  can a f f e c t  the  
s tr u c tu r e  of the p e r c ep tio n , as in  the examples of case
( 8 ) .  Of c o u rse , i t  i s  not on ly  dynamic a sp ects  which 
have th is  e f f e c t ,  but s tr u c tu r e  a ls o .  Our everyday
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knowledge about how the world i s  organised provides  
d ir e c t io n  and coherence to our a t te n t io n . This 
knowledge, whether organ ised  as frames (Minsky, 1974) or  
s c r ip t s  (A b elson , 1974) or w hatever, fu n ction s as an 
organised  p a tte r n  of e x p e c ta n c ie s . Expectancy or s e t  can 
have much th e  same e f f e c t  on p ercep tio n  as m o tiv a tio n . 
In any c a s e , what we have i s  an extreme form of 
a s s im ila t io n . I n te r n a lly  d r iven  schemata are search in g  
fo r  support in  the e x te r n a l w orld . In poor stim u lu s  
c o n d it io n s , they are not d isco n firm ed ; indeed , they fin d  
something which w i l l  do as su p p ort. In e ith e r  c a s e , a 
m isp ercep tion  o c cu rs. Of c o u r se , th ese  e f f e c t s  are  
com patible w ith  the r a d ic a l c o n s tr u c t iv is t  p o s it io n  
taken h e r e , and perhaps w ith  none o th e r .
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4 .5  AESTHETIC PERCEPTION and ACCOMMODATION.
The b a sic  reason fo r  the s e n s a t io n is t  view of
p ercep tion  i s  phenom enological. E a r lie r , i t  was noted  
that any in c id e n t of p ercep tio n  has a p a r t ic u la r  o b je c t ,  
but th is  o b jec t need not be the same across any two
in c id e n ts , even in  the presen ce of the same ex te r n a l
s tim u lu s . This i s  the case of s e e in g  an a sp e c t . Now, on 
sw itch in g  from one aspect to  an o th er , something changes, 
and something remains the same. T his lead s to the n o tion  
that there are a t l e a s t  two l e v e l s  o f the v is u a l
e x p er ien ce , one of idiich i s  sim ply g iv en , and one of 
which depends on our in te r p r e ta t io n  or o r g a n isa t io n . 
S im ila r ly , th ere  i s  the exp er ien ce  of se e in g  in  vhat 
might be c a lle d  d if fe r e n t  'm odes'; we can se e  the same 
th ing from moment to moment e i t h e r  in  terms of l i g h t ,  
shade, co lou r and form, or in  terms of i t s  s tr u c tu r e  and 
i t s  id e n t ity  as a member of a p a r t ic u la r  category  having  
th a t s tr u c tu r e . This i s  d i f f e r e n t  from se e in g  an a sp ect  
in  th at th ese  do not seem to  be m utually e x c lu s iv e ,  
indeed the tem ptation i s  to id e n t i f y  th ese  modes w ith  
the le v e ls  a lready m entioned. What i s  a t is s u e  i s  a 
change of emphasis; in  one case a t te n t io n  i s  d ir ec ted  to  
the o rg a n isa tio n , and in  the o th er to  the appearance, to  
what i s  sim ply g iv en . The l e v e l  which i s  sim ply g iven  i s  
equated w ith  se n sa tio n  by many p sy c h o lo g is ts  who, l ik e  
James (1890a), d is t in g u is h  between a p r ior  r e la t iv e ly
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unem bellished c o n sc io u sn e ss , and one which has been  
enriched  by a d d itio n  of memories and a s s o c ia t io n s  ;
'P ercep tio n  thus d i f f e r s  from se n sa tio n  by the
co n sc io u sn ess  of fa r th e r  fa c t s  a sso c ia ted  w ith  the
o b ject o f s e n s a t io n : '
and who l in k s  se n sa tio n  w ith  the world of ch ild h ood :
'Pure se n sa tio n s  can on ly  be r e a lis e d  in  the e a r l i e s t  
days o f l i f e .  They are a l l  but im p ossib le  to  a d u lts  w ith  
memories and s to r e s  of a s s o c ia t io n s  a cq u ired .'
I t  i s  tem pting to see  th is  as some so r t  of p r im itiv e  or 
naive p e r c ep tio n . This i s  what i s  a c tu a lly  th ere  in  the  
l i g h t ,  how th in gs a c tu a lly  appear and appeal to  our
se n s e s . From t h is  we must g e t  to  the world of o b je c ts  in
which we l iv e  and a c t .  This i s  to  be r e g r e t te d . Much 
more to be r e g re tte d  i s  th a t once we did t h is
co n sc io u s ly  and on ly  to  n eed , now we do so
a u to m a tica lly . Once we l iv e d  in  the p r i s t in e ,  immediate 
world of the se n se s , on ly  lea v in g  i t  now and then on
sh ort b u sin ess  t r ip s  in to  the world of a f f a ir s ;  now we 
have alm ost fo rg o tten  i t s  e x is t e n c e .  This view  i s  common 
among a r t i s t s  and c r i t i c s ,  who o f te n , l ik e  C o lerid ge or 
T o lsto y , see  the fu n c tio n  of ar t as to r e s to r e  us to  
th is  innocent s e e in g . Indeed , i t  can sc a r c e ly  be denied  
th a t a e s th e t ic  exp erien ce  has something to  do w ith  
r e la t in g  to the appearance o f th in g s . The q u e stio n  i s
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whether th is  bare appearance has anything to do w ith  
e ith e r  se n sa tio n s  or ch ild h ood . I t  I s  p o s s ib le  to
reco g n ise  the d e sc r ip t io n s  as capturing som ething r e a l ,  
and to  accept th a t t h is  mode of se e in g  i s  som ething of 
great v a lu e , w ith ou t agreein g  w ith  th e  p a r t ic u la r
p sy c h o lo g ica l model proposed . Indeed, C oleridge held  
onto t h is  in s ig h t  a l l  through h is  l i f e ,  but a t one 
period he expressed  i t  in  the language of A sso c ia tio n ism  
(a f t e r  H artley ) and la t e r  on he espoused a theory  
d er iv ed , l ik e  the theory argued h e r e , from Kant and 
S c h e llin g .
The theory espoused h ere says that t h is  a e s th e t ic  
mode of p ercep tio n  i s  not a m atter of a p r im it iv e  form 
or e a r l ie r  s ta g e , but o f th e  so r t  o f a t t itu d e  or 
m otivation  we bring to the s i t u a t io n .  A ttitu d e s  and 
m otivations ac t through what Kant c a l l s , the em p ir ica l 
concepts of th e  understanding; th a t i s  through the  
system  of c a te g o r ie s  which we have learned to  apply to 
the w orld, and which are la r g e ly  embodied in  our 
ordinary language. A fter  a l l ,  we take up a p a r t ic u la r  
a tt itu d e  to som ething as t h is  or th a t p a r t ic u la r  type of 
th in g . This mode of p ercep tio n  bypasses the category
system . I t  i s  a s o r t  of d is in te r e s te d  p e r c e p tio n , where
a tte n t io n  i s  d is tr ib u te d  not according to  any p reju d ice  
or purpose, but accord ing to  the requirem ents of a 
complete sy n th e s is  under a schema created  fo r  ju s t  th at  
s i t u a t io n .  I t  ought to  be p o s s ib le  to  produce in  
s u b je c ts , or have them produce in  th em se lv es , th is  so r t
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of r e la x e d , d i f f u s e  a t te n t io n  where the lower le v e l  
p ercep tu a l p r o c e sse s  are not driven  by any p a r t ic u la r  
schem ata. One way m ight be to  In s tr u c t  them to  use the  
whole resou rces of language to  capture e x a c t ly  and 
com p letely  what Is  In fro n t o f them, i . e .  to w r ite  a 
poem, and then to  read the poems or in te r r o g a te  them 
about th e ir  e x p e r ie n c e . This has not been done in  any 
'd is c ip lin e d  way. However, the r e s u lt s  of thousands of 
n atu ra l experim ents are a v a ila b le  in  a n th o lo g ie s  of 
p o etry , and th ere  are many accounts of the exp erien ce  by 
poets in  work's l ik e
Wordsworth's p reface  
to  the 'L y r ic a l B a lla d s ' ,  and C o le r id g e 's  'B iographia  
L ite r c tr ia ' . These lend con sid erab le  support to  the so r t  
of phenom enological d e sc r ip t io n  g iven  above. There i s  
another s tr a te g y  fo r  d isco n n ectin g  p ercep tu a l p rocesses  
from the ongoing stream  of a c t io n , a f f e c t  and thought, 
and fo c u ss in g  a t te n t io n  on the " bare exp er ien ce" , and 
t h is  i s  sim ply (although fa r  from e a s i ly )  to  forgo  
language. This i s  the s tr a te g y  in  th a t area o f research  
which has come to  be known as the exp er im en ta l.stu d y  of 
m ed ita tio n . However, i t  i s  perhaps worth record ing th at  
the phenomena in  q u estion  were known of in  more or l e s s  
con ven tion a l psychology b efore  the current in te r e s t  
a ro se . Indeed James (1890a) had a s o p h is t ic a te d  taxonomy 
of a t te n t io n a l  s t a t e s ,  in  which the one under d isc u ss io n  
here was c a lle d  'a c t iv e  immediate s e n s o r ia l  a t t e n t io n ' .  
In the s tu d ie s  by Deikman (1 9 6 6 ), su b je c ts  were required  
to d ir e c t  th e ir  a t te n t io n  onto a sim ple o b je c t , and keep
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I t  th e re . When the mind wandered -  a s , of co u rse , i t  
o fte n  did -  su b je c ts  were in s tr u c te d  sim ply to bring i t  
back to the o b je c t . S u b jects  were asked to  report th e ir  
e x p e r ie n c e s . They reported  in  very s im ila r  terms to  the  
d e sc r ip t io n  above. Deikman found th a t c o n s is t e n t ly ,  they  
reported in c re a se  in  v iv id n e s s  and H o l in e s s ,  'd e­
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  of m o d a l i t ie s ' ,  and the so r t  of f e e l in g s  
of fre sh n e ss  or d isco v ery  m entioned above.
In t h is  mode we n o t ic e  more, th a t i s  we n o t ic e  
th ings and a sp ec ts  g e n e r a lly  ignored ; we n o t ic e  more 
in te n s e ly , th a t i s  our p ercep tio n s  have more l i f e  and 
energy; and we n o t ic e  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  th a t i s  we seem to  be 
in  a q u a l i t a t iv e ly  d i f f e r e n t  r e la t io n sh ip  to the o b je c ts  
of our p e r c ep tio n .
(1 ) Colours are b r ig h te r , or ra th er  the exp erien ce  of 
colour i s  more in te n se ;  hues and tones are s u b t le r ,  we 
make f in e r  d is t in c t io n s  and ap p rec ia te  th e ir  s u b t le ty ;  
we n o t ic e  shadows, and how deep they are; we n o t ic e  and 
re v e l in  th e  q u a lity  o f th e  l i g h t  i t s e l f .
(2 ) We n o t ic e  te x tu r e , th in gs are seen  as rough or
smooth, and more than t h is  we exp erien ce  the  
s ig n if ic a n c e  of te x tu r e , th in g s are seen  as damp, s l i c k  
or dry. We r e la t e  our se e in g  im m ediately to  a s o r t  of 
s e n s ib le  r e a c tio n ; we can f e e l  th in gs through our eyes  
as though touching them. There i s  a d i s t in c t ly
cross-m odal f e e l  to th e  e x p e r ie n c e , and th is  c a r r ie s
over in to  our em otions. J u s t  as we would r e c o i l  from a 
p a r tic u la r  so r t  of slim y touch , so we r e c o i l  from the
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same q u a lity  presen ted  v i s u a l ly .
(3 ) Form " p resen ts I t s e l f  in  new ways; i t s  almost as i f  
i t  breaks up in to  a sp e c ts ;  s o l i d i t y ,  d e l ic a c y ,
p r e c a r io u sn e ss , and so on. Each of th ese  a sp ects  can
c a l l  up an apparently  appropriate  resp on se.
(4 ) A lon gsid e  the s p e c i f ic  t a c t u a l ,  b od ily  and em otional 
resp onses m entioned, there are o fte n  more gen era l 
resp on ses of fa s c in a t io n  or wonder.
T h is, of c o u rse , i s  a s u b je c t iv e ,  im p r e ss io n is t ic  
account, and i t  may seem th a t th e o r ie s  cannot be 
con stru cted  on the b a s is  o f th is  s o r t  of o b serv a tio n , a t  
l e a s t  i f  they are to c la im  any so r t  of o b j e c t iv i t y .
N e v e r th e le s s , i t  w i l l  be argued th a t the account g iven
above has a grea t deal of in te r - s u b je c t iv e  v a l id i t y ,  and 
in  the study of p ecep tio n  what more i s  there? However, 
so p h is t ic a te d  the methods everyth in g  comes down to  
rep orts of e x p e r ie n c e , or of judgements on e x p e r ie n c e s .
I f  p ercep tio n  i s  made up of se n sa tio n s , i t  i s  a t  
th is  l e v e l  they ought to be e v id e n t . Now the a sp ec ts  in  
the f i r s t  ca tegory  may bear some resem blance to  the  
t r a d it io n a l  s e n s a t io n s , and even in  the second, the 
purely  v is u a l  exp erien ce  might s t i l l  be r e la te d  to  
f a ir ly  lo c a l  even ts a t the r e t in a ,  but the a sp ects  in  
the th ir d  ca teg o ry , a t  l e a s t ,  are su r e ly  not candidates  
fo r  se n s e -d a ta . At l e a s t ,  i f  they are th is  i s  a fa r  cry 
from a to m is tic  th e o r ie s  of s e n sa tio n  which see  the b a s ic  
c o n s t itu e n ts  of p ercep tion  as so r t  of in f in i t e s im a l  
quanta of coloured  l i g h t .  Now, t h is  does not mean th a t
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the b a s ic  c o n s t itu e n ts  are not perceived  in  t h is  mode. 
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  d is t in g u is h  a n a ly t ic a l ly  w ith in  th is  
mode, as indeed was done h e r e , a number of c a te g o r ie s ,  
and to  say th a t one of th e se  c a te g o r ie s  com prise the  
b a s ic  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  but t h is  d iv is io n  i s  not p resen t in  
the e x p e r ie n c e , and th ere  would be no phenom enological 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the c la im . Phenom enological accounts  
ought, of cou rse, to  in c lu d e  not only what we 
e x p e r ie n c e , but what we d o . What we do in  th is  mode i s  
nothing in  p a r t ic u la r , noth ing o th er  than look in g  a t  the  
w orld . Our normal mode of p e r c ep tio n  i s  very la r g e ly  
a s s im ila t iv e ;  that i s  we apply ready-made schemata to  
the w orld . This mode i s  p r im a r ily  one o f accommodation 
to  the world; th a t i s ,  o f the c o n str u c tio n  and o p era tio n  
of p ercep tu a l schemata e x a c t ly  ad justed  to the w orld in  
a l l  i t s  con crete  d e t a i l .
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CHAPTER 5  : VISUALpeRcee^^-xo o( SPACix,
S'.l INTRODUCTION.
There are two r e l a t iv e l y  d is t in c t  notion s of a 
model. The f i r s t  i s  when we t a lk  about a model boat or 
car . Here, the model bears a c lo s e  p h ysica l resem blance  
to the o r ig in a l . I t  has the same p a r ts , perhaps, in  the  
same p h y sica l r e la t io n s h ip s .  I f  i t  i s  a working m odel, 
these p arts may perform the same so r t  of operations in  
both c a se s , the only d if f e r e n c e s  being of s c a le  and/or  
m a ter ia l. I t  not on ly  look s the same, i t  behaves the 
same. The other id ea  o f a model i s  when we ta lk  about
m odelling the behaviour o f an o i l f i e l d  or a sp acesh ip
m athem atically . Such a m athem atical model m ight, o f
course, be implemented on a computer, and here we should  
ta lk  q u ite  n a tu r a lly  about a computer model. In any 
c a se , th ere  i s ,  n a tu r a lly , no q u estion  of any p h y s ic a l  
resem blance. Nor i s  th ere  any qu estion  of any
behavioural s im ila r ity ;  the operations going on in  a 
computer are not a t a l l  l ik e  th ose  going on in  a s e c t io n  
of the e a r th 's  c r u s t , or in  the in te r io r  of a sp a cesh ip . 
However, when i t  comes to computer models of behaviour, 
p a r tic u la r ly  mental b eh av iou r, the r e la tio n sh ip  may not 
be so c le a r .  Of co u rse , th ere  i s  s t i l l  no p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
a p h y sica l resem blance between the model and the
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o r ig in a l ,  but there may be a p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a
behavioural resem blance. That i s ,  a s u c c e s s fu l  computer
model of a p a r t ic u la r  s o r t  of mental behaviour may be
construed , r ig h t ly  or w rongly , as not only  producing the
same r e s u lt s  as the o r ig in a l  m ental behaviour, but as
performing the same o p e r a tio n s . I t  i s  q u ite  c le a r  th at
some models have been understood in  th is  way ( e .g .
Winograd, 197Î; Anderson and Bower, 1970), The
r e la t io n sh ip  might work both  ways; i f  computers are l ik e
humans, humans are l ik e  com puters, and th e ir  behaviour
can be expressed in  terms of in form ation  s to r a g e ,
transform ation , and r e t r ie v a l  ( e .g .  Posner, 1973), or
le v e ls  of processin g  (Craik and Lockhart, 197%), or of
s tr a te g ie s  and programs (N ew ell e t  a l ,  op c i t ) .  I t  i s
not denied th a t t h is  has a c e r ta in  v a l id i t y  fo r  c e r ta in
asp ects of mental b ehaviour, th ose  a sp ec ts  th a t  m ight be
c a lle d  s tr u c tu r a l or p ro ced u ra l. Even .h ere , i t  i s
necessary  to be c a r e fu l about the p r e c is e  r e la t io n s h ip
between model and r e a l i t y ,  and some of the p o s s ib le
r e la t io n s  are d iscu ssed  in  the next s e c t io n .  However,
the p o in t here i s  th a t m ental behaviour, or mental a c t s ,
as i s  o ften  more ap p ro p r ia te , are always more than mere
procedures. They in c lu d e  a sp e c ts  of what was r e fe r re d  to
as 'sp o n ta n e ity '. Now m o tiv a tio n a l p ro cesses  and
d e c is io n  p rocesses can be m odelled m ath em atica lly .
Indeed, th ere  i s  a \<hole branch of mathematics d ed icated
to t h i s ,  game th eo ry , which has been ap p lied
s u c c e s s fu lly  to behaviour in  anim als at l e a s t  ( e .g .
Maynard-Smith, 1976). N eed less  to  sa y , th ese  models can 
be on A, W  wooU be \eco<vi
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'weak' s e n s e . Of cou rse, hybrid models are p o s s ib le ,  
where the procedural a sp e c ts  might be construed  
p la u s ib ly  as models in  the stro n g  s e n s e , but they would 
be h y b r id s.
Sometimes, the claim  i s  made th at con sc iou sn ess i s  
merely a m atter of s tr u c tu r a l com p lex ity . A p iece  of 
human behaviour i s  m odelled on a computer, and the model 
i s  trea ted  as being s im ila r  in  a l l  r e sp e c ts  to  the  
o r ig in a l .  Of co u rse , i t  i s  never claim ed th at th is  or 
th a t p a r t ic u la r  computer op eratin g  th is  or th a t  
p a r tic u la r  model i s  co n sc io u s , but th is  i s  very o fte n  
seen  as a m atter of com p lex ity . Once r e a lly  complex 
asp ects  of human behaviour are m odelled , perhaps by some 
form of h e ta r c h ic a l m u lti-p ro cesso r  system , we w i l l  have 
no reason to deny that the system  i s  co n sc io u s . This i s  
a r e s u lt  of the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  tr a d it io n  which se es  
c o g n it io n s , p ercep tio n s , em otions as d if f e r e n t  forms of 
con sc iou sn ess fo llo w in g  each o th er  from moment to  
moment. Perhaps, em otional co n sc io u sn ess  remains a 
m ystery, but we are w e ll  on the way to producing  
c o g n itiv e  co n sc io u sn ess . The a c t io n  based approach used  
here shows th is  to be a n on sen se . Thinking, remembering, 
f e e l in g  are not d if fe r e n t  ty p e s , but d if fe r e n t  a sp ec ts  
of c o n sc io u sn ess . With th is  in  mind, we s h a l l  try to say  
something in  in form ation- p ro cess in g  terms about 
s tr u c tu r a l a sp ec ts  of the model being advocated.
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5 .2  AN OUTLINE MODEL.
A ction takes p la c e  in  space and in v o lv e s  other  
p h y sica l b o d ie s . N orm ally, i t  i s  guided by v i s io n ,  and 
the space and the b od ies are constructed  by v i s i o n .  Of 
co u rse , t h is  i s  not always so; i t  may be guided by 
touch , or the space and bodies may be con stru cted -b y
touch . In t h is  l a t t e r  c a s e , as we have se e n , the
c o n str u c tiv e  elem ent i s  more obvious. T his a b i l i t y  to  
con stru ct a world on the b a s is  of in form ation  from the  
sen ses  i s  one mode of o p era tio n  of a more gen era l image 
making f a c i l i t y  which a ls o  operates when we co n stru ct  
images in  the absence of any environm ental s t im u la t io n .  
Of co u rse , what i s  meant here i s  th a t both v is u a l  
imagery and v is u a l  p ercep tio n  in vo lve  the same s o r t  of 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  but i t  may be of some in te r e s t  th at there  
are d e f in i t e  in d ic a t io n s  th a t they employ the same 
hardware (Brooks, 1 9 6 8 ). In any c a se , th is  means th a t a
p ercep tion  i s  as much a crea tio n  as an image in  a
daydream. Of co u r se , i t  corresponds more or l e s s  e x a c t ly  
to the w orld, but th ere  i s  no c o n tra d ic tio n  h e r e . A ll  
a c tio n s  are s im u lta n eo u sly  constrained  and supported by 
th e ir  environm ent, and to the ex ten t th a t they are 
co n stra in ed , they r e f l e c t  i t s  s tr u c tu r e . A lso , they are 
d irec ted  by th e ir  g o a ls , and the goal of t h is  p a r t ic u la r  
so r t  of a c tio n  i s  to rep resen t the environm ent.
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The images can be understood as c o n s is t in g  of three  
le v e ls ;  s tr u c tu r e  of p a r ts , o r g a n isa t io n  of space and 
se n s ib le  m a te r ia l . The h ig h e s t  l e v e l  of s tr u c tu r e  of 
parts can be expressed  in  terms of a system  com prising a 
s e t  of elem ents w ith  r u le s  fo r  th e ir  permissd-ble 
com binations. This maps d ir e c t ly  onto the conceptual 
system , p rov id in g  a bridge between p ercep tion  and 
thought -  the tr a d it io n a l  fu n c tio n  of im agination in  
philosophy. The ru le s  generate s tr u c tu r a l d e sc r ip t io n s  
of the s o r t  fa m ilia r  from l in g u i s t i c s  in  g e n e r a l, and 
TGG in  p a r t ic u la r , i . e .  immediate c o n s t itu e n t  stru c tu re  
or phrase s tr u c tu r e . This so r t  of s tr u c tu re  i s  u su a lly  
expressed in  terms of a tr e e  diagram w ith branching 
nodes term in ating  in  u ltim a te  c o n s t i tu e n ts .  The u ltim a te  
c o n stitu e n ts  are drawn from a s e t  of p r im itiv e  fea tu res  
which are not capable of fu r th er  a n a ly s is  at the same 
l e v e l ,  but are capable of r e a l i s a t io n  at a lower l e v e l .  
Of cou rse , in  most l in g u i s t i c  system s on ly  term inal 
item s have such r e a l i s a t io n s ,  whereas here (se e  f i g  1) 
a l l  item s may have them.
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a ir c r a f t
r .  wingbody1. wing
fu s e la g eta i lp la n e
tr ia n g u la r  p r ism / i s o s . /  
w id th  in c r e a s in g /  5 w id th  
in c r e a s in g  towards b a s e /  .
tr ia n g u la r  lam ina/ 
r ig h t  an g led / . . .
c ig a r  shaped/ d iam eter  
d e c r ea s in g  towards rear
F igu re 1
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There are many problems Involved  In the c o n str u c tio n  of 
such a system , th e  most ob v iou s, perhaps, having to do 
w ith departures from the norm, m issin g  p a r ts , and w ith  
the more gen era l problem of co n tex t dependency. However, 
i t  seems l ik e l y  th a t th ese  can be so lv e d . A lready, 
severa l system s of t h is  type e x is t  e ith e r  as a working 
program fo r  a r e s t r ic t e d  range o f o b je c ts  (Winograd, 
1972), or as a proposal in tended to  apply to  a l l  
p o ss ib le  o b je c ts  (M ille r  and Johnson~Laird, 1977).
At the s p a t ia l  l e v e l ,  images are stru ctu red  s e t s  of 
affordances fo r  a c t io n , u su a lly  in stru m en ta l a c t io n .  
This i s  in  c o n tr a s t  to a view  lA ich  says th a t we see  
o r ig in a lly  the p r o je c t io n  of o b je c t s ,  and th a t we 
in te r p r e t  th ese  p r o je c t io n s  in  terms of su r fa c e s , ed ges, 
protru beran ces. Of co u rse , p r o je c t iv e  geometry does
describe th e  l ig h t  f a l l in g  a t the e y e , and, o f co u rse ,
th is  l ig h t  does cause changes in  the r e t in a  which
tr ig g e r  o f f  v a r io u s  other p ro cesses  in  the nervous
system . The p o in t i s  that th ese  are p h y s io lo g ic a l
p r o c e sse s , not m ental a c t s .  We need perform no 
operations to get from a primary p ercep tion  to an
enriched , in te r p r e te d , humanly s ig n if ic a n t  p e rcep tio n . 
T his, of cou rse , i s  G ibson's theme s l i g h t ly  r e s ta te d . In 
a se n se , Gibson i s  m erely paraphrasing Kant. The primary 
con sc iou sn ess i s  o b je c t iv e ;  the secondary, r e f l e c t iv e ,  
may be s e n s a t io n a l . In another se n se , he i s  an
improvement, for  Kant was i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  in  h is
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approach ra th er  than pragm atic, and saw o b je c ts  as 
members of c a te g o r ie s  of the und erstand ing, whereas 
Gibson sees  them as m anipulable t h in g s •
• This l e v e l  of o r g a n isa tio n  in  space can be
represented in  much the same way as the l e v e l  above. Of
cou rse, here we are concerned not w ith  p arts in  a 
s p a t ia l  r e la t io n s h ip , but w ith a sp e c ts  in  a lo g ic a l  
r e la t io n s h ip . Here the term inal item s correspond to 
se n s ib le  fe a tu r e s  of the w orld. These in c lu d e  shapes, 
co lo u rs , s la n t s ,  o r ie n ta t io n s ,  and so on. Systems of 
th is  sort have been described  in  o u t lin e  fo r  p ic tu r e s  
( e .g .  Clowes, 1969) and for  rea l o b je c ts  (Marr and
N ish ihara , 1976). M arr's system  of g e n e r a lised  cones i s
p a r t ic u la r ly  in t e r e s t in g ,  s in ce  i t  rep resen ts  an advance 
over more i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t /  a n a ly t ic a l  approaches in  th at  
i t  makes some attem pt to rep resen t the a c tu a l p h y sica l  
presence of the o b je c t .
S tructure i s ,  in  some s e n s e , a rb r ita ry  or 
con ven tion al; shape i s  n o t . I t  has an im m ediate, obvious  
o b je c t iv ity  which d er iv es  from the fa c t  th at we are 
m ateria l bod ies among o th e r s , and i f  we do not 
'c o r r e c t ly '  p e r c e iv e  space and the bodies f i l l i n g  i t ,  we 
come up a g a in s t  the world w ith a bump. When we see  the  
world i t  i s  always organised in  some way, and there can 
be sev era l p o s s ib le  o r g a n isa tio n s  of the same s p a t ia l  
c o n fig u r a tio n . There need be no le v e l  of pure, 
unorganised, s p a t ia l  p ercep tio n , however, although such
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a d e sc r ip t io n  of the world might s t i l l  be v a lid  as an 
o b ject of r e f l e c t io n .  Shape i s  an a b s tr a c t io n , a 
d e sc r ip t io n  of what th e se  s e v e r a l org a n isa tio n s have in  
common. This a f te r  a l l  i s  the p o s it io n  w ith  regard to  
atomic s e n s a t io n s . W ittg e n ste in  i n s i s t s  that th is  i s  not 
the case; th at i t  i s  sim ply wrong to a s s o c ia te  
o rg a n isa tio n  and shape as a sp e c ts  o f p ercep tio n . He says  
th at when the o r g a n isa t io n  changes, something remains 
the same, and th at t h is  som ething in c lu d es shape. By 
shape remaining th e  same, he means that i f  he were to  
s tr e tc h  out and touch v a r io u s p o in ts  of the o b ject he 
would do the same b e fo re  and a f te r  the change. However, 
he has m isled  h im self by c o n s id er in g , p ic tu r e - o b je c t s , 
rath er than o b je c ts  prop er. Gibson n o tw ith stan d in g , 
there are times when the in form ation  in  the l ig h t  does 
not uniquely and c e r t a in ly  sp e c ify  a p a r t ic u la r  
three-d im ensional s p a t ia l  la y o u t . In th is  c a se , we may 
form a n o n -v e r id ic a l p e r c ep tio n . When cues become 
a v a ila b le  which f a l s i f y  t h i s ,  a change to  a d i f f e r e n t ,  
th is  time v e r id ic a l ,  p ercep tio n  occu rs. P a r tic u la r  
id e n t i f ie d  p o in ts  of o b je c ts  or su rfaces w i l l  then be 
lo ca ted  at d if f e r e n t  p o in ts  in  sp ace , in  the sen se  that 
I would make d i f f e r e n t  movements to touch them. The Ames 
room experim ents o f fe r  lab oratory  examples o f t h i s ,  but 
i t  a lso  occurs o u ts id e  the lab oratory , e s p e c ia l ly  in  
co n d itio n s of r e s t r ic t e d  v i s i b i l i t y ,  such as m is t .
At th is  l e v e l  th ere  i s  a complementary way of 
see in g  concerned w ith  our awareness of sp a ce .
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p a r t ic u la r ly  the space we move in .  Most p ercep tion  is  
p ercep tion  of th in g s , or r a th er , most ta lk  about 
p ercep tion  i s  about p e r c ep tio n  of th in g s . Yet we are 
im m ediately aware o f sp a c e , how i t  i s  f i l l e d  and where 
we are in  i t  and how we are moving in  i t  in  r e la t io n  to  
o b s ta c le s , gaps and su p p o rts . We are im m ediately aware 
of what our immediate environm ent a ffo rd s to  us in  the  
way of a c t io n s .  At l e a s t  as regards whole body a c t io n s ,  
th is  does not in v o lv e  any d e ta ile d  parsing o f the form s, 
indeed q u ite  the re v er se  as when we d escr ib e  a curved 
path p ast a number of o b s t a c le s .  I t  i s  o ften  claim ed  
that we see  b od ies and not the spaces between them, but, 
at th is  l e v e l ,  the o p p o s ite  seems to be the c a se . What 
we see  i s  sp a ce , sometimes opening up, sometimes 
c lo s in g , sometimes curving or bending o f f  to one s id e .  
We are s c a r c e ly  co n sc io u s  of the b o d ies , c e r ta in ly  not 
of th e ir  a r t i c u la t io n .  Where we see  them, i t  i s  as 
su r fa c e s , boundaries of sp ace , the l im it s  and the 
supports of our a c t io n s .  T his i s  the s o r t  of p ercep tion  
Gibson d e sc r ib e s  when he i s  ta lk in g  about v is u a l  
p ercep tion  and the c o n tro l of locom otion . This i s  not so 
much a l e v e l  as an a lte r n a t iv e  mode of p ercep tio n , 
perhaps even r e la te d  to  a d if f e r e n t  v is u a l  system  
(T revarthen, 1970).
S t i l l  a t  th is  s p a t ia l  l e v e l ,  th ere  i s  a th ir d ,  
rather p e c u lia r , way of s e e in g . We d iscu ssed  e a r l ie r  the 
change th a t occurs when a n o n -v e r id ic a l p ercep tio n  of 
space i s  corrected  by the a v a i la b i l i t y  of new
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in form ation . Something remains the same during and a f te r  
the change. The world seems to a l t e r  shape, y e t  noth ing  
in  the a c tu a l appearance of th in g s  seems to a l t e r .  We 
should d escr ib e  the world d i f f e r e n t ly  a f t e r ,  but we 
should d escrib e  the im pression  i t  makes on us in  e x a c t ly  
the same term s. Of c o u r se , th is  i s  because the a c tu a l  
contours as they s lo p e  towards or away from each o th er  
remain the same. The scene a ffo r d s  e x a c tly  the same as 
b efore  fo r  eye movements. I t  i s  tem pting to  g iv e  th ese  
v is u a l  contours s p e c ia l  s t a t u s ,  but th is  would be a 
m istak e. Voluntary eye movements, accommodation and
vergence movements norm ally work to g eth e r . Take the case  
of an edge reced ing from th e ob server . The eyes may
fo llo w  the edge; as they do eye movements w i l l  be made 
to  take account of how the edge p ro jec ts  onto the
fr o n to -  p a r a l le l  p la n e , and accommodation and vergence  
movements w i l l  be made to take account of how the v is u a l  
in form ation  changes as th e  edge recedes in  the depth  
p la n e . Accommodation and vergence movements r e la t e  to  
a sp e c ts  of the stim u lu s -  c la r i t y  and b in ocu lar  
d is p a r ity  -  ju s t  as eye movements r e la te  to  contour; and 
accommodation and vergence movements provide depth 
in form ation , ju s t  as eye movements provide depth, 
d ir e c t io n  and e le v a t io n , l f^hat s p e c i f ie s  form i s  the so r t  
of exp loratory  a c t io n  i t  w i l l  support. This a c tio n  
occurs in  three d im ensions, two of them accounted fo r  by 
voluntary  eye-movements and the th ird  by voluntary  eye 
movements p lus accommodation and vergence movements. We 
can see  th is  in  the s o r t  of 'h u n tin g ' th at occurs in  the
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accommodation system  as the change occu rs, and, of 
cou rse , in  the fa c t  th at t h is  so r t  of s itu a t io n  occurs 
m ainly in  m ist when th is  system  i s  confused by the lack  
of sharp im ages.
We can , of co u r se , d ir e c t  our a t te n t io n  to  th is  s e t
of affordances fo r  vo lu n tary  eye movements. We can put
ofo u rse lv es  in  th a t p e c u lia r  frame^^mind where, as Gibson 
puts i t ,  we are look in g  a t the v i s u a l  f i e l d  rath er than 
the v is u a l  w orld . In c e r ta in  c ircu m stan ces, th is  w i l l  be 
eq u iv a len t to se e in g  a 2D p ic tu r e .  The tr a d it io n a l  view  
i s  th a t the m a ter ia l in  v is u a l  p ercep tion  does not 
correspond to  the d i s t a l  s t im u lu s , the» actu a l ob ject  
p erce iv ed , but to the proximal s t im u lu s , the p attern  of 
events in  the f lu x  of energy at the receptor su r fa c e . 
Here, i t  seem s, we are con sc iou s of ju s t  th a t , or of 
something rather c lo s e ,  perhaps c lean ed  up ju s t  a l i t t l e  
by la t e r a l  in h ib it io n  and s u c h lik e . However, 
phenom enolog ica lly , i t  i s  sim ply not true that we f i r s t  
experience a 2D d is p la y , a d isp la y  w ithout depth and, 
th e r e fo r e , w ithout s iz e  con stan cy . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
see  w ithout s iz e  con stan cy , and in  many circum stances  
im p o ss ib le . Take the case where an observer i s  looking  
at a v e r t ic a l  book in  a bookcase about e ig h t or nine  
f e e t  away; the book i s  of A4 s i z e ,  more or l e s s .  %(\ 
fron t o f the ob serv er , e ig h t  or n ine inches away and 
ly in g  h o r iz o n ta l i s  a sh e e t  of A4 paper. J^hen he looks  
at the sp in e  of the book, he can s t i l l  see  the paper. I t  
i s  im possib le  to see  them as the paper being twelve
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times the s iz e  of the book. I f  they are put in  the same 
plan e, and e s p e c ia l ly  i f  they are a lso  placed so as to 
p roject onto ad jacen t areas o f the r e t in a , one can see  
w ithout s i z e  con stan cy , maybe. I t  i s  only because most 
constancy experim ents are conducted under co n d itio n s  
that approxim ate to th is  second co n d itio n  that the  
notion  we can overcome s iz e  constancy has any 
p la u s ib i l i t y  w h atsoever. The tru th  i s  that th is  i s  a 
very s o p h is t ic a te d ,  h ig h ly  a n a ly t ic a l  mode of s e e in g .  
Nor i s  i t  s e e in g  w ithout a th ird  dim ension. What 
happens i s  th a t everyth ing  i s  f la t te n e d  onto a p ic tu r e  
p lane, but th a t p lane i s  s t i l l  a t  some p a r t ic u la r  depth.
The term " se n sa tio n ” i s  used in  a number of ways. 
One d e f in i t io n  i s  th at i t  i s  the su b je c t iv e  pole of our 
exp er ien ce . I f  we run our f in g e r s  over an o b je c t ,  
norm ally, what we exp erien ce  i s  the o b je c t . However, we 
can turn our minds to the f e e l  o f our sk in , the pressu re  
and the in d e n ta t io n . C er ta in ly , t h is  has something to  do 
with the p a tte r n  of even ts a t the su rface  of the sense  
organ. However, i t  does not bear the same r e la t io n sh ip  
to the f in a l  o b je c t iv e  p ercep tio n  as t r a d it io n a l  
accounts would have us b e l ie v e .  This can be demonstrated 
by a r e la t iv e ly  sim ple experim ent taking advantage of 
the fa c t  th a t wedge prism s impose curvature on the  
stim ulus as w e ll  as d isp la c in g  i t .  I f  a s tr a ig h t  
v e r t ic a l  edge i s  in sp ected  w h ile  wearing wedge prism s i t  
w i l l  be seen  as curved. I f ,  w h ile  look in g  at th is  curved 
d isp la y , a su b je c t  runs a f in g e r  along the edge, the
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edge w i l l  be f e l t  as curved. The exp lan ation  of th is  
e f f e c t  i s  in  terms of the v is u a l  p ercep tio n  determ ining  
the e ffe r e n c e  ap p lied  to the f in g e r  to  keep i t  in  
con tact w ith  the edge, and the f e l t  shape o f the edge 
depending on t h is  p attern  of e f fe r e n c e . At any r a te , i t  
does not depend on the a ffe r e n c e  from p ressu re  se n se , or 
p o s it io n  s e n s e .
In a c t iv e  touch our hands are m oving, the s itu a t io n  
i s  changing from moment to moment. We have a c h o ice , 
e ith e r  to  a tten d  to  the se n sa tio n s  or to the o b je c t . 
Once the ev en ts  have passed away, we cannot change the 
ch o ice  fo r  th ese  e v e n ts . In v is io n  the s itu a t io n  i s  
rath er d i f f e r e n t ,  a t l e a s t  fo r  s t a t i c  d is p la y s . We can 
look a t th e  same d isp la y , and we can con cen tra te  f i r s t  
on the c o n te n t, and then on the im pression  i t  makes on 
u s . The n o tio n  th a t in  th is  s t a t e  we are exp erien cin g  
some f i r s t  l e v e l  of p ercep tu a l p ro cessin g  has g iven  r is e  
to  a number o f c h a r a c te r isa t io n s  of th is  f i r s t  l e v e l .  
The most obvious are the im pressions of Hume or the  
p r im itiv e  sen sory  u n i t ie s  of Hebb (1 9 4 9 ). This so r t  of 
theory i s  c u r r e n tly  undergoing a r e v iv a l both in  the  
form of ico n s (S p e r lin g , I960; N e is se r , 1967), and 
primal sk etch es (Harr, 1974). However, as we have seen , 
the id ea  of a tw o-dim ensional im print does not match our 
ordinary e x p e r ie n c e . In any c a s e , such th e o r ie s  do not 
f i t  the experim ental fa c t s  on the occurrence of 
m otivated m isp ercep tion s (se e  chapter 3 ) .  Im pressions 
allow  too l i t t l e  room fo r  n e g o t ia t io n . The same i s  true
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of G esta lt  f i e l d s .  Although they are n o t , by any means, 
r e p lic a s  of the proximal s tim u lu s, the f i e l d  i s  
determined e n t ir e ly  by the s tim u lu s, and the  
o rg a n isa tio n  i s  determ ined e n t ir e ly  by the c o n fig u r a tio n  
of the f i e l d .
In v i s io n ,  a l s o ,  we can r e c a l l  an image. When we do 
t h i s ,  we g e t  the im pression  th at i t  i s  p resen t to us a t  
a l l  l e v e ls  in c lu d in g  the s e n s ib le  m a te r ia l-  This i s  not 
tru e o f touch where ( se e  chapter 3) the s e n s ib le  
m ater ia l bears a ra th er  d if f e r e n t  r e la t io n s h ip  to  the  
p e r c ep tio n . We f e e l  we can re-exam ine the v is u a l  image, 
re -a n a ly se  i t .  'This i s ,  perhaps, th e  root of the n otion  
of atomic s e n s a t io n s . However, th ere  i s  no reason at a l l  
tO' suppose th a t th ese  th e o r e t ic a l  o b je c t s ,  o b je c ts  of  
r e f l e c t io n ,  should be in  any way s im ila r  to  the o b je c ts  
of our exp er ien ce  ir\ a n on -ref l e  c t iv e  mode.
The theory advocated here depends on G ibson's  
in v a r ia n ts . I t  i s ,  b road ly , th at there i s  no icon  or 
primal sk etch  fo r  h igh er  l e v e l  p ro cesses  to  in te r r o g a te  
or in te r p r e t . What i s  in terp re ted  or in terro g a ted  i s  not 
something in  the head, but the w orld . What i s  meant by 
se n s ib le  m a ter ia l i s  the p a ttern s o f in v a r ia n c e , no 
m atter how com plex. That is^ a s in g le  spot of l ig h t  
s ig n ify in g  a s in g le  spot of l i g h t ,  a tex tu r e  grad ien t  
s ig n ify in g  depth, or a p a r t ic u la r  p a ttern  of movement 
s ig n ify in g  depth are a l l  at the same l e v e l ,  th e  l e v e l  of 
se n s ib le  m a te r ia l. However, th is  l e v e l  i s  not ju s t
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p a ss iv e  m a te r ia l;  i t  i s  l ik e  th e  o th er  le v e ls  a schema, 
a p lan  fo r  a c t io n . In t h is  c a s e , the a c tio n s  are  
exp lora tory  a c t io n s , eye movements and the l i k e .  This 
le v e l  i s  a part of our se e in g ;  i t  i s  not ju s t  som ething  
upon which our see in g  i s  consequent, l ik e  even ts a t  the  
r e t in a , fo r  in s ta n c e . There i s  a tendency in  in form ation  
p ro cess in g  accounts to rep r ese n t le v e ls  such th a t  
in form ation  i s  passed from one to  the o th er , and then  
f in a l l y  some reduced, transform ed or elaborated  v e r s io n  
i s  a llow ed to en ter  c o n sc io u sn e ss . In some of th ese  
s ta g e  models the r e s u lt  would seem to  be our hearin g  
rath er  than see in g  the v is u a l  world ( e .g .  Haber and 
HersVjeO^Oj 1973), or a t perhaps merely in tu it in g  the  
id e n t ity  of the o b jec ts  w ith  which we are co n fro n ted . 
Each of the l e v e l s  must e x h ib it  transparency to the ones 
below i t ,  so that they a l l  en ter  in to  our p ercep tio n  
r ig h t  down to th is  f in a l  l e v e l  where the a c tu a l s e n s ib le  
q u a l i t ie s  are apparent.
The image i s  r e la te d  to  th e  actu a l f lu x  o f 
s tim u la t io n  as a schema imposing cohesion  and 
o rg a n isa tio n  on i t ,  but a lso  as an h yp oth esis  which the 
a ctu a l p a ttern  of s tim u la t io n  may confirm  or d isco n firm . 
S p e c if ic  fea tu r e s  of the image are r e a lis e d  as 
p a r t ic u la r  s p a t ia l  and tem poral p a ttern s in  the l ig h t  
f a l l in g  a t  the ey e . These fe a tu r e s  combine -  under the  
co n tro l o f ra th er  general schemata of space, the o b je c t ,  
e t c .  -  and su ggest or determ ine the image, m issin g  
fea tu r e s  being provided from memory. This image gu ides
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the production  and e x tr a c t io n  of o th er  p a tte r n s , o ther  
fe a tu r e s . The image i s  a p lan  th en , fo r  the performance 
of exp lora tory  a c t io n s , eye movements, s h i f t s  of 
a tte n t io n  (c^.f. N e is s e r 's '  1976 p ercep tu a l c y c le s ) .  
Sometimes the in form ation  requ ired  to confirm  the
h y p o th esis  i s  not th e r e . This can occur in  two 
s itu a t io n s ;  a sim ple lack  o f in fo rm a tio n , due perhaps to  
had l ig h t  or b r ie f  exposure; or the presence of
d iscon firm in g  in form ation . In the f i r s t  case the image 
i s  imposed on the incom plete stim u lu s -  t h is  i s  how we 
se e  bushes as w ild  anim als or footpad s in  the dark, or a 
ta c h is to s c o p ic a lly  presen ted  red two of spades as b lack  
(Bruner and Postman, 1949). The case  o f d iscon firm ing  
ev id en ce i s  more com plex. E ith er  the inform ation  i s  
accepted and the image accommodates to  i t ,  but r e ta in s  
i t s  id e n t i ty  -  we se e  a car w ith  tr ia n g u la r  w h eels . I f  
the d iscrepancy i s  to g r e a t , we g e t  a new image, a new 
o r g a n isa tio n  -  everyone i s  fa m ilia r  w ith the s it u a t io n  
where two o rg a n isa tio n s  of the same s e n s ib le  m ater ia l  
v ie  w ith  each other fo r  a moment or two before  one i s
p r e fe r r ed , l^ e re  accommodation o c c u r s , i t  need not be
com plete, e s p e c ia l ly  i f  the stim u lu s i s  in  some way 
inadequate. Here, the r e s u lt  i s  a compromise p ercep tio n , 
a brown two of sp ad es, or one th a t i s  black w ith  red 
borders (Bruner and Postman, op c i t ) .  Of co u rse , 
d iscrep a n t in form ation  may be th e r e , but sim ply not 
e x tr a c te d , and th is  corresponds to  the f i r s t  s i t u a t io n ,  
absence of in form ation .
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When we s e e , a l l  l e v e l s  are In vo lved . There i s  
always s tr u c tu r e , always form , and always sensory  
m a te r ia l. The s tru c tu re  may be m inim al, as in  a s in g le  
sim ple form, the space may be reduced to  two dim ensions, 
and the co lou r and l ig h t  and shade r e s tr ic t e d  to  a 
sim ple b lack  aga in st w h ite . But to  look  a t a b lack  form 
on a w h ite  f i e ld  i s ,  n e v e r th e le s s ,  to  se e  in  a way th a t  
i s  com p letely  described  on ly  in  terms of s tr u c tu r e , form 
and sen sory  q u a lity . This can be seen  in  W ittg e n ste in 's  
t r ia n g le ,  a sim ple p lane f ig u r e  which he i s  able to  use  
as an example in  a d is c u ss io n  of a l l  th e se  l e v e l s .  The 
s tr u c tu r e  may be ju s t  an in v en to ry  o f item s, each one no 
more r e la te d  to any of the p a r t ic u la r  item  than to  any 
of the o th e r s , no conglom eration  in to  groups and h igher  
order groups. Something of th e  e f f e c t  can be seen  in  a 
B reugel p a in tin g  where although f i r s t  order groups are  
sometimes formed the s tr u c tu r e  i s  very f l a t ,  p r a c t ic a l ly  
n o n -e x is te n t , w ith  no le v e ls  of o r g a n isa t io n  between the  
primary groups or in d iv id u a ls  and the p ic tu r e  as a 
w h ole. This i s  a very unnatural o r g a n isa t io n , d i f f i c u l t  
to  ach ieve  in  p e r c ep tio n , and alm ost im possib le to  
m ain ta in . There i s  a n a tu ra l tendency to  group e ith e r  on 
the b a s is  of purely  p h y s ic a l a sp e c ts  of the s itu a t io n  
such as proxim ity or (p h y s ic a l)  s im i la r it y ,  or on the  
b a s is  of the id e n t ity  and meaning o f the item s. This i s  
r e la te d  to  the span of apprehension . Seeing i s  a 
c o g n it iv e  o p era tion , in v o lv e s  p ro cess in g  of in form ation , 
and i s  su b ject to l im ita t io n s  on channel cap acity  and 
the l i k e .  We have a c e r ta in  f ix e d  cap acity  and so must
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break up the world in to  chunks. We handle each one of 
th ese  chunks s e p a r a te ly , grasp  each , come to know each  
as a u n it .  Then we can take th e ir  in te r n a l s tr u c tu r e  fo r  
granted , and use them as item s in  larger  chunks. The 
b it s  and chunks a r e , o f c o u r se , not as a rb ita ry  or as 
a b stract as in form ation  theory  accounts would have i t .  
For our c o g n it io n , our knowledge of the world i s  not 
p rim arily  a b s tr a c t , but c o n c r e te , not p rim arily  for  
r e f l e c t io n ,  but fo r  a c t io n .  We cou ld , of co u rse , d es ig n  
a percep tual system  whose b a s ic  u n its  were sim ple  
two-valued sw itc h e s , and fo r  which any o r g a n isa tio n  of  
th e se , whether good fo r  m erely th e o r e t ic a l  purposes, fo r  
p r a c tic a l  purposes, or no good a t  a l l ,  was as e a s i ly  
handled as any o th e r . B ut, i t  would not be a human, or 
even a b io lo g ic a l  system .
We s h a l l  c a l l  p a tch es o f l i g h t ,  shade and c o lo u r , 
con tou rs, te x tu r e s , and so on, s e n s ib le  f e a tu r e s ,  and 
the va lu es they take in  a p e r c ep t, sensory f e a tu r e s .  
G en erally , our p e r c ep tio n  corresponds more or l e s s
e x a c t ly  to the w orld . We do sometimes m isp e r c e iv e ,
however, and t h is  i s  more than to m is id e n tify  on the  
b a s is  of an incom plete or fragmented p e r c ep tio n . A 
m isperception  i s  a com plete and u n if ie d  som ething which 
corresponds in  every way to  a proper p ercep tio n , excep t  
th at i t  turns out to  be wrong. I t  has a l l  l e v e l s ,
transparent to  each o th e r , r ig h t  down to sen sory
fe a tu r e s , and th e se  need not correspond to any even t a t  
the receptor su r fa ce  -  t h is  i s  the case in  one type of
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m isp ercep tion . The only  way t h is  can be so i s  fo r  th ese  
sensory fe a tu r e s  to  correspond to  output p ro cesses  in  
the CNS. C le a r ly , th ere  i s  more to  i t  than th a t ,  or our 
percep tion s would on ly  correspond to  the world by the
most u n lik e ly  o f c o in c id e n c e s . The su g g estio n  i s  th a t
th is  low est l e v e l  should be r e a lis e d  as a s e t  of 
p a r a l le l  p ro cesses  each o f which i s  a s o r t  of
h y p o th e tica l sta tem en t, a c o n d it io n a l of the so r t  
i f  X then 0 u y  
with X a p a r t ic u la r  con sc iou s co n ten t, and y one 
s ig n if ic a n t  p a tte r n  of l ig h t  from among a l im ite d  s e t  of 
such s ig n i f ic a n t  p a ttern s  of l ig h t  a t the e y e . 0 i s  the  
s e t  of a l l  n o n - s ig n if ic a n t  p a ttern s  o f l i g h t .  I f  th is  
co n d itio n a l i s  s a t i s f i e d ,  p ercep tion  x takes p la c e; i f  
i t  i s  n o t, p ercep tio n  x does not occur. Im p ortantly , x  
may be a sim ple th in g  such as a spot of coloured  l ig h t  
at a p a r t ic u la r  p o in t in  the v is u a l  f i e l d ,  or a more
complex th in g  l ik e  movement or a n g u la r ity . There i s ,  o f  
course, no doubt th a t the v is u a l  system  can e x tr a c t  
movement b e fo r e , and independently  o f ,  tr a n s lo c a t io n  of  
a p a r t ic u la r  o b je c t in  v is u a l  sp a ce , and r e c e n t work 
su ggestin g  th a t  some so r t  of fo u r ie r  a n a ly s is  i s  
performed on th e  l ig h t  f a l l in g  a t the r e t in a  o f fe r s  a 
p la u s ib le  mechanism fo r  the e x tr a c t io n  of other s o r ts  of 
'h ig h - le v e l  in v a r ia n t ' .  In any c a se , such a process  
would o b v io u sly  fu n c tio n  to provide com pletion  over the  
blind  sp o t , and even out variou s other anom alies. Of 
course, a t t h is  lo w est l e v e l  th e  h yp oth esis  i s  t e s t e d ,  
not a g a in st  the con ten ts  of another l e v e l ,  but a g a in st
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the p attern  of l ig h t  f a l l in g  a t the r e t in a ,  the l ig h t  
r e f le c te d  from su rfa ces  in  the w orld . T his has an 
im portant consequence. Since th e se  su r fa c e s  are not 
g en e r a lly  tra n sp a ren t, some l im it a t io n  o b ta in s  on what 
asp ects of the h yp oth esis  can be v a lid a te d , what a sp e c ts  
can be f le s h e d  out w ith a c tu a l m a te r ia l . This i s  why we 
do not s e e ,  y e t  in  some way our se e in g  seems to  s p e c ify  
at l e a s t  ra th er  vagu ely , the backs o f o b je c ts  in  our 
v isu a l f i e l d ,  and th is  i s  why we do not s e e ,  y e t  in  some 
sen se  they are s t i l l  part of our p e r c e p tio n , o b je c ts  out 
to the s id e  or round the back o f  our head.
The system  as d escrib ed  so fa r  a llow s top-down 
p rocessin g  to occur and i t s  products to  be v a lid a te d  
a g a in st  the ex te r n a l w orld . N eed less  to  sa y , we must 
a lso  a llo w  inform ation  to  flo w  bottom -up. Without 
bottom-up p rocessin g  our se e in g  would break down very  
qu ick ly  when the s i t u a t io n  changed suddenly or 
u n p red ic ta b ly , we could  se e  on ly  what we might 
reasonably e x p e c t. Moreover, the system  could  never get  
o f f  the ground in  the f i r s t  p la c e . Perhaps the most 
obvious model would be to  a llow  the c o n d it io n a l  
i f  X then 0 u y 
to be rep laced  by a b i-c o n d it io n a l  
i f f  X then 0 u y 
This c le a r ly  w i l l  not do as i t  s ta n d s , s in c e  i t  would 
r e s u lt  in  every n o n -s ig n if ic a n t  p a tte r n  of l ig h t  -  l ik e  
a g a n z f ie ld , or th at caused by sh u ttin g  o n e 's  eyes -  
o f f  a w e lte r  o f p ercep tio n s  u n rela ted  to
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the a ctu a l s i t u a t io n ,  but in d is t in g u ish a b le  from 
ord inary, v e r id ic a l  p e r c e p tio n . However, a s l i g h t  change 
to  '
( i f  X then 0 u y ) u ( i f  y then x )  
w i l l  produce the d e s ir e d  r e s u l t s .  That i s ,  each fe a tu r e  
a t the lo w est l e v e l  i s  tr ig g e re d  e ith e r  by the demands 
of a h igh er  l e v e l ,  or an appropriate p a tte r n  of  
s t im u la t io n .
There i s  a problem w ith  the sort of bottom-up  
p rocessin g  d isc u sse d  above. I t  lock s our p ercep tion  too  
f irm ly  to the w orld . I t  makes the percep tion  at any 
moment a fu n c tio n  of the s e n s ib le  m ateria l o f the  
p ercep tion  at th a t moment. However, there are a number 
of even ts th a t take pace on a r e la t iv e ly  long  
t im e -s c a le , y e t  co n tr ib u te  to th e  percep tion  at any 
in s ta n t ,  m otion p a r a lla x , fo r  in s ta n c e . M oreover, i t  
makes the occurrence in  th e  p ercep tio n  of any sen sory  
fea tu re  the in e v ita b le  r e s u lt  of the occurrence in  the  
l ig h t  of an appropriate  cue fo r  i t .  This i s  ju s t  not the  
c a se . We can be con sc iou s of some ev en t, say , a shadow 
which allow s us to in fe r  a second even t, say , a s lo p e  of 
a su r fa c e . The f i r s t  even t might be of the s o r t  which  
would, in  other c ircu m sta n ces, produce the p ercep t of 
the second e v e n t. N e v e r th e le s s , we do not n e c e s s a r i ly  
see  the second e v e n t. What i s  req u ired , then , i s  some 
so r t of gap between the w orld , and our p ercep tion  of i t .  
This gap i s  provided by the fa c t  th a t i t  i s  the output 
p rocesses  which correspond to  our conscious exp er ien ce
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o f the o b je c t . These do n ot need con stan t environm ental 
supp ort. Indeed, they need sim ply not to  be 
d iscon firm ed .
Let X be a s e t  o f fe a tu r e s  making up our 
p er c ep tio n , and x any s in g le  f e a tu r e . Z i s  the  
corresponding s e t  in  the r e a l w orld , and z i s  any 
fea tu re  fo r  which th ere  i s  a corresponding x . y i s  an 
o p t ic a l  event in  the cau sa l chain; 
z — y —  X
We can rep resen t the system  as in  f ig u r e  (2 ) .
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th e r e p r e se n ta tio n  o f  what 
i s  seen
what i s  seen
what i s  th ere
F ig u re  2
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Consider the r e la t io n s h ip  between le v e ls  1 and 2* 
As we go down the h iera rch y , som ething i s  added; the  
d e s c r ip t io n  i s  more f u l l .  At l e a s t ,  the d e sc r ip t io n  i s  
more f u l l  in  p ercep tu a l term s, fo r  of course le v e l  1 
t i e s  in to  the whole system  of s c i e n t i f i c ,  h i s t o r i c a l  
know ledge. However, as we go from le v e l  2 to  l e v e l  3 
noth ing i s  added; in d eed , the amount of in form ation  i s  
l e s s .  The ex tra  in form ation  in  l e v e l  2 i s  o r g a n isa t io n ,  
and i s  contributed  by th e  s e l f .  However, i t  does not 
n e c e s s a r i ly  depend on memory, a t l e a s t  not on 
p r e p o s it io n a l ,  c a te g o r ia l ,  p o t e n t ia l ly  con sciou s memory, 
but i s  r e la ted  to our a b i l i t y  to  move in  sp ace , and to  
m anipulate o b je c t s . Our v is u a l  experience can be 
understood in  two p a r ts , h a lf  pure p ercep tion  and h a lf  a 
m ixture of p ercep tion  and th ou gh t. The core of v is u a l  
exp er ien ce  i s  our exp er ien ce  of sp a ce , and here the two 
h a lv es  come to g e th e r . They are complementary in  the  
sen se  th a t togeth er  they p rov id e fo r  a v is u a l  world th a t  
i s ,  a t the same tim e, th e  world we move around in ,  the  
world we m anipulate, and th e  world we think and ta lk  
about. In one se n se , l e v e l  2 i s  r e la t iv e ly  independent 
of l e v e l  3 . The same s p a t ia l  la y o u t can be s p e c if ie d  by 
a large  number of s e t s  of in v a r ia n ts . A lso , i f  l e v e l  2 
changes, as new in form ation  becomes a v a ila b le  to  co r re c t  
a m isp ercep tion , fo r  in s ta n c e , many of the fea tu r e s  ; f i l l  
remain the same. In t h is  sen se  i t  i s  l ik e  o r g a n isa t io n , 
but very  much l e s s  su b je c t  to  the w i l l .  L evels 1 and 3 
both r e la t e  away from p e r c e p tio n , le v e l  1 to  the in n er
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world of thought and memory, and l e v e l  3 to  the a c tu a l  
p h y s ic a l ' f e e l '  o f th in gs out th e r e , bu t, a t  the same 
time to  m o tiv a tio n  and em otion, and, th e r e fo r e , back to  
le v e l  4 .
So the v is u a l  system  c o n s is t s  of a h ierarchy  of 
p r o c e sse s , each l e v e l  c o n s is t in g  o f an h yp oth esis  
expressed as a procedure fo r  v a lid a t in g  i t s e l f  a g a in st  
the con ten t of the n ext l e v e l  down. There h ave, of 
co u rse , been many previous models which in vo lved  
h y p o th e s is -  t e s t in g  ( e .g .  Bruner, 1957; N e is se r , 1967), 
and even models which have seen  the image ( e i th e r  the  
'm ental image' or the image in  p ercep tio n ) as the  
'a n tic ip a to r y  schema' which s im u ltan eou sly  provides the  
p ercep tual h y p o th e s is  and the p ercep tio n  (N e is s e r , 1976, 
1978). However, they have, in  g e n e r a l, in s is t e d  th at the  
bottom le v e l  was d i f f e r e n t ,  th a t i t  was in  some sen se  
more 'a c t u a l ly  t h e r e ' .  This so r t  o f h a lf-w ay  house does 
not d e l iv e r  us from in te l le c tu a lis r a  and dualism . Only a 
vdiole hearted  r a d ic a l co n str u c tiv ism  can do th a t .  That 
i s  what i s  proposed h ere , and what we w i l l  attem pt to  
support in  the next ch ap ter.
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CHAPTER 6: EyfEÜlMEÜTAL ÊVlOtriCiT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
T i l l  now, the concern has been to trace  the h is to r y  
of a number of id e a s , such as im ag in ation , a c tio n  
schema, the r e la t io n  between b o d ily  a c tio n  and v is u a l  
p ercep tio n , to  r e la t e  th ese  id e a s , and to a r t ic u la te  
them in  a way more fa m ilia r  to  modern psychology. 
Sometimes i t  has seemed appropriate  to r e fe r  to modern 
work to e lu c id a te  or support what was being proposed. 
However, i t  can not be c la im ed , on th is  inform al b a s is  
alon e, th a t modern p sy c h o lo g ic a l experim en tation  
supports the view  o u tlin ed  h e r e . Much of what has been 
said  about the in flu e n c e  of thought and im agination  on 
v isu a l p e r c ep tio n  i s  u n c o n tr o v e r s ia l. Most p ercep tu a l  
th e o r is t s  have made use of the id eas of o r g a n isa tio n  and 
of d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of the v is u a l  ex p er ien ce . The 
notable ex c ep tio n  i s  Gibson (ops c i t ) .  A lso the idea  o f  
p ercep tion  as in v o lv in g  a c t iv i t y  i s  now more or l e s s  
accep ted . Nor i s  th ere  anything s p e c ia l  about lin k in g  
these id eas o f o rg a n isa tio n  and a c t iv i t y ;  the way we 
d is tr ib u te  our a t te n t io n  has always been seen  as the  
major determ inant of the o r g a n isa tio n  we impose on the 
v isu a l f i e l d .  Moreover, the case fo r  the v isu a l image as 
a schema fo r  t h is  so r t  of a c t iv i t y  i s  in c r e a s in g ly
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recogn ised  ( e .g .  N e is s e r , 1976). What i s ,  perhaps, more 
c o n tr o v e r s ia l i s  the way th ese  ideas have been put 
to g e th e r , and in  p a r t ic u la r  the way they have been 
ap p lied  to  more or le s s  do away w ith  the id ea  o f a 
low est l e v e l  of m erely sen sory  aw areness, or to  make 
t h is  low est l e v e l  the same s o r t  of s tu f f  as the o th e r s .  
There a re , o f cou rse , th o s e , l ik e  Gibson, who do not 
b e lie v e  in  se n sa tio n  as a l e v e l  o f p e rcep tio n , but then  
n e ith e r  do they b e l ie v e  in  o r g a n isa tio n  and im ages. 
Those who b e l ie v e  in  o r g a n isa tio n  and images have 
g e n era lly  b e lie v e d  in  some l e v e l  of se n sa tio n  or v is u a l  
im pression which i s  q u a l i t a t iv e ly  d if fe r e n t  from what i s  
b u i l t  on top ( e .g .  Hebb, op c i t )  Of co u rse , i f  the  
low est le v e l  i s  not d i f f e r e n t ,  then i t  must be an a c tio n  
schema. I f  i t  i s  an a c tio n  schema, then an a lte r a t io n  in  
the r e la t io n sh ip  between a c t io n  performed and r e s u lt  
must r e s u lt  in  e ith e r  a d isru p tio n  of p ercep tio n  or a 
change in  the schema, th a t  i s  a change in  e x p e r ie n c e .
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6 .2  VISUAL ADAPTATION TO OPTICAL RE-ARRANGEMENT AS THE 
FORMATION OF NEW SCHEMATA.
Various tran sform ations in  the array of l ig h t  
f a l l in g  a t the eye may be accom plished by the use of 
o p t ic a l  d ev ices  such as prism s and m irro rs. I t  has been 
known,' s in ce  H elm holtz, a t l e a s t ,  th a t some s o r t  of 
ad ap tation  was p o s s ib le  to c e r ta in  of th ese  
tran sform ation s. The range of tran sform ations examined 
in c lu d es in c lu d es in v e r s io n , r e v e r s a l ,  d isp lacem en t and 
changes o f form. The r e s u lt s  in d ic a te  th a t b eh av iou ra l 
adaptation  a t l e a s t  i s  p o s s ib le  fo r  any law -ab id in g  
tran sform ation; th is  c la s s  o f tran sform ations are known 
as re-arrangem ents. Where the r e la t io n sh ip  between  
proximal and d i s t a l  stim u lu s i s  not ju s t  a l te r e d , but
d estroyed , say by the a p p lic a t io n  of a continuingly_  
varying prism , no ad ap ta tion  i s  p o s s ib le ;  t h is  c la s s  of 
transform ations are known as d i s -  arrangem ents. Although  
some so r t  o f ad ap tation  occurs to a l l  re-arrangem ents, 
i t  may be th at th ere  are d i f f e r e n t  degrees or types of 
a d a p ta tio n , or d i f f e r e n t  mechanisms und erly in g  the 
ad ap ta tion , for  d i f f e r e n t  tran sform ation s, or for  
d if f e r e n t  sta g es  of ad ap tation  to the same 
tran sform ation . C e r ta in ly , i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to 
d is t in g u is h  between behavioural ad ap ta tion  and 
percep tual ad ap ta tion . A lso , i t  i s  important to note
th a t not a l l  tran sform ation s provide co n d itio n s  for
d iscr im in a tin g  between th ese  d if fe r e n t  forms of
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a d a p ta tio n . For in sta n ce  w h ile  in v ers io n  of the v is u a l  
f i e l d  prov id es both b ehavioura l and p ercep tu a l 
d isr u p tio n , d isp lacem ent o f th e  v isu a l f ie ld  l a t e r a l ly  
provides on ly  the form er, s in c e  the a lte r ed  stim ulu s i s  
in  i t s e l f  in  no way odd, but m erely seems to  come from 
somewhere in  the world which i t  does n o t.
One of the e a r l i e s t  experim en ts, and c e r ta in ly  the 
most fam ous, was ca rr ied  out by S tra tton  at the end of 
the l a s t  cen tu ry . He wore an o p t ic a l  arrangement which 
both in v erted  and l e f t - r i g h t  reversed  the v is u a l  w orld , 
and w hich , in c id e n t i ly ,  reduced h is  v is io n  to  about 
seven teen  degrees of v is u a l  angle from only one e y e . He 
performed s e v e r a l experim ents, each conducted over a 
period  of se v e r a l days during which he wore the d ev ice  
a l l  the tim e h is  eyes were open and uncovered, i . e .  
during the experim ental period s he rece ived  no 
un-re-arranged s t im u la t io n . He con tin u ed , in so fa r  as was 
p o s s ib le ,  w ith  h is  ordinary a c t iv e  l i f e ,  moving around, 
w r it in g , r id in g  h is  b ic y c le W h a t  i s  c le a r  i s  th a t a f te r  
some tim e he achieved  a very  h igh  degree of behavioural 
adaptation  or re-ad ju stm en t. A lso , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t the  
world came once more to lo o k , or a t l e a s t  to  seem 
norm al, a t any r a te ,  as long as he did not adopt an over 
a n a ly t ic a l  a t t i tu d e .  However, when s p e c i f ic a l ly  asked to  
attend  to  h is  s e e in g , to an a lyse  and report upon the 
d e t a i l s  of h is  v is u a l  ex p er ien ce , i t  was a lso  c le a r  
th a t, long a f te r  th is  f e e l in g  of fa m ilia r ity  and harmony 
had been r e -e s ta b lis h e d , there was s t i l l  something th at
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was d i f f e r e n t  about h is  v is u a l  ex p er ien ce . I t  i s  ea sy ,  
indeed tem ptin g , to suppose th a t what remained d i f f e r e n t  
was the a c tu a l v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n . However, S tr a tto n  ' 
g iv e s  some reason to suppose th a t ,  e v e n tu a lly , even t h is  
component norm alised , a t l e a s t  some of the tim e, and the 
whole exp erien ce  became v i r t u a l ly  id e n t ic a l  w ith  b efore  
donning the d e v ic e . The e x is te n c e  of genuine p ercep tu a l 
adaptation  i s  made somewhat p la u s ib le  by the
o b se r v a tio n s , f i r s t l y ,  th a t con sciou s c o r r e c tio n s  led  to
\m ista k es, and, se co n d ly , th a t on removing th e  go g g les  
there was what seemed to be a genuine p ercep tu a l  
a f t e r - e f f e c t .  So, we can sum up the r e s u l t s  o f  
S tr a tto n 's  s tu d ie s  as fo llo w s :
(1 ) Im m ediately on donning the d ev ice;
(A) B ehavioural e f f e c t s ;
( i )  The su b ject lo s e s  sen sori-m otor c o -o r d in a t io n .
(B) E x p e r ie n tia l e f f e c t s ;
The su b jec t f e e l s  th a t h is  v is u a l  exp er ien ce  has 
changed. A n a ly t ic a l ly ,  th is  can be broken down in to  two 
components.
(1 )  A f e e l in g  th a t the world looks s tra n g e  and 
u n fa m ilia r , and th a t p ercep tion  of i t  i s  fragm ented and 
disharm onious.
( i i )  Things look  d i f f e r e n t ,  the a c tu a l appearance, as 
'd is t in c t  from the a t t itu d e  to the appearance as e ith e r  
stran ge or fa m ilia r , i s  d i f f e r e n t .
There i s  no ev id en ce th at su b je c ts  make the d i s t in c t io n  
between th ese  two changes sp on tan eou sly .
(2 ) A fter  a d a p ta tio n .
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(A) B ehavioural e f f e c t s .  A fter  some w hile su b je c t  
ach ieves a h igh  degree o f re-adjustm ent as described  
e a r l i e r .
(B) E x p e r ie n tia l e f f e c t s .
( ! )  G eneral. A fter  some w h ile , perhaps s l i g h t ly  longer  
than i t  takes to  ad ju st b e h a v io u r a lly , su b jec ts  a d ju st  
in  the sen se  th a t they no lo n g er  f e e l  the world to be 
strange or d i f f e r e n t .  Any d if fe r e n c e s  there might be are  
no lon ger  a t th e  cen tre  of th e ir  aw areness. This i s  as 
i f  one were to  s ta r t  to  see  th in g s  as covered in  pink  
polka d o t s .  At f i r s t  th in gs would look stra n g e , then the  
stan gen ess would go, but th is  i s  not the same as i f  the  
polka d ots were to  d isap p ear . At t h is  stage  i f  the  
su b ject i s  asked . s p e c i f i c a l ly  i f  he i s  see in g  th in gs  
upside down or r ig h t way up, he becomes confused , i s  not 
always a b le  to  answer c o h e r en tly , but i t  becomes obvious 
that th in gs are s t i l l  in  some se n se  d i f f e r e n t ,  although  
the su b je c t  was not aware of t h is  u n t i l  ch a llen g ed .
( i i )  P e r ce p tu a l. E ven tu a lly , com plete adaptation  o ccu rs, 
at l e a s t  fo r  some th in g s , some o f the tim e.
(3) On rem oval.
(A) B eh av iou ra l.
Im m ediately on removal sen sori-m otor co -o rd in a tio n  
breaks down.
(B) E x p e r ie n t ia l,
( i )  G eneral. S u b jects exp erien ce  a shock of r e c o g n it io n .
( i i )  P e r ce p tu a l. I f  the d ev ice  has been worn fo r  a 
con sid erab le  period of tim e, and something l ik e  genuine  
percep tu a l adaptation  has occurred , there i s  an
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a f t e r - e f f e c t ;  th in g s , or the s e l f  -  the rep orts are 
ambiguous on t h is  p o in t -  appear fo r  a short time to  be 
upside dowm*
There are se v e r a l th e o r ie s  current purporting to  
ex p la in  ad ap ta tion  to re-arrangem ent of the v is u a l  
f i e l d .  I t  would be n ic e  i f  they were a l l  can d id ates  
intended to  make sense o f the same agreed range of 
phenomena, but t h i s ,  of co u rse , i s  not the c a se .  
Theories which p lace  ad ap ta tion  a t  th e  motor end o f the 
system , or in  the sen sori-m otor  hookup, tend to s tr e s s  
the b ehavioural e f f e c t s ,  w h ile  th e o r ie s  which say th a t  
adaptation  occurs w ith in  the p ercep tu a l system  s tr e s s  
the p ercep tu a l e f f e c t s .  These th e o r ie s  are n o t , then , 
m utually e x c lu s iv e ,  s in c e  th ose  who hold  th a t proper 
p ercep tu a l ad ap ta tion  does take p la c e , and h o ld , 
moreover, th a t the ex p la n a tio n  of th is  ad ap ta tion  i s  to 
be found w ith in  th e  p ercep tu a l system , do not 
n e c e s s a r i ly  deny th a t  p r ior  t o ,  and perhaps 
independently  o f ,  p ercep tu a l a d a p ta tio n , th ere  occurs 
some s o r t  of beh av iou ra l ad a p ta tio n , and th a t the 
exp lan ation  for  t h is  i s  to  be sought e lsew h ere . 
A ccordingly , th ese  th e o r ie s  should be consid ered  not 
n e c e s s a r i ly  as a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  but as c o n tr ib u tio n s  to a 
more genera l th eory .
In the e a r ly  1950s the p r e v a il in g  Z e i t g e i s t  was 
s t i l l  th a t of behaviourism  and the tendency was to 
exp la in  ad ap tation  in  terms of operant learn in g
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In vo lv in g  t r i a l ,  error and (p u rp osive) c o r r e c tio n  e .g .  
Snyder and Pronko (1 9 5 2 ). Much evidence had been 
produced which tended to support th is  v iew , ^including  
ev id en ce for  savings on r e -le a r n in g  (P e tersen  and 
P e ter se n , 1938; Snyder and Pronko, op c i t ) ,  and fo r  task  
s p e c i f i c i t y  (Snyder and Pronko, op c i t ) .  However, i t  was 
known th a t performance was d isru pted  a f te r  removal of 
the re-arrangin g d e v ic e , which i s  hard to  understand  
w ith in  a s tr a ig h t  motor lea r n in g  account s in c e  th ere  
should have been enough c u e - s p e c i f ic i t y  to keep the 
normal and adapted behaviours in t a c t ,  d if f e r e n t ia te d  and 
attached to th e ir  r e sp e c t iv e  c o n te x ts . However, Kohler 
(1 9 (4 ) , reporting  a la rg e  number of experim ents 
conducted by Erisraann and h im se lf  at Innsbruck, 
propounded a theory of genuine p ercep tu a l change 
fo llo w in g  on from behavioural change e s ta b lish e d  by 
motor lea r n in g . This id ea  was developed in to  a form al 
theory by Taylor (196%).
Held (1955) produced a problem for  the K ohler/ 
Taylor so r t  of accou n t. He reported an experim ent on 
ad ap tation  to auditory  re-arrangem ent which d id  not seem 
amenable to th is  so r t  of ex p la n a tio n . C e r ta in ly , a l l  
d ir e c t  error feedback was denied and no co n sc io u s ,  
purposive co r re c tio n  took p la c e . Held and G o ttlie b  
(1958)' produced an experim ental setup to d iscover  
whether the same s o r t  of adaptation  w ithout error  
feedback was p o s s ib le  w ith  v is u a l  re-arrangem ents. The 
apparatus co n s is te d  of a prism  d ev ice  which la t e r a l ly
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disp laced  the v is u a l  world some known amount. The 
su b ject had to perform  variou s task s w ithout error  
feedback e .g .  the su b je c t  in  a p o in tin g  ta sk  did not 
know when he had h i t  th e  ta r g e t . However, the f in a l  
p o s it io n  of the hand was v i s i b l e .  Subject head movement 
was p reven ted . The r e s u l t s  were th at ad ap ta tion  did  
occur. A second experim ent (Held and H ein, 1958) w ith  
the same setup  was design ed  to  t e s t  the r o le  of a c t iv e  
versus p a ss iv e  hand movement in  a d a p ta tio n . I t  was found 
th a t no ad ap ta tion  occurred when s u b je c t 's  hand was 
moved p a s s iv e ly .  Held made sense of th ese  r e s u lt s  in  
terms of a model derived  from von H o ls t 's  (1954) 
so lu t io n  to  the problem of s t a b i l i t y  in  the v is u a l  
w orld, the s o -c a l le d  r e -a ffe r e n c e  m odel. R e -a fferen ce  i s  
s tim u la tio n  from the ex te r n a l sen ses caused by the  
s u b je c t 's  own (v o lu n ta r y ) m otion, the changes in  the 
o p tic  array caused by turning the head or e y e s , fo r  
in s ta n c e . The model in v o lv es  producing an expected  
r e -a f fe r e n t  s ig n a l .  T his i s  done by means o f a copy of 
the motor command or p lan  -  the e f fe r e n t  copy -  which  
a ccesses  a memory or c o r e la t io n  s to r e  to produce a copy 
of the r e -a ffe r e n c e  p re v io u sly  produced by th at  
p a r tic u la r  p a ttern  of movement. This r e -a f fe r e n c e  copy 
i s  compared to the a c tu a l r e -a f fe r e n c e . I f  th ere  i s  a 
match normal p ercep tio n  occu rs, i f  th ere  i s  not 
something i s  stran ge about the p ercep tio n , but n o te  th a t  
adaptation  does not depend upon the r e s u lt s  o f th is  
comparison. A daptation occurs by the en ter in g  o f the new 
e f f e r e n c e /r e -a f fe r e n c e  c o r e la t io n . The c r u c ia l  fe a tu r e s
149
of the model are;
(1 ) the s i t e  of ad a p ta tio n ,
(2) the r o le  of a c t iv e  movement,
(3 )  the ir r e le v a n c e  of feedback .
Howard and Templeton (1966) agree w ith  Held as to  
the locu s of a d a p ta tio n , but d isagree  w ith  the two other  
c r u c ia l fea tu r e s  of the m odel. They p o in t out that
w ithout feedback (H eld 's co n d itio n ) su b je c ts  never
ach ieve f u l l  a d a p ta tio n , w h ile  in  other experim ental
se tu p s , they do. They argue th a t adaptation  i s  p o s s ib le  
w ith p a ss iv e  movement, provided feedback of r e s u lt s  and 
an opportunity  fo r  conscious co r re c tio n  i s  g iv en , the  
experim ents quoted (Howard and Templeton, 1966 pp 386 -  
390) make i t  q u ite  c le a r  th a t what i s  being stu d ied  here  
i s  t r i a l  and error le a r n in g . I t  seems to be the c a se , 
however, th a t th is  learn in g  causes ra th er  than 
c o n s t itu te s  a d a p ta tio n . This would be very c lo s e  to 
K ohler's p o s i t io n ,  and, ind eed , the phases o f adaptation  
from con sc iou s c o r r e c tio n  to  f u l ly  autom atic are 
d iscu ssed  in  v ir t u a l ly  the same terras. However, what i s  
learn ed , o f ra th er  what changes or adapts subsequent to 
le a r n in g , i s  d if f e r e n t  in  each c a se . F in a l ly ,  they show 
that other types o f e x -a ffer e n c e  may be used to produce 
adaptation  in  the absence of e ith e r  a c tiv e  movement w ith  
or w ithout r e -a ffe r e n c e  or p a ss iv e  movement of e f fe c to r  
organs. The experim ent here (Howard and Tem pleton, 1965) 
c o n s is t s  of f ix in g  an observer in  an o p t ic a l  system  such 
th at the v is u a l  world i s  d isp laced  l a t e r a l l y .  No head
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movement. Indeed, no movement of any so r t  i s  p erm itted . 
A rod approaches the su b je c t  and s t r ik e s  him on the  
l i p s .  According to  the v is u a l  in p u t , o f co u rse , the rod 
should m iss by the amount the world i s  d isp la c e d . 
Adaptation occurs as measured by manual p o in tin g  a t a 
v isu a l ta r g e t , although the ad ap ta tion  was by no means 
com plete. Their theory depends, th en , on in form ation a l 
discrepancy ir r e s p e c t iv e ,  more or l e s s ,  o f the source of 
th at d iscrep an t in form ation .
A theory th a t might be seen  as ly in g  somewhere 
between motor th e o r ie s  and c e n tr a l sw itchboard th e o r ie s  
was proposed by H arris (1 9 6 3 ). H arris adapted h is  
su b jec ts  to  wedge prism s causing la t e r a l  d isplacem ent of 
the v is u a l  w orld . They adapted by p o in tin g  to  v is u a l  
ta r g e ts  ' s t r a ig h t  ahead' w ith  in form ation  a v a ila b le  on 
both the f in a l  p o s it io n  o f the hand and i t s  r e la t io n sh ip  
to the ta r g e t .  Thus, su b je c ts  q u ick ly  achieved a
con sid erab le  degree of a d a p ta tio n . Sub jects were te s te d  
fo r  inter-m odal (v is u a l  to  a u r a l) , in ter-m an u al, and
in te r - ta s k (p o in t in g  a t d if f e r e n t  ta r g e ts  than th ose  to
\diich they adapted) t r a n s fe r . H arris argued that proper 
percep tual ad ap tation  should cause inter-m anual 
tr a n sfe r . No such tr a n sfe r  occurred , and, acco rd in g ly , 
he ruled out the p ercep tu a l system  as the s i t e  of 
ad ap tation . He a lso  argued th a t i f  the locu s of 
adaptation  were the visu o-m otor in te r f a c e ,  as H eld , fo r  
in s ta n c e , would have i t ,  there should be no in ter-m od al 
tr a n sfe r . There was more or l e s s  p e r fe c t  tr a n sfe r
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between the aural and the v is u a l  c o n d itio n s . However, 
proponents of t h is  theory may claim  sim ply th a t aural 
input i s  not d ir e c t ly  lin k ed  to  the motor system , but i ^  
recoded in  terms of v is u a l  sp a ce . There i s  p le n ty  of 
ev id en ce , a f te r  a l l ,  th a t in  m atters of s p a t ia l  lo c a t io n  
the aud itory  system  i s  secondary to the v i s u a l . Motor
le a r n in g , the lea rn in g  of 'a  new p attern  of muscle
c o n tr a c t io n ',  i s  ru led  out by the p e r fe c t  in te r - ta s k  
t r a n s fe r ,  i . e .  by the lack  o f the so r t  of g e n e r a lis a t io n  
grad ien t th a t c h a r a c te r ise s  le a r n in g , and so we are l e f t  
w ith  p ro p r io cep tiv e  change. This l a s t  argument seems to 
be somewhat weakened by th e  very s im ila r  nature of the  
ta sk s . A ll  that i s  in vo lved  i s  p o in tin g  to ( s p a t ia l ly )  
d if f e r e n t  ta rg e ts  to  those used during ad ap ta tion . True, 
they do rep resen t d i f f e r e n t  p attern s of m uscle
c o n tr a c t io n s , but s in c e  L a sh ley , a t l e a s t ,  two th in gs
have been c le a r ;  th a t th ere  are purely motor p a ttern s  
which run o f f  w ithout c o n tr o l from input from the  
e x te r n a l s e n s e s , and th a t th e se  are more than p a ttern s  
of muscle c o n tr a c t io n s . I t  i s  not in
: the l e a s t  su r p r is in g  th at i f  p e r fe c t
g e n e r a lis a t io n  can occur fo r  ar -peggios played in  
d if f e r e n t  keys on the piano keyboard, i t  can occur for  
p o in tin g  to  ta r g e ts  lo ca te d  a t d if fe r e n t  p o in ts  in  
sp ace . In any case  l o c a l i s a t io n  of hand or arm i s  more 
accurate i f  a c t iv e  movement i s  allow ed dem onstrating  
th a t m onitoring of e ffe r e n c e  p lays as large  a part in  
p o s it io n  sense as a f fe r e n c e . Indeed H arris (1964) has
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allowed t h i s ,  and i t  i s  no lon ger  c le a r  what i t  means to  
say th at what i s  a lte r e d  i s  the f e l t  p o s it io n  o f the  
hand, ra th er  than the motor o u tp u t. Moreover, what i s  a t  
issu e  i s  not the form ation of d if fe r e n t  p a ttern s  of 
e ffe r e n c e , but the production  of these p a ttern s  to  
d if f e r e n t  s t im u li .  The p r o p r io -c e p tiv e  s o lu t io n , in  any 
c a se , does not f i t  the f a c t s .  H arris says th a t  
adaptation  in v o lv e s  a change in  the f e l t  p o s it io n  of the  
hand such th a t the su b je c t  comes to f e e l  th a t he i s  
p o in tin g  ahead, when he i s  p o in tin g  to the s id e .  
However, a f te r  ad ap ta tion  th e  s itu a t io n  i s  sim ply th a t  
the su b jec t f e e l s  he i s  p o in tin g  ahead, when he i s  in  
fa c t  p o in tin g  to the s id e .  S u b jects  do indeed , as H arris 
r e p o r ts , ev in ce  su rp r ise  when they see  where they are  
p o in tin g , but on ly  when they s e e ,  that i s  when they see  
where th e ir  hand i s  r e la t iv e  to the median p lan e of 
th e ir  body. One obvious fea tu r e  of H arris's  theory  i s  
the r e c o g n it io n  th at the motor sid e  of v isu o-m otor  
c o -o r d in a tio n  has an a ffe r e n t component,
p r o p r io -c e p tio n . He a lso  recogn ised  that the v is u a l  s id e  
had a motor component, eye movements. His d e f in i t io n  of 
v is u a l  s tr a ig h t  ahead in v o lv ed  , as i t  should h ave, the  
p o s it io n  of the e y e s . An o b jec t was s tr a ig h t  ahead i f  i t  
f e l l  on the fovea  when the eyes were p o in tin g  s ta ig h t  
ahead w ith  resp ec t to  the body. Genuine p ercep tu a l 
ad ap tation , by h is  d e f in i t io n ,  would have been i f  
s ta ig h t  ahead had a lte r e d . I f  th is  had occu rred , i t  
could have been due to  e ith e r  the r e -c a lib r a t io n  of the 
s p a t ia l  va lu es of r e t in a l  p o s it io n s ,  or the
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r e -c a l ib r a t lo n  of the s p a t ia l  v a lu es  of eye p o s i t io n s .  
He did not fo llo w  th is  up, b ecau se , of c o u rse , he 
in te r p r e te d  h is  r e s u lt s  as showing th a t no a l t e r a t io n  of 
the v is u a l  s tr a ig h t  ahead had taken p la c e . As was shown, 
h is  in te r p r e ta t io n  was c e r ta in ly  wrong. 'What seems more 
reason able i s  that the id ea  'v i s u a l ly  s tr a ig h t  ahead' i s  
rath er  complex in v o lv in g , as i t  d oes, variou s r e la t io n s  
between sev era l v a r ia b le s , and th at th ese  can be 
uncoupled and re-coupled  fo r  p a r t ic u la r  va lu es of the 
v a r ia b le s  w ithout a f fe c t in g  the whole system . The 
obvious in te r p r e ta t io n  of what occurs i s  th a t , on 
p u ttin g  on the prism s, the su b je c t  has to move h is  eyes 
to fo v e a te  the ta r g e t . This s p e c i f ie s  that the ta r g e t  i s  
at a p a r t ic u la r  lo c a t io n  in  sp a ce , and the su b jec t makes 
the 'ap p rop ria te ' arm movements. These do not work. 
Other arm movements are made, which do work, and these  
become a sso c ia te d  w ith  th at p a r t ic u la r  eye p o s i t io n .  
This s o lu t io n  was f i r s t  propounded by H elm holtz(1 8 6 2 ), 
and was used by Wooster (1923) to  e x p la in  the r e s u lt s  of 
an experim ent very s im ila r  to H a r r is 's .  More r e c e n t ly ,  
i t  has been shown th a t the W ooster-H arris procedure does 
lead  to change of gaze when su b je c ts  are asked to look  
s tr a ig h t  ahead. Howard and Templeton quote ev id en ce of 
th e ir  own to show th at eye p o s it io n  does adapt. 
N e v e r th e le ss , they argue th a t in  H a rr is 's  experim ent 
r e -c a lib r a t io n  occurs a t the arm rather than the e y e . 
Perhaps they mean th at no change o f r e t in a l  va lu es  
o ccu rs .
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However, I t  must be adm itted that Harris has 
demonstrated som ething which lo o k s more l ik e  adaptation  
than le a r n in g . The (presum ably) autom atic tr a n sfe r  
across m o d a lit ie s  r u le s  out any s t r a ig h t  motor- lea rn in g  
e x p la n a tio n . A lso , the lack  of in ter-m anual tra n sfe r  may 
argue a g a in s t  p ercep tu al a d a p ta tio n , but i t  a lso  argues 
aga in st m otor- le a r n in g , fo r  i t  i s  w e ll  e s ta b lish e d  th at  
even r e la t iv e ly  complex task s l ik e  m irror-drawing show 
con sid erab le  inter-m anual tr a n s fe r  (Ewert, 1926). 
C onsidering a l s o ,  the e x is te n c e  o f a f t e r - e f f e c t s ,  and 
the occurrence of change w ith ou t error-feedback  or 
conscious c o r r e c t io n , i t  begins to  look l ik e  a t l e a s t  
two, and p o s s ib ly  th r ee , d i f f e r e n t  th in gs are happening. 
F ir s t ly ,  th ere  i s  motor lea rn in g ; t h is  i s  ch a ra cter ised  
by
(1 ) t r i a l  and error  lea r n in g ,
(2 ) no in ter-m od al tr a n s fe r ,
(3 ) some in ter-m anual tr a n s fe r ,
(4 ) g e n e r a lis a t io n  grad ien t from ta sk  to  ta sk .
Secondly, th ere  i s  some s o r t  of adaptation  or 
r e -c a l ib r a t io n , and t h is  i s  c h a r a c te r ise d  by:
(1 ) no error  feedback or con sc iou s co r re c tio n  req u ired .
(2) in ter-m od al tr a n sfe r ,
(3 ) no in ter-m anual tr a n sfe r ,
(4 )  in te r - ta s k  tr a n sfe r .
One p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  th at th ese  two forms of ad ap tation  
can occur independently , but th a t the f i r s t  might 
f a c i l i t a t e  the second, and th a t i t  might a lso  enable and 
f a c i l i t a t e  a th ird  so r t  o f ad ap ta tion , genuine
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percep tual a d a p ta tio n . Another p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  th a t a l l  
the procedures m entioned m ight bring about le a r n in g , and 
th a t th is  might en ab le  and f a c i l i t a t e  p ercep tu a l 
ad ap tation . In th is  c a s e ,  any e f f e c t s  which seemed 
in e x p lic a b le  on the b a s is  of le a r n in g , a f t e r  e f f e c t s ,  
fo r  In sta n ce , might be a scr ib ed  to p ercep tu a l change 
brought about by le a r n in g .
I t  s t i l l  remans to  answer the q u estion  of whether 
or not the world appears th e  same as i t  used to a f te r  
ad ap tation . For the reason s g iv e n , th is  i s  u su a lly  
argued on the b a s is  o f ev id en ce  from s tu d ie s  in v o lv in g  
re-arrangem ents other than la t e r a l  d isp lacem en t. 
F ir s t ly ,  the q u estio n  of in v e r s io n  and r e - in v e r s io n  w i l l  
be d iscu sse d . I t  has to  be noted th a t t h is  i s  a very  
r a d ica l so r t  of re-arrangem ent, and a n eg a tiv e  answer to 
the q u estion  of p ercep tu a l ad ap ta tion  here does not 
commit one to a n e g a tiv e  answer in  o th e r , l e s s  d r a s t ic  
circum stances ( e .g .  p a r t ia l  r o t a t io n ) .  The q u estio n  i s  
th en , a fte r  donning in v e r t in g  sp e c ta c le s  and a llow in g  
time for  th e  most com plete a d a p ta tio n  p o s s ib le ,  does the 
world appear u p r ig h t. Howard and Templeton reco g n ise  
three d iffe r e n t  meanings of u p r ig h t;
(1 ) motor c o -o r d in a tio n  u p r ig h t , which depends on 
whether or not movements are e f f e c t iv e ly  r e la te d  to  
v is u a l  ta r g e ts .
(2 ) in te r -se n so r y  u p r ig h t , which depends on whether 
judgements of u p righ t made on the b a s is  of v is u a l  
inform ation are c o n s is te n t  and harmonious w ith
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judgements of u p righ t made on the b a s is  of in form ation  
from other sen sory  m o d a lit ie s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  from g r a v ity  
se n so r s ,
(3) b e h a v io u r a l-p o la r ity  u p r ig h t, which depends on 
whether behaviour to  m ono-oriented o b je c ts  i s  
appropriate .
Taking the th ir d  s o r t  of u p r ig h t, fo r  the moment. The
world i s  p o la r ise d  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  g r a v ity . O bjects are
a lso  p o la r ise d  w ith  re sp ec t  to  other o b je c t s , o f co u r se ,
but th is  so r t  of in t r a - f i e ld  p o la r ity  i s  not a t is s u e
h ere . I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to have th is  so r t  of o r ie n ta t io n
w ithout g r a v ity  s e n s e , a l l  th a t i s  required i s  th a t we
m aintain a c o n s is te n t  o r ie n ta t io n  to  the o b je c t s .  This
may requ ire g r a v ity , of co u rse , but not any sen se  of i t .
cuWe s t i l l  se e  the world as u pright when we are f lo w in g , 
although th ere  i s  no e f f e c t  of g r a v ity , and we se e  the 
world as upside down i f  we look at i t  w ith  our heads 
between our l e g s ,  although g r a v ita t io n  and r e t in a l  
p r o jec tio n  are in- harmony. This so r t  of u p r ig h t i s ,  
then, a m atter of memory. There are a number o f ways of 
d iscern in g  whether normal behavioural p o la r ity  o b ta in s .
(1 ) verbal -  use of the la b e l upside down.
(2) speed of r e c o g n it io n .
(3 ) co r re c tn ess  of r e c o g n it io n  of top and bottom of 
m ono-oriented o b je c t s .
(4 ) a b i l i t y  to reco g n ise  p o la r ise d  movements.
(5 ) f i r s t  f ig u r e  to be recogn ised  in  com posite ambiguous 
f ig u r e s .
Some of th ese  t e s t s  seem n e c e s s a r i ly  to tap the same
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s k i l l ,  (3 )  and ( 5 ) ,  for  in s ta n c e , and some not s o , but 
fo r  now i t  i s  assumed that a l l  do. I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  
although memory i s  in v o lv e d , more than a f e e l in g  o f 
fa m il ia r ity  i s  a t is s u e , and th is  i s ,  presumably, why 
b ehavioural p o la r ity  upright was s e le c te d  as a name.
This i s ,  th en , a memory tra ce  theory , but im plying  
two s o r ts  of memory. The f i r s t  might be c a lle d  
'com parison memory'. Without a t the moment enquiring too  
c lo s e ly  in to  what com prises e ith e r  of the o b je c ts  
compared, i t  must be the case th a t the f e e l in g  of 
stran gen ess or Im propriety p er ta in s  to t h i s .  The second  
so r t  i s  "im plem entation memory", which c o n s is t s  in  
implementing procedures fo r  the in te r p r e ta t io n  of 
s t im u li  and the id e n t i f ic a t io n  of o b je c t s . Of co u rse , 
th ere  i s  ev id en ce for op eration s of the f i r s t  s o r t .  
S tra tto n  rep o rts  th a t f i r s t l y  th in gs seemed strange and 
u n fa m ilia r , then he l o s t  th a t f e e l in g ,  but th a t i t  
returned to him th e  moment he r e c o lle c te d  c o n sc io u s ly  
what they had looked l ik e  b e fo r e . E q ually , i t  i s  known 
that new h a b its  can be developed fo r  the in te r p r e ta t io n  
of ambiguous s ta ir c a s e s  or f ig u r e s .  But i s  th is  enough? 
Appearance i s  d if f e r e n t  from id e n t i t y ,  and we can d ir e c t  
our a t te n t io n  to the appearance of th in g s . Indeed, we 
remember appearances, or the comments of S tra tto n  would 
make no s e n s e . The q u estion  remains of w hether, a f te r  
the d e c lin e  of f e e l in g s  o f s tr a n g e n e ss , a f te r  the  
form ation of new h a b its  fo r  the in te r p r e ta t io n  of 
ambiguous f ig u r e s ,  there i s  a th ird  stage  of ad ap ta tion ,
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and i f  th ere  i s ,  o f what i s  i t s  b a s is .  This stage  would
be s ig n a lle d  by the absence of any f e e l in g  of
s tra n g en ess , and of any judged d if fe r e n c e , between how
th ings looked now and how th in g s looked then when the
su b ject was asked c o n sc io u s ly  to  r e c a l l  how th in gs  
looked to him th en .
Rock's theory i s  based on memory, e x p l i c i t l y .  He 
holds what i s ,  b a s ic a l ly ,  B er k e ley 's  view  as regards the 
separate nature of the v is u a l  and ta c tu a l  cod es, and the  
consequent ir r e le v a n c e  o f r e t in a l  p o s it io n . An e n t ir e  
scene i s  p erceived  u p righ t i f  the sky i s  p erceived  in  
the same d ir e c t io n  as regards the ground as the eye i s  
as regards the f e e t .  An o b je c t  i s  u p righ t i f  i t  i s  in  
i t s  c o rrec t r e la t io n  to  the ground, or to the o b se r v er 's  
a x is .  Rock con sid ers  a number of a lte r n a t iv e  answers to  
the q u estio n  of why an o b jec t looks upside down when 
viewed through in v e r t in g  s p e c ta c le s .
(1) Because of g r a v ity . No. L ie  down h o r iz o n ta lly , and 
put on the in v e r t in g  s p e c ta c le s ;  th in gs s t i l l  look  
upside down.
(2) Because of p r o p r io ce p tio n . No. Look through the  
sp e c ta c le s  a t  your f e e t ,  and th ere  i s  no c o n f l i c t .  Your 
f e e t  f e e l  down (next to the ground), and they look  next  
to the ground (down).
(3 ) Because of c o n f l i c t  w ith  acquired motor 
h a b it s / ta c tu a l  e x p e c ta n c ie s . But th ere  i s  no c o n f l i c t  in  
the case of a chimney.
ïfhat i s  a t is s u e  i s  a learned  a s s o c ia t io n  between an
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image and a part of the r e t in a ,  he sa y s . That i s ,  what 
i s  learned i s  a p ic tu r e  and i t s  p o s it io n  on the r e t in a .  
However, the example of the chimney would not apply now 
as I s i t  on the fou rth  f lo o r  o f the l ib r a r y , look in g  
down on the chim neys. So, i t  i s  not a b so lu te  p o s it io n  
th a t m atters , b u t, perhaps, r e la t iv e  p o s it io n  or 
o r ie n ta t io n . T his i s  im portant, f o r ,  although r e la t iv e  
in d iv id u a l lo c a t io n s  on th e  r e t in a  would norm ally be 
s p e c if ie d  on a co -o rd in a te  system , they need not be for  
the theory o f lo c a l  s ig n s .  A ll  th a t i s  n ecessary  i s  th a t  
they are un iquely  la b e lle d  each independently o f the  
o th e rs , perhaps, l ik e  A laska, New York, and system , 
s in ce  we can move our eyes d ir e c t ly  to any lo c a t io n  from 
any o th e r . Rock makes th e  d is t in c t io n  between  
o r ie n ta t io n  w ith  r esp ec t to  g r a v ity , or w ith  r e sp ec t  to  
any o th er ex tern a l frame of re fe r en ce  such as earth  and 
sky, and o r ie n ta t io n  w ith r e sp e c t  to  the body's a x is ,  
and i n s i s t s  th a t w ith  r e sp ec t  to  PERCEPTUAL a d a p ta tio n , 
only th e  l a t t e r  i s  r e le v a n t . He has shown th a t we can 
d iscr im in a te  up and down w ith  resp ec t to  the body's  
a x is .  He did not a llow  eye movements, but 
d is q u a l i f ic a t io n  of a c tu a l movements i s  ir r e le v a n t .  Rock 
c le a r ly  b e l ie v e s  th a t the b a s is  of what i s  remembered, 
the memory tr a c e ,  c o n s is t s  o f cop ies of the r e t in a l  
s t im u la t io n , cop ies of the p ic tu r e s  painted  on the  
r e t in a .
However, th ere  i s  another p o s s ib i l i t y ,  the one 
advocated h e r e , th a t the trace  c o n s is t s  of a number of
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d if f e r e n t  r e p r e se n ta tio n s  a t d if fe r e n t  l e v e l s .  These 
r e p r ese n ta tio n s  are schemata, and a t the ' lo w e s t '  l e v e l  
they are schemata fo r  eye movements, th a t i s ,  they can 
be tr a n s la te d  in to  e y e -  movements and p r e d ic tio n s  of the 
e f f e c t s  of th ese  eye-movements on r e t in a l  s t im u la t io n . 
Howard (1974) has proposed a theory which i s  s im ila r  in  
some w ays. He se e s  p ercep tion  as c o n s is t in g  of two 
l e v e l s ,  d e s c r ip t iv e  p rocesses and stim ulu s bound 
p r o c e sse s , and the d e sc r ip t iv e  p rocesses  are d escrib ed  
as schemata in  much the same sense as h e r e . However, he 
does not s e e  the lower le v e l  as schem ata, as in v o lv in g  
a c t io n s , d e c is io n  r u le s ,  e t c . ,  but sim ply as a m atter of 
r e c e iv in g  stim u lu s energy and p rocessin g  i t  in  a 
d eterm in ate , bottom-up manner. The theory espoused here  
does not deny th a t such stim ulus bound p rocesses  occu r, 
of c o u r se , but sim ply th a t they are a part of 
p e r c ep tio n , of v is u a l  co n sc io u sn ess , a c tu a lly  and 
p o t e n t ia l ly .  T his theory which sees  a l l  l e v e l s  of 
p ercep tion  as the r e s u lt  of c o n str u c tiv e  p rocesses  w i l l  
be re ferred  to  as the rep r ese n ta tio n  th eory . The 
a lte r n a t iv e  which allow s a lower l e v e l  com p letely  
determined by the stim ulus energy w i l l  be re ferred  to as 
stim u lu s th e o r ie s .  They includ e both Rock's and Howard's 
th e o r ie s .  Stim ulus th e o r ie s  must e ith e r  p r e d ic t  no 
p ercep tu a l ad ap tation  or adaptation  v ia  change of 
r e t in a l  v a lu es  independent of adaptation  of head /eye  
movements•
As regards prism  ad ap ta tion , the th e o r ie s  make
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d if fe r e n t  p r e d ic t io n s . The r ep resen ta tio n  theory  
p r e d ic ts  th a t adaptation  to  d isp lacem ent i s  accompanied 
by a change in  the d ir e c t io n  of gaze la b e lle d  as 
s tr a ig h t  ahead. This means th a t when prisms are f i r s t  
donned the eyes move to f ix a t e  the ta r g e t , and th at th is  
new d ir e c t io n  of gaze becomes s tr a ig h t  ahead. There i s  
an a l t e r n a t iv e ,  of c o u r se , th a t the eyes are kept 
determ inedly s tr a ig h t  ahead. In th is  case what would 
have to change would be the r e t in a l  p o s it io n  la b e lle d  as 
s tr a ig h t  ahead, and a l l  o th er  r e t in a l  p o s it io n s  in  
r e la t io n . A r e s u lt  of t h is  would be that we could  not 
fo v ea te  (look  a t)  what we were look in g  at (d ir e c t in g  our 
eyes a t ) .  However, the d i f f i c u l t y  in  decid in g  whether or 
not a change in  s tr a ig h t  ahead i s  a v is u a l  change makes 
th is  an u n su ita b le  t e s t  between the th e o r ie s . This 
problem does not a r is e ,  of c o u rse , w ith in v e r s io n  or 
l e f t - r ig h t  reversal, would remain the c e n tr e , but the top 
would become the bottom and the bottom the top , or the 
l e f t  would become th e  r ig h t  and the r ig h t ,  l e f t .  One 
r e su lt  of th is  i s  th a t we should tend to move our eyes 
up or l e f t  in  circum stances in  which we should  
p rev io u sly  have moved them down or r ig h t .  The o th er  
component of gaze, head movements, w i l l  fu n ctio n  under 
the same ru les  as p r e v io u s ly , i . e .  to f i x  gaze on 
something to  the l e f t ,  move the head to the l e f t .  
Normally, of cou rse , head and eye movements are c lo s e ly  
co -ord in a ted , and the d isr u p tio n  caused i s  experienced  
as a lo s s  of p o s it io n  con stan cy . Adaptation to  th is  
occurs, of cou rse , but now th ere  are th ree  system s
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( in v o lv in g  e y e , head, and instru m en ta l resp o n se) rath er  
than two ( in v o lv in g  exp lo ra to ry  and instru m en ta l 
r e sp o n se s ) . There i s  some evid en ce th a t in  the 
exp lora tory  system , eye movements are the p r in c ip a l  
resp o n se , or a t l e a s t  th a t eye movements have the more 
powerful e f f e c t s  on gaze con tin gen t phenomena ( e .g .  
K ohler, 1964). Ignoring  head movements fo r  the moment, 
then , th ere  i s  no opportun ity  fo r  change o f r e t in a l  
va lu es independent o f eye movements, and so the 
experim ental s it u a t io n  a t  is s u e  cannot serve  to 
d if f e r e n t ia t e  the t h e o r ie s .  One circum stance th a t would 
perm it d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  i s  where the in v e r t in g  le n se s  or 
m irrors are a ttached  to the eye rath er  than to the head, 
such th at they move w ith  the e y e s . In th is  c a s e , the 
d ir e c t io n  of eye-movements and r e t in a l  d ir e c t io n  are 
d ivorced , and eye movements remain co -o rd in a te  w ith  hand 
and fo o t movements. This i s  the r e a l t e s t  of the  
Berkeley/Rock h y p o th e s is . For i f  ad ap tation  i s  p o ss ib le  
h e r e , th ere  are indeed two cod es, v is u a l  and motor, 
whose c o -o r d in a tio n  i s  sim ply a m atter o f acquiring  
a s s o c ia t io n s .  As fa r  as the theory d iscu sse d  here i s  
concerned, th is  circum stance i s  rath er l ik e  knowing an 
o b je ct by accommodating the grasp of the hand to  i t ,  and 
then f in d in g  th a t t h is  was not v e r id ic a l  a g a in st  
exp loratory  movements of th e  hand and f in g e r s .  This must 
be extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  to adapt to . N e v e r th e le ss , the 
p r e d ic tio n  i s  not n e c e s s a r i ly  no a d a p ta tio n . What i s  
being argued here i s  th a t p ercep tio n  as a form of 
con sc iou sn ess i s  on ly  p o s s ib le  as co n sc io u sn ess  of
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p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  a c t io n . O rie n ta tio n , p o s i t io n ,  shape 
are a l l  forms of s p a t ia l  c o n sc io u sn ess , th a t i s  
con sc iou sn ess of th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of movement and a c t io n .  
There are two s o r ts  o f a c tio n s  re lev a n t h e r e , 
instrum ental and e x p lo ra to r y . Instrum ental a c tio n  takes  
p la ce  w ith  the body and ex p lo ra to ry , with the e y e s ,  
t y p ic a l ly .  They are not e n t ir e ly  sep arate  c la s s e s ,  of 
cou rse. Each whole body a c tio n  brings about a change in  
the v isu a l f i e l d ,  as does each head movement, whether or 
not they are performed fo r  purely  in strum ental p u rp oses- 
However, the body or the head can be con sid ered  in  
i s o la t io n  as organs of a c tio n ;  r e tin a s  are not in  
them selves organs of a c t io n . I f  adaptation  o c c u r s , i t  
w i l l  be no lon ger  p o s s ib le  to d is t in g u is h  a l e v e l  ;diich  
remains the same; th ere  w i l l  be no turning back the  
a tte n t io n  and f in d in g  th a t th in gs are not under 
in sp ectio n  what they were supposed. A daptation  must 
needs be com p lete. T h is , of co u rse , i s  to  say th a t  
r e t in a l  va lu es must change, th at there i s  no p o s s ib i l i t y  
of a change or ad ap tation  of eye movements w ithout t h i s .
Our theory i s  four s ta g e ;
(1 ) sen sori-m otor  c o -o r d in a tio n .
(2 ) lack  of stran gen ess  due to changes in  the co n ten ts  
of e p iso d ic  memory.
(3) d i s t a l  a d a p ta tio n , due to h ab it memory.
(4) proximal a d a p ta tio n , due to h ab it memory.
I t  i s  p red icted  th a t(4 )  does not occur w ith  s p e c ta c le s ,  
but does w ith  l e n s e s .  There i s  a report in  the
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l i t e r a t u r e  th a t seems to co n tra d ic t t h i s .  Taylor (1966) 
reports th a t h is  su b je c t , P apert, claim ed com plete  
adaptation  of the type being d isc u sse d . However, 
P ap ert'8 r e p o r ts  a lso  make i t  abundantly c le a r  th a t h is  
f i e ld  of v i s io n  was so r e s t r ic t e d  th a t he could not 
procure in form ation  by eye-movements, th a t he had to  
sample the world by head movements, This makes h is  
s itu a t io n  fu n c t io n a lly  id e n t ic a l  to  the len s  s it u a t io n .  
There are se v e r a l rep o r ts  o f d if f e r e n t  s o r ts  of p a r t ia l  
p ercep tu al ad ap ta tion  which are in terp re ted  as 
in term ed ia te  s t a t e s .  These are common in  reverse  
p o la r ity  s i t u a t io n s ,  p a r tly  because t h is  i s  where they  
would be n o t ic e d , but a lso  because p o la r ity  i s  an 
a ll-o r -n o th in g  th in g  which does not a llow  fo r  the same 
so r t  of gradual change as t i l t  or d isp lacem en t. The most 
common form i s  th a t sometimes th in g s appear one way and 
sometimes the o th e r . This seems to occur a t both the 
proximal and d i s t a l  r e p r esen ta tio n s  in so fa r  as one can 
judge from the r e p o r ts . This does not seem to  favour any 
p a r tic u la r  th eory , e x c ep t, perhaps, th a t i t  might be 
sa id  to favour learn in g  th e o r ie s  over r e c a lib r a t io n  
th e o r ie s .
There are cases where p arts  of the v isu a l world 
seem normal and o th er p arts rev ersed . Perhaps the most 
obvious ca ses  in vo lve  w r itin g ; th e re  are rep orts  of 
in c id e n ts  where cars are seen  tr a v e l l in g  on the co rrect  
(re-n orm alised ) s id e  o f the road, but w ith  number p la te s  
rev ersed , and rep orts of b u ild in g s  the r ig h t  way round,
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but w ith  the l e t t e r in g  on p osters on the w a lls  s t i l l  
rev ersed . Here i t  i s  c le a r  th a t the d is t a l  
r e p r e se n ta tio n , the rep resen ta tio n  in  terms of b od ily  
movements i s  adapted , but the proxim al r e p r e se n ta tio n , 
the r e p r e se n ta tio n  in  terms of eye movements i s  n o t. 
This i s  to  be expected  in  most cases where sp e c ta c le s  
are worn. A v a r ia t io n  on th is  so r t  of case i s  the 
su b ject of a debate between Howard and Templeton and 
Taylor (Howard and Templeton, 1966). The is su e  i s  a 
report by a su b je c t  of K ohler's who, when w alking in to  a 
room w ith  a window, saw a l l  the o b je c ts  in  the room the  
r ig h t  way up, and everyth ing  o u ts id e  the room ( i . e .  
everyth ing  seen  through the window) as upside doxm. 
Taylor cla im s t h a t ,  i f  asked to draw what had been seen , 
the r e s u lt  would have been a drawing w ith  the o b jects
in s id e  the room in  the usu al o r ie n ta t io n , a md
everyth ing  o u ts id e  th e  room in  the reverse  o r ie n ta t io n .  
Howard and Templeton take the view  th a t the experience  
could not be captured by a drawing a t  a l l ,  but any 
drawing made would have to  show both p a r ts  of the v isu a l  
world in  the same o r ie n ta t io n . Since the su b ject was
wearing g o g g le s , and hence would have adapted in  terms 
of h is  d i s t a l  r e p r e se n ta tio n , but not h is  proxim al, the 
theory proposed h ere  p r e d ic ts  th at i f  the task  was s e t  
a fterw ard s, the outcome would have been as Taylor 
p r e d ic ts ,  but had th e  task  been s e t  in  the s itu a t io n  
w ith the s u b j e c t 's  a tte n tio n  drawn to the fea tu r e s  of
the proximal r e p r e se n ta tio n , the outcome would have been 
as suggested  by Howard and Templeton. In any c a se , th ese
166
in stan ces  provide strong support fo r  the th eory .
The th ir d  so r t  of case in v o lv e s  gh ost o b je c t s . One 
of K oh ler's s u b je c t 's  reported  se e in g  m irror w r itin g  
between l in e s  of norm alised w r it in g , and Papert reported  
seein g  two c h a ir s , one in  the norm alised p o s it io n  and 
the other in  the rev ersed . These were both w ith  the s e t  
up p rev io u sly  d escr ib ed , where, although s p e c ta c le s  
rather than le n s e s  were worn, v is u a l  ex p lo ra tio n  was a 
m atter of head movements ra th er  than eye movements. 
Another p o s s ib i l t y  i s  th a t the gh osts  rep resen t the  
e f f e c t s  of ad ap ta tion  to re-arrangem ent a f fe c t in g  eye  
movements one way and head movements the o th e r , 
requiring  a double s p a t ia l  va lu e  fo r  each r e t in a l  p o in t .  
That r e t in a l  p o in ts  are capable of taking two such 
valu es i s  known from the e x is te n c e  of monocular d ip lo p ia  
a fte r  op eration  fo r  the c o r r e c tio n  of stj^abismus.
The c r u c ia l  experim ent rem ains, however, w ith  
in v ertin g  or rev ers in g  prism s or m irrors attached to  the 
e y e . This has not been performed s a t i s f a c t o r a l ly .  
However, F e stin g e r  e t  a l (1967) have performed a s e r ie s  
o f experim ents on the r e la t io n  between eye and hand 
movements and a d a p ta tio n , in c lu d in g  one w ith  v e r t i c a l ly  
mounted wedge prism s inducing curvature attached to  the 
ey e . They e x p l i c i t l y  lin k ed  th e ir  work to an e f fe r e n t  
theory of c o n sc io u sn e ss , th a t i s  to  an a c tio n  based 
theory of the so r t  proposed h e r e . Welch (1 9 7 4 ), 
review ing th e ir  work sums up;
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"They argued th a t i f  sensory inform ation  from an 
o p t ic a l ly  curved contour comes to induce an e ffe r e n t  
read in ess to  make a s tr a ig h t  motor movement (eye and/or 
lim b ), the l in e  w i l l  be p erceived  as s tr a ig h t  ( i . e .  
adaptation  w i l l  have occurred ."
Their experim ents supported th is  v iew . U n fortu n ately , 
however, d e s p ite  the fa c t  th a t they performed v ir tu a l ly  
the same experim ent once w ith  the d e v ice  attached to the 
e y e s , and once to the head, they d id  not d i f f e r e n t ia te  
the two types or le v e ls  of a d a p ta tio n . Burnham (1968) 
and Gyr and W ille y  (1970) a lso  supported th is  
h y p o th e s is .
I t  was argued e a r l ie r  th a t the tr a d it io n a l  idea of 
a se n sa tio n  was in  fa c t  a compound of twin id e a s , one 
d eriv in g  from a fu n c tio n a l a n a ly s is  of the percep tual 
process -  a p ercep tu a l atom -  and one d er iv in g  from a 
phenom enological a n a ly s is  -  a mode of look in g at the 
w orld. This mode, i t  turns o u t, i s  eq u iv a len t to see in g  
the world as a s e t  of affordances fo r  eye movements. The 
other r e le v a n t  mode c o n s is t s  of se e in g  the world as a 
s e t  of a ffordances for  body movements. The actu a l 
affordances s ig n a lle d  by a p a r t ic u la r  p a ttern  of l ig h t  
at the r e t in a  can be a lte r e d . They can be a lte r e d  for  
body part movements, but not fo r  eye movements, or they  
can be a lte r ed  fo r  b oth . They cannot be a lte r e d  fo r  eye 
movements a lo n e . E ith er  so r t  of a l te r a t io n  produces 
ad ap tation , but of a d if f e r e n t  s o r t .  Both are p ercep tual
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a d ap ta tion , s in c e  p e rcep tio n  i s  ju s t  consciou sn ess of 
the s e t  of a fford an ces fo r  p a r t ic u la r  so r ts  of a c t io n .  
However, I t  i s  the second s o r t  th a t c o n s t itu te s  the 
change in  the 'a c tu a l appearance of th in g s' th a t has 
been a t i s s u e .  Im p ortantly , the f i r s t  so r t rep resen ts  
something more than sen sori-m otor  r e -c o o r d in a tio n , which 
precedes i t  and i s  a n ecessary  co n d itio n  o f i t .  This 
r e -c o o r d in a tio n  i s  a ch iev ed , to a large e x te n t , by 
lea r n in g , though th ere  may be some r e -c a lib r a t io n  
independent of le a r n in g .
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CHAPTER 7 : CoNCLOôXOfsi.
7 .1  CONCLUSION.
T his t h e s is  has been an attem pt to o u t lin e  a theory  
of v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n . I n i t i a l l y ,  two c r i t e r ia  were s e t  
out by which such a theory should be judged. The f i r s t  
was th at i t  should be ab le  to  account fo r  the phenomena 
w ith in  i t s  range of a p p lic a t io n ;  th a t i s ,  in  th is  c a s e , 
i t  should be able to  account fo r  the phenomena u su a lly  
subsumed under v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n , th in gs l ik e  o b jec t  
r e c o g n it io n , space p e r c e p tio n , and so on. In t h is  
c o n te x t , the phenomena are a l l  the so r ts  of th in gs th at  
o r d in a r ily  c o n s t itu te  t h is  s o r t  of v i s io n .  I t  does not 
mean a l l  the arcane e f f e c t s  reorted  from p sy c h o lo g ica l 
la b o r a to r ie s .  This i s  p a r t ly  because we are d ea lin g  w ith  
an o u t l in e ,  but a lso  p a r t ly  because th is  i s  the b e st  and 
s a f e s t  way to proceed . C on tro lled  experim entation  d oes, 
of co u rse , have i t s  p la c e , but not as the b a s is  fo r  
sp e c u la t io n  or th e o r is in g  about v isu a l p ercep tion  in  
g e n e r a l. Indu ction  on such an a r t i f i c i a l ,  narrow, and 
s e le c t iv e  data base i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  s t e r i l e ,  and claim s  
to p r a c t is e  the h y p o th e tico -d ed u ctiv e  method are sim ply  
d isin gen u ou s. V isu a l p ercep tio n  i s  part of our l i f e ;  we 
know what i t  i s  we are try in g  to d escr ib e  and e x p la in , 
and we know i t  by other and fa r  more powerful means than 
doing p sy c h o lo g ica l exp erim en ts. Once we are provided
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w ith  th e o r ie s , i t  may be th a t experim ents can s e le c t  
between them, o r , much more l ik e l y ,  can a t l e a s t  add 
w eight to  one account ra th er  than another. For t h is  
reason , the e a r l i e r  and la r g e r  part of the t h e s i s  i s  
la r g e ly  taken up w ith  th e o r ie s  which p h ilosop h ers have 
proposed on the b a s is  of knowledge and exp erien ce  th a t  
we a l l  have access  to  as human b e in g s . However, no 
attem pt has been made to  keep modern psychology out of 
t h is  s e c t io n , and wherever i t  has seemed appropriate  
referen ce  has been made to  experim ental work on the same 
t o p ic s .
The second c r i t e r io n  was th a t any model proposed  
should a llow  p la u s ib le  th e o r ie s  of other p sy c h o lo g ic a l  
fu n c tio n s; th a t i s ,  i t  should be com patible w ith  what we 
know about the r e la t io n s h ip  between p ercep tion  and o th er  
areas of p sy c h o lo g ic a l fu n c tio n in g , such as em otion , 
a c tio n , thought and sp eech . T h is, of cou rse , r e in fo r c e s  
the p o in ts  made above w ith  resp ect to  a llo w in g  the  
r ic h e s t  p o ss ib le  phenomenal b a se . I t  a lso  e x e r c is e s  a 
strong independent fo rc e  of i t s  own. 'What we know' 
about the r e la t io n sh ip  between p ercep tion  and a c tio n  i s ,  
of cou rse , c o n te n tio u s , but there i s  a strong case th at  
t h is  i s  not an e x te r n a l r e la t io n s h ip . So, we are look in g  
fo r  th e o r ie s  th at in c lu d e  concepts l ik e  'a c t io n  schema' 
which capture t h is  s o r t  of r e la t io n s h ip , ra th er  than 
concepts l ik e  'a s s o c ia t io n '  which m erely a s s e r t  a 
m echanical l in k .
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On the c r i t e r i a  d isc u sse d , the in te r e s t in g  th e o r ie s  
are those of B erkeley  and Kant, There a r e , however, 
other more or l e s s  im p l ic i t  c r i t e r ia .  These are th a t  the 
theory should be p la u s ib le ,  not only p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly ,  
but e p is te m o lo g ic a lly  and b io lo g ic a l ly .  These l a s t  two 
turn out to be the same. S c h e llin g  saw t h i s ,  and h is  
theory r e f l e c t s  th is  w ith i t s  s o r t  of 
q u a s i-e v o lu tio n ism . However, only in  Macmurray do we g e t  ^
a r e a lly  p la u s ib le  s to r y  of how a v e r id ic a l ,  v is u a l  
con sc iou sn ess can emerge as an asp ect of an organism 's  
adaptation  to an environment through and fo r  a c t io n  in  
th a t environm ent. The r e s t  of the th e s is  can be seen  as 
an attem pt to  put some p sy ch o lo g ica l f l e s h  on 
Macmurray's p h ilo so p h ic a l sk e le to n , and to r e la t e  the 
r e s u lt  to some work in  modern experim ental p sych o logy .
The theory presen ted  here depends a g rea t d ea l on 
th a t of J .J .  G ibson. Like th a t , i t  s ta te s  th a t v is u a l  
p ercep tion  i s  a m atter of the a c t iv e  seek in g  out of  
in form ation; th a t  t h is  search i s  conducted a g a in s t  the  
p attern  of l ig h t  f a l l in g  a t the eye and not upon the  
con ten ts of some p r im itiv e  la y er  o f co n sc io u sn ess; th a t  
th is  search i s  guided by schemata; th a t th e se  schemata 
can d i f f e r e n t ia t e ,  and thus become capable of p ick in g  up 
more e la b o ra te  and complex pattern s of in v a r ia n ce; th at  
the pick-up of em otional tone or any o th er  so r t  of 
valen ce i s  s im ila r ly  the d e tec tio n  of h ig h - le v e l  
pattern s of in v a r ia n ce  under the guidance o f appropriate  
schemata. I t  d i f f e r s  in  the b e l ie f  th a t the a c tu a l
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con ten t and exp erien ce  of the p ercep tio n  i s  determ ined, 
not by the re ce p tio n  of the in form ation  from the  
environm ent, but by the a c t iv a t io n  of the h y p o th e s is . 
This i s  an im portant d iffe r e n c e  in  i t s  own r ig h t ,  but i t  
a lso  r ep resen ts  a change of emphasis in  th a t i t  
d e le g it im is e s  G ibson's contempt fo r  what goes on in  the 
head. This work may be seen  as an attem pt to g iv e  th is  
output v e r s io n  of G ibson 's theory a p rocess  
in te r p r e ta t io n .
Of co u r se , N e isser  has p r e v io u sly  w r itte n  on the 
same theme. He has produced an o u t lin e  theory of a model 
of v is u a l  p e r c ep tio n , w hich, l ik e  the one g iven  h e r e , i s  
intended to in corp orate  G ibson's in s ig h t s  in  a so r t  of 
p rocess m odel, and re feren ce  has been made to t h is  work 
throughout. However, he s ta y s  to  c lo s e  to G ibson. His 
percep tual c y c le s  are very c lo s e  to  what i s  su ggested  in  
chapter 4 , but the most obvious in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  th at  
the a ctu a l p ercep tio n  i s  a r e s u lt  o f the input ph ase, or 
perhaps th a t th e  two phases are so c lo s e ly  and
d eterm in ately  locked to g e th e r , th a t i t  makes no
d if fe r e n c e . Of co u rse , they are locked to g eth er  in  th ese  
s itu a t io n s  where the in form ation  p resen t in  the l ig h t  i s  
more than enough to un iq u ely  s p e c ify  the stim ulus
c o n fig u r a tio n . As fa r  as Gibson and N e isse r  are 
concerned t h is  i s  true over the whole range of norm al, 
e c o lo g ic a l  p e rcep tio n . This i s  sim ply not the c a s e ,
however. The e f f e c t s  of m otiva tion  and s e t  are f a c t s  of
everyday l i f e ,  and e s p e c ia l ly  of c l i n i c a l  l i f e .
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N e isse r  a s s im ila te s  a t te n t io n  to the a c t iv i t y  of 
inform ation  p ick -u p . He cla im s th a t there i s  nothing  
more to  a t te n t io n  than the op era tion  of one p ercep tual 
cy c le  rath er  than an oth er . He g iv e s  as an example 
watching one of two games superimposed on a v id e o . 
According to h is  th eo ry , i f  the su b je c t  a tten d s to  only  
one game, i . e .  operates only one p ercep tu a l c y c le ,  he 
should p ick  up noth ing of the o th er game. S u rely , th is  
i s  not the c a s e .  Nothing i s  p icked up of i t s  s tr u c tu re  
as a game, th a t  i s  tr u e , but what about i t s  s p a t ia l  
s tr u c tu r e . We would, s u r e ly , be ab le  to  a n t ic ip a te  
c o l l i s i o n s  between the two s e t s  of p la y e r s . Of cou rse, 
N e isser  a llow s th a t we sometimes do more than one thing  
a t a tim e, op erate  more than one p ercep tu a l c y c le .
However, su r e ly  h is  theory would p r e d ic t  two p ercep tual 
worlds in  t h is  c a se , ra th er  l ik e  when we watch
t e l e v is io n  and cook a meal a t the same tim e. Of cou rse , 
the fa c t  i s  th a t th e  worlds are p e r fe c t ly  in teg ra ted  as 
regards th e ir  s p a t ia l  s tr u c tu r e . N e isser  tr e a ts  
p ercep tu a l c y c le s  more or l e s s  as s in g le  u n i t s .  However, 
th ere  must be l e v e l s ,  and they must brush across each 
other ra th er  than be r ig id ly  l in k e d . Indeed, i f  they  
were r ig id ly  lin k ed  any s h i f t  from o f a t te n t io n  would 
r e s u lt  in  a sudden, com plete tran sform ation  of the 
p ercep tu a l w orld , w ith  people and th in gs appearing and 
disap p earin g  as g h o s ts , and, as N e isse r  h im se lf p o in ts  
o u t, t h is  i s  ju s t  what does not happen. This does not
co n tra d ic t  what was sa id  in  chapter 2 about our not
seein g  everyth in g  th ere  to be se en . What happens i s  th at
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we always have an up- dated rep r ese n ta tio n  of th e  space  
around us a t a r e la t iv e ly  crude l e v e l ,  and i t  i s  w ith in  
th is  framework th a t more s p e c i f ic  schemata may operate  
or n o t.
We have presen ted  an o u t lin e  of a theory o f v isu a l  
p ercep tio n  as one mode of op eration  of a more genera l 
fa c u lty  fo r  th e  c r e a t io n  of images fo r  the p lanning and 
c o n tro l of a c t io n  in  sp ace . This i s  a complex theory  
made up of a number of p ro p o sitio n s w hich, although  
c lo s e ly  r e la te d , are lo g ic a l ly  independent. These are  
th a t v is io n  i s  s p e c i f i c a l ly  adapted fo r  the c o n tr o l of 
b od ily  a c tio n ; th a t  i t  i s  dependent on b o d ily  a c tio n ;  
and th a t i t  i s  a form of a c t io n . We have seen  how these  
p ro p o sitio n s  have appeared s in g ly  and in  com bination in  
p rev io u s, m ainly p h ilo so p h ic a l, th e o r ie s  of space  
p e rcep tio n , and how th e ir  nature has changed as the 
d u a lis t  and i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t  assumptions were ch a llen ged  
by s u c c e ss iv e  c r i t i c s .  Of co u rse , from such a complex 
theory a very  la rg e  number o f em p irica l hypotheses can 
be d er iv ed . Some of th ese  w i l l  be obvious and/or 
t r i v i a l ,  and some xd .ll be so xddely accepted as to be no 
longer in  se r io u s  d is p u te . An example o f the la t t e r  
might be th a t lea rn in g  can a f fe c t  p ercep tion  a t  l e a s t  at 
the l e v e l  of o r g a n isa t io n . There rem ains, however, a 
su b s ta n t ia l  number which req u ire  defen cq . One of th ese  
might be the cla im  th at h igh er  l e v e l ,  presum ably  
learn ed , p ro cesses  can a f f e c t  the a c tu a l s e n s ib le  
m a te r ia l, i . e .  co lou r and form, of xfhat i s  p erce iv ed .
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However, I t  turns out th a t what i s  a t is su e  here i s  not 
the a c tu a l experim ental f a c t s ,  but th e ir  in te r p r e ta t io n .  
I t  i s  not in  d isp u te  th a t ,  in  many c a s e s , su b je c ts
report more than or o th er  than what i s  r e a l ly  th ere  in  a 
d isp la y  e x a c t ly  as i f  i t  were th ere  in  the d is p la y .
However, some e x p la in  t h is  in  terms of im agination or
memory, or anything but p e r c e p tio n . Of co u rse , the  
d is t in c t io n  between im ag in ation  and p ercep tion  i s  not 
allow ed in  the theory defended h e r e , nor th at between 
memory and p ercep tio n , and so m atters of experim ental 
fa c t  become m atters of t h e o r e t ic a l  in te r p r e ta t io n .  
N e v e r th e le ss , we would want the theory  to be com patible  
a t l e a s t  w ith  very s p e c i f i c  d e t a i l s  of experim ental 
f in d in g s  in  im portant a r e a s . We have shown th is  fo r
ad ap ta tion  to  o p t ic a l  re-arrangem ent. This i s  p e c u lia r ly  
s ig n if ic a n t  s in c e  i t  shows th a t the le v e l  of s e n s ib le  
m a ter ia l i s  n e g o t ia b le , and i s  n e g o tia b le  w ith  r esp ec t  
to  b o d ily  a c tio n  and a c t iv e  touch.
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